Modern constitutional development in China

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MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

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MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

BY

HAROLD MONK VINACKE

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIEN'CF.
IN MIAMI UNIVERSITY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1920

Copyright, 1920, by
Princeton Universitv Press

Published 1920
Printed in the United States of America

TO MY MOTHER

PREFACE:
In the following pages modern Chinese history, from the
constitutional point of view, is treated as a continuous develop-
ment since the inception of reform in 1898 under the Emperor
Kuang Hsii. It was only gradually that China was brought
to a realization of the necessity for change in her political
structure. During the years prior to 1898, it became apparent
to a few in the country that the Chinese house must be re-
paired if it was to remain standing. The "Hundred Days" of
reform in 1898 marked the attempt to patch up, without seri-
ously altering, the existing structure. The fundamental na-
ture of the alterations necessary, however, was not appreciated
at that time. With the failure of the reform movement came
a reaction against change. This reaction against the 'new'
culminated in the Boxer uprising. The disastrous termination
of the anti-foreign movement brought a deeper realization of
the need for radical reforms. The reforms undertaken in-
volved the introduction of a measure of representative gov-
ernment into China. But although committed to the idea of
change, the rulers of China were not prepared to move rapidly
enough to satisfy the radical element in the reform party and
revolution resulted. The revolutionary ideas marked a de-
cided break with the past. Since the revolution of 191 1, the
history of China has been the attempt to find a middle ground,
suited to the needs of the country, between the old traditional
life of the State, and the new conceptions of governmental
relationships brought to the East from the West. No change.

vn

viii Preface

whether m the nature of progression or retrogression, stands
by itself, but each hnks itself naturally with the antecedent
and the subsequent condition. That fact of itself justifies the
attempt to trace the threads of constitutional development in
modern China. The endeavor is further justified by the out-
standing importance to the world of the Far Eastern question
which cannot be divorced from the internal history of China.

The material for the first two chapters has been drawn
largely from such authoritative secondary works as H. B.
Morse's "International Relations of the Chinese Empire,"
Smith's ''China in Convulsion," and "China under the Empress
Dowager," by Bland and Backhouse (1910 edition). The
succeeding chapters have been written from a study of the
documents, and from knowledge of the situation gained dur-
ing residence in China. Where the interpretation of a fact or
event has been given in the form of a quotation, it has been
because the words quoted have expressed the point of view
of the present writer.

It is impossible here to make more than a general acknow-
ledgment of the aid given by friends both in China and the
United States in the preparation of this study. Grateful
acknowledgment is due, however, to the aid given and sug-
gestions made by Professors W. W. Willoughby and W. F.
Willoughby, and Professor Henry Jones Ford, who read and
criticised the entire manuscript; to Dr. S. K. Hornbeck who
read and gave valuable suggestions as to the first half of the
book; and to Professor E. S. Corwnn. The writer is under a
further debt of gratitude to his wife for her aid in the gather-
ing of materials, in the preparation of the manuscript, and in
the reading of the proofs of the book.

Harold Monk Vinacke.
Oxford, Ohio, 8 August, 1920.

CONTENTS

Chapter I. The old order and the foreign impact.

Chapter II. The K'ang Yu-vvei reform movement.

Chapter III. Constitutional Development under the Man-

chus 1900 to 1908.

Chapter IV. Constitutional Development under the Man-

chus. Second period 1908 to 191 1.

Chapter V. Constitutional aspects of the Revolution.

Chapter VI. The Nanking Constitution.

Chapter VII. Government under the Constitutional Com-
pact.

Chapter VIII. An interlude — The monarchy movement.

Chapter IX. The Republic after the Restoration.

Chapter X. The triumph of the "Military "

Chapter XI. Conclusion.

IX

CHAPTER I

For generations prior to the end of the nineteenth century
China had been pohtically in a state of suspended animation.
Life had continued but there had been Httle growth and to the
casual observer, almost no perceptible decay in her institutions.
Dynasties rose and fell without seriously affecting the politi-
cal organization of the country. One barbarian rule after an-
other was imposed on the "sons of Han," yet, after the con-
quest, the conquerors ruled according to the accepted customs
and traditions. Then, within a period of less than twenty
years, the whole political system was outwardly and rather
ostentatiously changed. The form of a constitutional mon-
archy was substituted for the paternal despotism of the past,
and, almost immediately, the limited monarchy gave way to a
republic. Political change does not come unheralded in any
country, certainly not in a State ruled by custom and tradi-
tion as China had for so long been. But it is not easy to show
why any change comes in the life of a nation, and it is not
always profitable to undertake such a task. In order to fol-
low the course of modern constitutional or political develop-
ment in China, however, it is necessary : ( i ) to appreciate the 1
conditions which created the necessity for reform and change ;
and (2) to discover wdiy those conditions led to a change in
the political structure instead of a simple change of dynasty.
This understanding can be best gained by means of a brief
description of the organization of the government under the
Manchus, together with a discussion of some of the new prob-
lems the Empire had to face during the last years of Manchu
rule.

2 Modern C onstihitional Development in China

At the head of the governmental organization stood the
Emperor. In theory he wielded the absolute power of life
and death over his subjects. In him were vested all of the
prerogatives of government : executive, legislative, and judi-
cial. The Imperial Mandates had the force of law; the Em-
peror was the highest court of judicial appeal in the land, the
stroke of the "vermillion pencil" being final; he had the abso-
lute power of appointment and dismissal. In short, he was
the typical despot of the Oriental Court. Practically, how-
ever, he was limited in the use of his powers by the strength
of custom over the minds of the people; by the laws estab-
lished by his predecessors; and because he could enforce his
will only so far as his agents were willing to carry out his
commands. The Emperor ruled as the "Son of Heaven," but
if he was unable to preserve order in the Empire, or if he
failed to respect the customs of the people, it was felt that
he had exhausted the "mandate of Heaven," and the people
held themselves justified in deposing him. "The Chinese con-
fer on their Emperor absolute power, but argue that when
they are oppressed it does not proceed from the absolute
power of the Emperor, but rather from a want of proper ap-
preciation of his high duties, and that when the Emperor is
thus guilty, they are under no obligation to countenance or
obey him."^

Assisting the Emperor in the performance of his extensive
duties was, at first, the Grand Secretariat (Nei Ko) ; to which
was added about 1730 the Grand Council (Kun Ki-chu). It
was the duty of the Grand Secretariat to deliberate on mat-
ters connected with the government of the realm; to find out
the will of the Emperor and to see that it was proclaimed
throughout the Empire. The Grand Council, which usually

^ Jernigan, "China in Law and Commerce," p. 56.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 3

consisted of five members, gradually displaced the Grand Sec-
retariat, becoming the actual Privy Council of the Emperor.^
Its duties also were to deliberate and advise on the affairs of
the State in the presence of the Emperor. While the advice of
the Grand Council was always sought, it was not always fol-
lowed, the Throne having the final decision of every question.
The actual administration of the affairs of the nation was not,
however, carried on by the council but was in the hands of
the six Boards (increased to seven by the creation of the
Tsungli Yamen,^ or Foreign Board, in 1861) i.e. the Boards
of Civil Office, Revenue, Rites, War, Punishment, and Works.
Before passing on to the jDrovincial system one branch of
the central administration deserves especial mention. The
only body in the Empire with the right directly to criticise
the Emperor was the Censorate. The duty of the Censors
was to criticise, and "this duty they exercised without fear,
though not always without favor.""* No cjuestion affecting
the interest of the State was too great, and none too small for
their scrutiny. The scope of their work can be judged from
the name, "The All Examining Court." Thus the Censorate,
says Williams, had "the care of manners and customs, the in-
vestigation of all public offices within and without the capital,
the discrimination between the good and bad performance of

- Membership in the Grand Secretariat continued to be the
highest honor attainable, however, although in later yeafs, when
it had been superseded by the Grand Council, it had come to be
a mere Court of Archives. Morse, Trade and Administration,
pp. 42-43.

^ The Tsungli Yamen (Foreign Board), dealing with the prob-
lems of foreign intercourse, the most pressing questions of the
day, was gradually increased in size and power until, in 1876,
its membership included all of the members of the Grand Coun-
cil, and none who were not at least President or Vice-president
of a Board. Morse, Trade and Administration, p. 42.

* Morse, "Trade and Administration of China," p. 46.

4 Modem Constitutional Development in China

their business, and between the depravity and uprightness of
the officers employed in them."^ It was largely through the
Censors that the Emperor was able to keep in touch with
public sentiment throughout his domains, and because they
did give an expression, albeit imperfect, to public opinion
they constituted one of the few effective checks on the ex-
ercise of the Imperial power. But the effectiveness of the
check was greatly lessened by the fact that the Censorate did
not act as an organic whole, but that each member acted inde-
pendently of the others.^ Thus the censors lost the force that
goes with united action. It was also lessened by the fact
that in the later days of the Dynasty, under the Empress Tzu
Hsi, criticism of the Government was liable to subject the
critic to severe punishment for his temerity. In spite of the
limitations of the Censorate, however, it is important to note
that there was a way by which the sovereign could keep in-
formed of the actions of his officials and could be reminded
of his own obligations to the people.

While the power of the Emperor was supreme its exercise
was delegated to his personal representatives throughout the
Empire. For administrative purposes the provinces were
grouped into viceroyalties. In two of the provinces, Chihli

^ Williams, "The Middle Kingdom," vol. I, p. 430. In theory
and practice the action of the censorate often differed. In theory
the Censors held before the Emperor the ideals of government
set forth by Confucius and his followers. In practice it was un-
fortunately often true, as Weale says (Reshaping of Far East,
p. 220) that the "Censorate stands, censoring those acts which
are not acceptable because no bribe had been paid." But even
in the last years of the Manchu rule there were Censors who put
their duty before even their lives. Men were always to be found
of the type of Wu K'o-tu who committed suicide as the highest
protest against the act of Tzu Hsi (the Empress Dowager) in
not providing the proper heir for the Emperor T'ung Chih.

^ See Colquhoun, '*China in Transformation," p. 287.

Modern Constitittlonal Development in China 5

and Szechtian, the Viceroy had only the administration of the
one province. In all other cases he had supervision over two
or more. In addition to the Viceroy each province had a
Governor, except where the Viceroy himself exercised direct
control. Both Viceroy and Governor were responsible to the
Crown and had the right of directly petitioning the Emperor/
Both were honorary members of the Censorate and had the
right of criticism that went with membership in that body.

Subject only to the final supervision of the Emperor and
the central administration, these highest provincial officials ex-
ercised as absolute a power in the government of their prov-
inces as the Emperor did over the whole country. As Morse
says : "The Provinces are satrapies to the extent that so long
as the tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and the gen-
eral policy of the central administration followed, they are
free to administer their own affairs in detail as may seem best
to their own provincial authorities."® From this it follows
that the administration of the laws, and the carrying out of
tlie Imperial orders varied from province to province in ac-
cordance with the interests and the initiative of the Governor
or Viceroy. This was true as late as 1900, when Yuan Shih-
kai in Shantung, and Liu K'un-yi in the Liang-Kiang, refused
to carry out the anti-foreign policy of the Court, while in
other parts of the Empire foreigners were being murdered
and their property destroyed.

So long as he sent in his apportionment of the Imperial
revenue, then, and did not come openly into conflict with the
policy of the central government, the Governor of each prov-
ince exercised an absolute control over the territory assigned
to him. His power was limited only by his fear of the re-
moval power of the Emperor, and by his ability to have his will

^ In position the Governor ranked with, but after the Viceroy.
" "Trade and Administration," p. 46.

6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

carried out in the province. He was directly responsible to the
Emperor for the maintenance of peace and order in his prov-
ince, and because of this responsibility, he was careful, in most
cases, not to take any action antagonistic to the desires and in-
terests of the people. In order that he might not be able to
establish himself so firmly in his post as to be tempted to set
up an independent rule, a Governor or Viceroy was commonly
appointed for a term of three years, with the possibility of one
renewal, after which he would be transferred to another prov-
ince. Li Hung-chang provided one of the notable exceptions
to the rule, being maintained as Viceroy of Chihli province for
over twenty years. A high provincial official was never ap-
pointed to a post in his native province.

Assisting the Governor in the actual administration was the
provincial treasurer, who was the head of the civil service, as
well as the chief fiscal agent of the province; the provincial
judge, who was the final (provincial) court of appeal; the
salt comptroller ; and the grain intendent. These four officials
constituted the deliberative and executive council of the pro-
vincial government, and, with the Governor and the Viceroy,
formed the general provincial administration residing at the
capital of the province.

For administrative purposes each province was divided into
Hsien, Chow or T'ing; several Hsien together formed a de-
partment or prefecture; and two or more Prefectures would
be united in a Circuit. Thus the largest subdivision was the
Circuit and the smallest the Hsien. "The unit for admin-
istrative purposes within the province is the Hsien or Dis-
trict;— two or three or more (up to five or six) Districts col-
lectively form a Fu or Prefecture; and two or more Prefec-
tures are placed under the jurisdiction of a Taotai. . . . The
Chow and the T'ing proper are a superior kind of Hsien, be-
ing component parts of a Fu;.the Chihli-chow and Chihli-

Modern Constitutional Development in China 7

T'ing are an inferior kind of Fu, both having as direct a re-
lation to the provincial government as a Fu, but the latter dis-
tinguished from the Fu by having no Hsien subordinated to

it."^

All the provincial officials, down to the Hsien magistrate,
were appointed directly by the central government. The Pre-
fect exercised the delegated authority of the Governor in his
prefecture, and was held responsible for its share of the reve-
nue of the province, as well as for the maintenance of order
in his jurisdiction. However, he dealt more with the external
relations of his Fu than with its internal administration, and
was rather a channel of communication than an executive
officer. He acted as the court of appeal from the Hsien's
court.

The Hsien (district magistrate) was the foundation of the
administrative system. He was the lowest official appointed
by the central government and in many ways was the most im-
portant officer of the administration. His work brought him
into direct touch with the people and thus he came to personify
the power of government to the mass of the population. In
the transference of responsibility it all came ultimately to the
Hsien. Just as the Governor was responsible for his prov-
ince, so the magistrate was responsible for the proper exercise
of all of the prerogatives of government in his district. An
enumeration of some of his functions will serve to show his
importance. He was police magistrate, deciding ordinary po-
lice cases; and was court of first instance in civil and criminal
cases. In addition to being the agent of the provincial gov-
ernment and the Imperial administration in collecting taxes
and the grain tribute, he was the registrar of land, the famine
commissioner, and the representative of the Board of Works
in the oversight of public buildings, etc. In fact everything

° Morse, p. 52.

8 Modern Constitutional Development in China

pertaining to the conduct of government came under his
charge." He alone had no one on whom he could shift the
responsibility for his acts.

This delegation of responsibility is well illustrated by the
specimen proclamation given by Parker : "The magistrate has
had the honor to receive instructions from the prefect, who
cites the directions of the Taotai, moved by the Treasurer and
the Judge, recipients of the commands of their Excellencies
the Viceroy and Governor, acting at the instance of the For-
eign Board, who have been honored with his Majesty's com-
mands."

"Politically the government of China turns on the recipro-
cal duty of parents and children. The Emperor is the head
of the government but the family is its base, and it is not
from the central head at Peking, but from the family unit
that the building of the governmental fabric proceeds. In
the family life may be seen the larger life of the Empire, and
it is the family unit that gives the semblance of unity to the
Empire."" The family was the social unit, just as the Hsien
was the administrative unit of the Empire. And the family
organization was based on the custom and tradition of cen-
turies. This being so, the magistrate was able to perform his
duties, and carry out the Imperial commands only so far as
they did not come into conflict with the custom and tradition
of his district. The greatest objection to a new law or tax,
or to anv innovation was that it had not been in existence be-
fore. "In the administration of the affairs of the Empire,"

" "In Chinese official documents the district magistrate is fre-
quently referred to as tlie father and mother of his people. And
as the head of a household can make it happy or unhappy ac-
cording to his disposition, so the rule of a good or bad magistrate
promotes order or disorder among the people of his district."
Jernigan, p. 35.

"Jernigan, p. 34.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 9

says Jerningan," "the principle is recognized that laws are
the particular institution of the legislator, while customs are
the institution of a nation in general, and that nothing tends
more to produce a revolution than an attempt to change a
custom by a law."

The village itself was organized, entirely apart .from the
general administration, on the basis of the family. The sev-
eral families united in a village organization selected one of
their number to serve as the village headman (Tipao).^^ He
acted as the intermediary between the Hsien and the village.
Because of the pressure this semi-political organization could
bring to bear on him, it was possible to force the magistrate
to adjust his execution of the law to the customs of the lo-
cality."

^-Jernigan, p. T,:y

^^ Morse says (Trade and Administration, p. 60), that the head-
man was nominated by the magistrate from among the village
elders, "but dependent upon the good will of his constituents."
On the other hand, Jernigan (p. 34), finds that the Tipao was
selected by the families, but that "it is sometimes required, after
the headman of a village has been selected, that he receive the
confirmation of the district magistrate." This latter view is
more nearly correct, although the selection of the Tipao varied
in dififerent localities.

"The pressure that the Tipao could bring to bear on the
magistrate may be understood, when the extent to which the
magistrate was forced to rely on these extra-official functionaries
for the administration of his district, is considered. "The Tipao,"
says Morse, "acts as constable, and is responsible for the good
conduct and moral behavior of every one of his constituents ; he
is also responsible for the due payment of land tax and tribute,"
etc. (p. 60). Since this village headman was not known to the
official administrative system he could not be fully controlled by
it. And since the magistrate could not conduct the work of his
district except through the Tipao, who represented the people, it
can be seen how powerful an influence the village could exert
on the administration.

lo Modern Constitutional Development in China

Applying this to the actual administration of the Empire,
remembering that the customs and traditions of one Hsien
were by no means identical with those of any other Hsien in
the Empire, it is clear that the carrying out of the law would
vary from province to province, and from Hsien to Hsien.
not only with the personnel of the official hierarchy, but with
the difference in habits and customs.

More than any other country, the old China was governed
by the class of scholars, the literati. Membership and prefer-
ment in the official system was based on a series of examina-
tions open to all classes. Beginning with the district exami-
nations, a candidate passed through the prefectural examina-
tion, and that of the province, finally coming to the Metro-
politan examination in Peking. Success in these examinations
gave admission to a distinct class in the state, the literati, the
class given the highest place in the popular esteem. Such
success meant even more than individual prestige. It threw
its reflected light on the whole village from which the suc-
cessful candidate had come, so that frequently the inhabitants
of a village would unite to give a promising student every
possible opportunity to prepare himself for the examinations,
and his progress would be watched with interest by all the
villagers. There was no national system of education, but a
man who had established himself in the opinion of his fel-
lows as a scholar would gather a few disciples around him and
impart his knowledge to them. As the whole plan of educa-
tion was based on the Confucian Classics, it was possible for
one teacher to conduct a student through the entire curriculum,
thus fitting him for examination. Fortunate was the village
which had an able expounder of the Classics!

This system would seem to promise an unusually intelligent
administration. But while examination was the basis of offi-
cial preferment, the practice of buying and selling office had

Modem Constitutional Dei^elopment in China ii

grown up. So that the most successful candidate had to be
prepared to satisfy the demands of those who had the bestowal
of patronage, or could influence its bestowal, if he could hope
to leave the class of "expectant"^^ officials, or to reach any
very high place in the government. Furthermore, the educa-
tion necessary to compete in the examinations was not always
calculated to fit a man for the actual duties and responsibili-
ties of public administration.

From this brief review of the administrative system of the
Chinese Empire as it existed under the Manchu regime, it will
be seen that two principles must be borne in mind in discussing
the reasons for the changes after 1898: first, that of responsi-
bility, each higher official holding his immediate inferior ab-
solutely responsible for the condition of the territory under
his jurisdiction; and, second, the variation in the administra-
tion due to the differences in local customs, and to the will-
ingness and ability of the men administering the laws.

While trade between China and European countries had
been carried on by Europeans for many years, it was not until
1842 that China may be said to have been opened in reality
to foreign intercourse. The traders, before that year, had
been confined to one port, Canton, and had not been permitted
to reside there throughout the year. No official communica-
tion was permitted between the States of the West because of
the Chinese conception of lordship over the "outer barba-
rians." From 1842 until the end of the century, however,
step by step, China was driven from her position of isolation
and forced into the family of nations. This meant also that
she was forced, in practice if not in theory, to recognize the

^^ "Expectant" officials were those who had passed the exami-
nations, thus qualifying for an official post, but who had not yet
received an appointment. In other words, they constituted the
official "waiting list."

12 Modern Cousfitutional Dc-i'elopment in China

modern legal principle of the equality of nations in their deal-
ings with one another.

Back of each step taken by the European countries in their
application of pressure to China lay the desire at first to de-
velop trade and later to exploit the "Middle Kingdom" as a
field for investment. To accomplish this it was necessary to
establish direct diplomatic relations so that the western na-
tions could have a channel of communication with Chinese
officialdom. The establishment of a diplomatic and consular
service in China resulted in a constant pressure on the govern-
ment and the people to undertake or permit the development
of new activities of a commercial and financial as well as of a
religious or philanthropic nature.

The struggle for a recognition of equality of relationship,
and the consequent establishment of diplomatic relations was
carried to a successful conclusion by means of the three so-
called Opium wars. The first was brought to an end by the
Nanking treaty of 1842 between England and China. The
commercial footing of foreigners was then recognized and
several ports opened to foreign trade. The right to maintain
diplomatic establishments in Peking was not gained until the
Anglo-French forces occupied that city in i860 during the
third war mentioned.

The years from i860 to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95
were marked by the struggle on the part of the Powers to
hold what had been gained by force; by the opening of new
ports to trade and a great expansion of commercial activity;
by the continued extension of the missionary propaganda and
the establishment of mission schools and hospitals, and by the
slow education of the Chinese to the point of acceptance and
adoption of western mechanical devices such as the steam
engine, with the consequent development of a system of rail-
way transportation, the telegraph, and some of the machines
of production.

Modern ConsHiiitional Development in China 13

During the first period (up to 1844) of limited foreign
intercourse with China, that country found little difficulty in
regulating the trade by means of the existing administrative
system. By putting it under the supervision of one official he
could be held responsible for all matters concerning foreigners
and foreign interests. With the British trade, by far the
most important, in the hands of the East India Company,
which was interested solely in the maintenance of peaceful
commercial relations, it was not difficult, by a threat of stop-
ping the trade, to enforce the regulations confining it to
Canton, and putting it in the hands of the monopoly of
Chinese merchants known as the Co-hong. It was also found
that by holding the foreign superintendent of trade responsi-
ble for the personal conduct of the foreigners, it was com-
paratively easy to keep them within the limits prescribed by
the laws of the Empire. During this period there was no
question of the amenability of the Europeans to Chinese law.
All dealings were with the merchants, not as nationals of
States equal to the Chinese Empire, but as individuals al-
lowed to carry on their trade as a mark of the favor of the
Emperor, and not as any matter of right. This status was
constantly kept before them, and, during the period of the
East India Company's control, was accepted by the merchants
rather than risk the loss of the trade. As long as China was
the dictator of the terms of intercourse and trade, and could
keep it confined to one place far removed from the capital ; so
long as there was no desire to establish interstate relations with
China; and while it was not necessary, in order to satisfy
foreign demands, to have a uniform administration of the
laws throughout the Empire, it was practicable to entrust the
entire oversight of the trade to a commercial agent like the
Hoppo^'' and hold him responsible for all matters connected

^'^ The Hoppo "the administrator of the Canton Customs, is

14 Modern Constitutional Development in China

with the foreigners. But when the monopoly of the China
trade was withdrawn from the British East India Company,
thus opening it to unrestricted competition on the part of
British subjects as well as other foreigners/^ and when a
representative of the British Government was appointed to
deal with the Chinese government officials, the weakness of
the Chinese administrative system was exposed.

Immediately upon the arrival of Lord Napier, in 1833, as
the first Superintendent of trade appointed by the British Gov-
ernment, the Chinese feeling of superiority which made re-
lations on a basis of equality impossible, was manifested. . . .
"He was met at the outset by a refusal to treat with him as
the envoy of a friendly power, enjoying a position of equality
with China; he was refused an interview with the Viceroy,
who required him to formulate his demands through the com-
mittee of Chinese merchants through whom the trade mo-
nopoly was worked; his letters were not received, and he was
required to present his written communications in the form
of a humble petition ; and coercion was applied to the English
merchants and their trade to force him to leave Canton."^^
Since Lord Napier and all succeeding British representatives,
whether appointed as Superintendents of trade, as Consular
representatives, or as Plenipotentiaries, were instructed to

a direct representative of the Emperor and entirely outside the
provincial .hierarchy, though, to give him due standing and
authority, he takes official rank with, but after the Viceroy."
Morse, "International Relations," p. 15.

^■^ The American, French, Portuguese and other non-British
traders had developed a considerable trade, and their trade was
not in the hands of monopolistic companies. No consular officers
were maintained to conduct official intercourse with the Chinese
government, and the trade was dealt with largely through the
British Superintendent, who was purely a commercial agent.
Morse, "Trade and Administration," p. 18.

18

Modern Constitutional Development in China 15

treat only with the representatives of the Chinese Govern-
ment, and not to conduct their business through the Hong
merchants; and since the very conception of intercourse with
foreign nations on a footing of equaHty was unknown to the
Chinese, it is evident that a situation was created which could
result only in conflict.

The struggle for a recognition of the equality of the Wes-
tern nations with "the Middle Kingdom" was brought to
open conflict by the questions arising out of the opium trade.
The first Edict against the importation of opium into China
was issued in 1800, but until twenty years later practically no
attention was paid to it by either Chinese or foreigners. The
trade was carried on openly at Canton, the only difference be-
ing that after the prohibition the opium could not be brought
to the factories, and it was liable to an irregular tax, on the
principle of making it pay all that the traffic would bear. But,
finally, the trade became so open that the Viceroy was forced
to take some action limiting it. Receiving ships were then
stationed by the foreign traders outside of Chinese jurisdic-
tion, and the trade was still carried on at Canton. As the
restrictions became more rigid there, the traders began to
make voyages up the coast, selling their opium for cash and
using the money to buy return cargoes at Canton. Even dur-
ing the most rigid enforcement of the prohibitory Edicts at
Canton, where trade was supposed to be confined, it was pos-
sible to bring opium into the country through the other sup-
posedly closed ports. This was due to the fact, already pointed
out, that the uniform enforcement of an Imperial Edict in
China was a rare occurrence, each order being executed only
so far as it was to the interest of each governor or commis-
sioner to carry it out. It is an interesting commentary on the
I Chinese administration that while commissioner Lin at Canton
was earnestly endeavoring to carry out the orders of the Em-

1 6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

peror prohibiting the opium trade, other high officials of the
government were openly disregarding them.

This same lack of uniformity was apparent in the observ-
ance of the provisions of the treaties negotiated with China
between 1842- 1860. In Shanghai, opened to foreign trade by
the treaty of Nanking (1842), providing a place of residence
for foreigners and the opening of the trade was attended with
no difficulty, while at Canton the old hostility was exhibited
by officials and people alike; the same attempts being made to
retain by delay and negotiation what had been given up as the
result of the terms of peace. In every case, the feelings of
the people were alleged as the reason why treaty provisions
could not be carried out. The officials claimed that they might
not be able to hold the people in check if the English insisted
on their right of entry into the city of Canton, although the
same right had been given and attended with no difficulty at
Shanghai. The people north of Canton found it to their in-
terest to enter upon peaceful trade relations with the foreign-
ers, so that in their case the law harmonized with the inter-
ests and the wishes of the people; while at Canton it had been
found profitable to hold the foreigners under strict control.
Another striking evidence of this predominance of local in-
terests over national policy was presented in the request of
the Imperial officials for British aid against the Taiping rebels
at Shanghai at the time when Great Britain was making ac-
tive war on the Imperial Government at Peking."

Before the Powers forced a recognition of their equality
with China, it had been possible to limit the control of the
Central Government to the appointment of the officials of the
provincial administration, and the dictation of the general

^^ These are but a few of the instances that might be cited to
show this lack of unity of feeling and of administration through-
out the Empire from 1842 to i860.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 17

policy of the government, leaving- large discretionary power
n the hands of its appointees as to the actual execution of
;his policy. But with the establishment of treaty relations
Uith outside States it was absolutely necessary for the Central
jovernment to assume a more direct responsibility in the
onduct of affairs.-" In the words of one writer: "When
)ressure began to come from without ; when it became neces-
;ary, in order to satisfy the demands of foreign nations, for
he government to control the provinces, and, in order to re-
ist the aggressions of those same foreign nations to be able
o marshal and unite the forces of the Empire; the de-central-
zation, the lack of uniformity, the lack of a sense of mutual
nterests and obligations, the habit of independence, and the
latural disinclination to subordinate local interests to the ne-
|essities of the nation proved sources of hopeless weakness."-^
fhe Powers were not satisfied to see the execution of the
reaty stipulations left to the individual initiative of each
pvernor of the eighteen provinces, but demanded that they
e enforced uniformly throughout the whole Empire. At the
ame time that they insisted on the exact execution of the ob-
ligations imposed on the Imperial Government, they took ad-
antage of this known lack of centralized authority to impose
ew penalties on the Chinese whenever foreign interests were
ijured as a result of the inability of the Central Government
3 control the provincial administration. Thus in self-defence

^° After the treaty of 1842 the Emperor still transferred re-
ponsibility for the conduct of foreign relations to the proper
rovincial officials. Official intercourse was rather with the
rovince as a unit than with the Central Government of China.
t was only with the residence of the Ministers at Peking, where
ley could exert direct pressure, that any attempt at a uniform
dministration of treaty provisions was secured.

^^ Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in Far East," p. 36.

1 8 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the Imperial Government was forced to a closer supervision
of the administration of the provinces.

In criticising the execution of treaty provisions it must be
remembered that the idea of reciprocal obligations between
nations as embodied in treaties or the principles of an inter-
national law was entirely new to the Chinese Government
equally with the people of the country. Before 1842 they
had been accustomed to look upon all outside nations as "bar-
barians," and inferior to the "Middle Kingdom." Ambassa-
dors came only as bearers of tribute, and to learn the will of
the Emperor. The fact that they had been forced at the can-
non's mouth to concede an outward equality did not mean
that they really recognized it as existing; forcing them to as-
sume obligations did not carry with it a recognition of the
binding quality of those obligations if it was possible to evade
them. It took the entire period from 1842 to 1901, with its
four wars and the final suppression of the Boxer uprising, the
element of force being constantly kept before the eyes of the
Government and the people, and China's weakness being con-
sistently brought to light, to bring home to the Chinese a
realization of the binding force of an international agreement.

A foreigner, familiar with China, if asked what is the
greatest deficiency in the Chinese government, would reply
immediately, "the lack of a sense of honesty among the officials
as a class." Yet, from the Chinese point of view, there was
nothing dishonest in the system of "squeeze." It meant simply
this. The Emperor notified each province of its proportion
of the revenue needed for the Central Government. The
Governor added to this fixed sum a sufficiently large com-
mission to enable him to maintain his official household prop-
erly and to add a reasonable amount to his own meager salary.
This increased sum was then apportioned to the various pre-
fectures. The Prefect took the sum assigned to his Depart-

Modern ConstituHonal Development in China 19

ment for collection and added his commission. He then dis-
tributed the total amount among the Hsien under his juris-
diction for actual collection. But the Hsien Magistrate was
also entitled to his commission to pay those to whom he dele-
gated the task of collecting the taxes, and to bring his own
salary to the level necessary to maintain the dignity of his
office. Therefore only a small proportion of the revenue actu-
ally collected reached the Central Government. The same
process was applied to the collection of all port duties and im-
posts. This practice was well known to the people and since
it was an established custom no great objection was made.
As long as the Imperial Government received its quota it was
I content to pay the officials small salaries and let them add to
^ their incomes in any way they could, provided they kept the
people under their jurisdiction contented. Such a system
worked well enough so long as the expenses of the Govern-
■ liment were only the nominal ones of the Imperial Household
and the payment of small fees to the officials. But when large
foreign indemnities were added one after another and the
expense of foreign wars and the great Taiping rebellion had
to be met, the Emperor was forced to increase the amounts
ei I demanded from the provinces. This increase meant that the
vi| people had to find a way to provide more, — not that the offi-
cials gave up any of their "squeeze" to meet the additional
expense. At a time when the entire country had been de-
vastated by marauding bands of rebels, even a slight increase
in taxes worked a great hardship. The discontent growing
from this condition could be utilized by the Government in
part to keep alive a hatred of foreigners who had made the
new burdens necessary. But when it was seen that the Gov-
ernment was able neither to protect the country from the ag-
gressions of the West, nor to preserve order at home, this
restlessness and discontent reacted directly on the Manchu

20 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Government. If the people had felt that the Imperial Court
was retrenching in every way, and that the officials were do-
ing everything in their power to help meet the new burdens,
it would have helped enormously to keep them loyal supporters
of the established regime.

The contrary, however, was known to be the case. It was
a notorious fact that the actual power in Peking was in the
hands of the eunuchs. The revenues that should have been
used for the protection of the country and for repairing the
ravages of the Taiping rebellion were being used to enrich a
few servitors in the Palace who had gained the ear of the
ruler. Not only were the Imperial revenues going that way,
but every official, from the highest to the lowest, was forced
to pay huge sums to these eunuchs in order to get any official
preferment, the officials being expected to reimburse them-
selves at the expense of the people. The Manchus had recog •
nized from the beginning of their rule in China Proper that
a eunuch-ridden Court meant a government in a state of de-
cay. One of the earliest of the dynastic House-laws provided
that eunuchs should never be allowed to hold official position
of any kind, or to advise on matters of State. ^" The corrup-
tion of the Ming Court, due to the ascendency of the eunuchs,
and the consequent decline of the power of the Ming Dynasty
brought this fact vividly home to the founder of the Great
Tsing Dynasty.^^ But while the evil effects of the eunuch sys-
tem were clearly recognized, it was not long until the system
itself had become thoroughly established in the Manchu Gov-
ernment. In a despotic form of government those closest to
the person of the ruler inevitably exercise the greatest influ-
ence in the government of the realm. In an Asiatic country

^^ Bland and Backhouse, "Annals and Memoirs of the Court
of Peking," p. 232.

^^ Ibid., especially ch. V and ch. IX.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 21

it is almost invariably the attendents of the harem, constantly
in communication with the Emperor, who are able to influence
him in his determination of the policy of the government.
But the exercise of such an unofficial influence, where the
wielder of the real authority is not accountable for his actions
to anyone except his master who has given him the power,

r is certain to lead to corruption and misgovernment.

' A realization of the futility of expecting protection from
foes, either without or within, from the decentralized and
eunuch-controlled Manchu Government was forced on the
educated Chinese by the outcome of the war with Japan in
1894-95. Money that had been collected ostensibly to strength-
en the defences of the Empire, and which, if properly ex-
pended, would have enabled China to make at least a credit-
able showing against Japan, had been diverted to the build-
ing of a summer palace for the Empress-dowager, Tzu Hsi.
Most of the funds went directly into the pocket of the chief-
eunuch Li Lien-ying, through the medium of the contracting
firm that built the palace. Even such a humiliating defeat as
was inflicted on the Empire at that time did not arouse the
people as much as the knowledge that the heavy taxes imposed
on them, instead of being used at least in part for their wel-
fare, were enriching the favorites of Tzu Hsi. Strange as
it seems to the Western mind, a military defeat does not serve

|lto lower the prestige of the country in the minds of the
Chinese. They came out of the wars with England as firmly
convinced as before of China's superiority to all other na-
tions of the world. This was due to the fact that in the
Chinese civilization the profession of arms has always, until
recently, occupied the lowest place in the estimation of the
people. But the defeats inflicted by foreign Powers on the
"Celestial Empire" did serve to bring home vividly to the

II

2.2 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Chinese the inherent weaknesses of their system of govern-
ment.

Briefly, then, by 1898 the Chinese had been shown con-
clusively the inability of their government to keep the foreign-
ers out of the country or to protect Chinese interests when
they were in conflict with the interests of European Powers,
or even of Japan. The Powers had entrenched themselves in
China on a basis of equality, and in so doing had imposed on
the country a heavy burden of debt for indemnity and war
expenses. Because of this foreign contact, the Central Gov-
ernment had been forced to exert a greater control over the
provincial governments in order to secure the uniformity of
administration made necessary by the provisions of the treat-
ies entered into with the Powers. Because of the new finan-
cial obligations of the State, the Central Government had been
forced to increase taxes. This increase of taxes carried with
it an increase, not a diminution, of the "squeeze" of the offi-
cials. The corruption of the Court was notorious. The peo-
ple were fast getting ready for revolt because of their eco-
nomic grievances, and because of the weakening of the grip
of the government. On the other hand, together with the ob-
ligations imposed on the government, England, France and
the United States had been instrumental in carrying western
ideas and methods to China and in a small measure introduc-
ing them to a few of the more open-minded of the Chinese,
particularly in the South. So that it was partly under the in-
fluence of Occidental ideas that the first attempts at reform
began. This influence made itself felt in the entire field of
political change, whether constitutional or merely reformative,
beginning with the first period of reform under the Emperor
Kuang Hsu.

CHAPTER II

The Emperor of China at the time when the foreign impact
first became definitely felt was Tao Kuang, who ruled from
182 1 until 1850. Tao Kuang was a man of good intentions
but lacked the understanding and vision necessary to deal with
the host of new problems presented with the attempt of the
foreign governments to secure intercourse with China on a
basis of equality. Had the treaties of 1842-44 been carried
out fully and their operation extended gradually there would
not have occurred the later struggles that perplexed the reign
of his successors. But Tao Kuang, safe in the North from
immediate contact with the foreign problem, felt that it was
wise to allow his officials to accede to the demands made and
then to defeat the foreigner in the application of the terms of
settlement.

Tao Kuang dying in 1850, one of his seven sons succeeded
him, taking the reign title Hsien Feng. During the ten years
comprising the period of his rule, affairs in China went stead-
ily from bad to worse. Rebellion and brigandage became the
rule rather than the exception. The great Taiping rebellion
seemed for a time to presage the end of Manchu rule in China,
and, had the rebels secured the aid of foreigners, the last half
century of Chinese history might have been differently writ-
ten. Fortunately or unfortunately foreign advice and active
support was given to the Imperial rather than to the rebel
forces, and the Manchu authority was finally re-established.
Before the Taipings had been brought under control, how-
ever, the central part of the Empire had been terribly de-
vastated.

23

24 Modern Constitutional Development in China

While this struggle was still going on rebellion broke out
in southwestern China in the form of a Mohammedan up-
rising. Here again it needed time and all of the remaining
Manchu strength to restore the authority of Peking. These
great rebellions were accompanied by minor uprisings in other
parts of the country, and, because of the turmoil and disturb-
ance and the consequent relaxation of the hand of authority,
bands of brigands infested all parts of China. This condi-
tion, in the past, had always accompanied and predicated the
downfall of the Dynasty, but the end of the Manchu rule was
to be postponed for another half -century largely because, out
of these major and minor uprisings, came nO' constructive
leadership capable of unifying the country against the Manchu
rule.

In the midst of these internal troubles the problem of for-
eign intercourse again became immediate and perplexing.
Trouble broke out at Canton in 1856 over a minor incident.
This difficulty was later extended to cover the question of the
application of the treaty of 1842, and the British and the
French united to carry the struggle to the North. The ex-
pedition was so far successful as to enable the plenipotentiaries
accompanying the armed force to negotiate a more favorable
treaty than that which China had been forced to sign at Nan-
king in 1842. This treaty of 1858, in addition to reaffirming
and extending the operation of the principles of that signed
at Nanking, gave also the right of residence at Peking to
foreign diplomatic agents. But again the Chinese attempted
to retain by procrastination what had been unwillingly con-
ceded to superior might, and another expedition to the North
was necessary before the issue was finally settled. This time
Peking itself was taken, Hsien Feng and the Court fleeing
north to Jehol, leaving only Prince Kung, a brother of the
Emperor, to negotiate with the British and French.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 25

While in exile from the capital, Hsien Feng died. Just be-
|| fore his death a struggle had been going on between two fac-
tions at the Court for ultimate control of the child who was
heir to the Throne. In the result a joint regency was effected
II of the wife and the favorite concubine of the Emperor, with
Prince Kung acting as their chief adviser. Since Tzu Hsi,
Ij the mother of T'ung Chih (the reign title taken by the suc-
cessor of Hsien Feng) was not the Empress-Consort, she had
at first to share the power with the Emperor's widow, but
she gradually made herself the dominjint factor in the gov-
ernment, virtually ruling China from 1861 until her death in
1908, with the exception of the two years of the majority of
T'ung Chih and the nine years' rule of his successor known as
Kvvang Hsu.

It was under the direction of this remarkable woman that
the Taiping and Mohammedan rebellions were put down, the
problems of foreign relations handled with a fair degree of
success, and reform finally undertaken by the Manchus.

T'ung Chih died in 1875, two years after he had attained
his majority. The short period of his reign did not shed any
increased lustre on the Manchu rule. Of a licentious and
depraved character, he came under the influence of his eunuchs
who encouraged his tendencies toward extravagent and im-
moral living. "It became cause for scandal in the Palace it-
self that His Majesty would return from his orgies long after
the hour fixed for the morning audience with his high officers
of State. He was mixed up in many a drunken brawl and
consorted with the lowest dregs of the Chinese city, so that
it was no matter for surprise when he contracted the germs of
disease which speedily led to his death."^

^ Bland and Backhouse, "China Under the Empress-Dowager,"
p. 121. All references to "China under the Empress Dowager"
are to the 1910 (Lippincott) unabridged edition.

26 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Upon his death, of small-pox, Tzu Hsi again took matters
into her own hands and dictated his successor. Through her
influence the son of Prince Ch'un, seventh son of the Emperor
Tao Kuang, was chosen as the new ruler, and the Empress-
es-dowager were again called to the regency. The new "Son
of Heaven" took the reign title of Kwang Hsu, meaning
"Glorious Succession." /^i^i

On reaching his majority in jM^, Kwang Hsu nominally
took over the reins of government and the Empress Dowager
went into retirement. But she still continued to exercise a
supervision over his acts, leaving the young Emperor more
or less of a puppet. Naturally this was galling to a man who
felt that he was not unfitted himself to control the policies of
the government of which he was the titular head. There
were many others in the realm who felt that it was deplor-
able for the governm.ent to be controlled by a woman, and the
Emperor kept in tutelage. This feeling was stronger in the
South than in the North, so that it was largely on the south-
erners that the Emperor relied for support when he came
finally to make the attempt to assert himself. The desire to
exercise the real power himself, later joined to a feeling of the
need for change in the government, led to the attempts at
reform in 1898.

That the necessity of reform did not influence his policy
until shortly before the reform edicts began to be issued was
recognized clearly by the leader of the movement, K'ang Yu-
wei himself. "According to K'ang's account the relations
between the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor have never
been anything but strained. She has resented all attempts on
his part to exercise real power, and he has felt deeply the posi-
tion of inferiority and subjection in which she has until re-
cently succeeded in keeping him. Until the Emperor became
an ardent convert to the cause of reform this struggle seems

Modern Constitutional Development in China 27

to have been mainly one for power generally without any
striking difference in the ends for which power was to be
used, and high officials sought the favor of the Emperor or
Empress according to their belief in the probability of the
one or the other obtaining- or keeping- the upper hand, the
opinions of these officials as to the necessity of reform or
their contrary determination to keep to the old ways, not
entering into the question. It was in short a conflict involv-
ing no difference of principle."^

The feeling of an urgent need for reform in the Chinese
State seems to have come home to the Emperor Kwang Hsii
after the humiliating defeat of China in the war with Japan.
It is a generally accepted fact that the Emperor had been in-
terested for several years in the ideas of the West. Western
mechanical contrivances such as toy railways abounded in
the Imperial pleasure grounds; it is reported that he had
taken some lessons in English; and he had actually manifested
his interest in western knowledge by sending for the back
copies of the Review of the Times, a magazine published
in Shanghai. Then to this was added the knowledge that
Japan had triumphed over China largely because she had
adopted western methods. The way was prepared for the
Imperial mind to accept the ideas of the group of reformers
dominated by K'ang Yu-wei.

K'ang Yu-wei, the leader of the reform party in 1898, has
been extolled as the far-sighted patriot and decried as the
selfish seeker after office, the advocate of impossible reforms,
who hoped to advance himself by arousing the spirit of change
in the Emperor. In reality he was but the forerunner, the

^ Memorandum of Conversation with K'ang Yu-wei on Voy-
age from Shanghai to Hongkong, Sept. 27-29, 1898. Correspon-
dence Respecting Affairs of China (British), 1899. Enclosure
2 in No. 401.

28 Modern Constihitional Development in CJiina

John the Baptist, of those who desired to overthrow the old
and substitute for it the new, economically and politically.
Born in Kuangtung province, the home of most of the promi-
nent reformers of this and the later period, K'ang had been
given the usual classical education. When about twenty-nine
years old he began an extensive tour of China. In the course
of his travels he touched at Shanghai and Hongkong and was
much impressed by the cleanliness and good order of the for-
eign settlements. Upon his return to Canton he began to
make as great a study of Western ideas as was possible with
the limited number of translations of foreign books at his
disposal. As a result of his study K'ang founded, in 1891, a
school of new learning. The extent of his progress in for-
eign knowledge may be determined from the subjects taught
in his school: The Confucian Classics; Buddhistic Literature;
Chinese Philosophy and History; and Western Knowledge.^

In spite of his own limited knowledge of the civilization of
the West K'ang Yu-wei soon gathered around him a group
of followers, many of them scholars of good standing ac-
cording to the old standards. The most prominent of these
was Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, a man who has, since 1898, far sur-
passed his teacher in the struggle for a new order in China.

This was the beginning of the party advocating reform
imder the Manchus, as opposed to the societies conducting an
anti-dynastic agitation. From 1891 until he gained the ear of
the Emperor in 1898, K'ang Yu-wei spread his ideas by means
of leaflets and tracts, occasionally sending in memorials to the
Throne. In 1893 h^ started a Reform Society in Peking, in-
tending to establish branches throughout the Empire. But
before long the society had become sufficiently well known to

^ "K'ang Yu-wei, His Life, Ideas, and Character." Professor
M. E, Tsur. (Reprinted from the National Retneiv (China),
1915-

Modern Constitutional Development in China 29

reach the knowledge of the court, and it was ordered dis-
solved by an Imperial Edict. This preliminary work of agi-
tation and diffusion of knowledge was continued and bore
fruit long after the immediate reform programme had been
rendered impossible of achievement by the coup d'etat of 1898.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the reform edicts it
is advisable to note briefly the extent to which foreign ideas
had entered China. We have seen that the coming of the
foreigners had brought a great many new problems to be
solved by the Imperial Government. Trade had increased
continually on a reciprocal basis. The Chinese had begun to
use foreign-made goods, and to see that the trade was a good
thing for them as well as for the trading nations. At first
they had not needed foreign products, opium being almost the
sole import of any great value. With the extension of the
desire for goods from abroad commercial relations were put
on a much firmer basis than when China had been an export-
ing nation, a selling and not a buying State. The daily con-
tact of Occidentals and Chinese in the treaty ports had brought
with it a greater mutual tolerance of the one for the ideas and
peculiarities of the other. The feeling of superiority of the
Chinese was not greatly lessened, but a growth of respect for
some western institutions and industrial methods was mani-
fested. This was shown in a measure in the attempts made
by a few of the prominent Viceroys to construct arsenals and
shipyards ; by the encouragement offered in some places to the
building of factories and workshops; and by the increased in-
terest in the development of the coal and iron deposits of the
country. Before the Japanese war an abortive attempt had
been made to build up a modern navy for China on a small
scale. After the war the reorganization of the army along
western lines received great attention, although the venality
of officials prevented much being accomplished.

30 Modern Constitutional Development in China

While the trade contact was responsible in some measure
for the interest manifested in the material side of European
civilization, the missionaries had been at work steadily awak-
ening the people to a realization of the value of western edu-
cation. Although they were impeded in their work by its limi-
tation to only a few points in the Empire, and by the hos-
tility of many of the officials of the old type, they had made
continuous progress, partly by the publication and distribution
of tracts and pamphlets, partly, where that was possible, by the
foundation of schools for the Chinese. Many of the leaders
in the movement for constitutional government and govern-
mental reform were educated either wholly or in part in the
mission schools, or early came into contact with missionaries.
In some cases, because of their imperfect assimilation of the
new ideas, they did harm rather than good. But even so, they
had a place in the movement towards a new China.

Before 1900 there had been little attempt to secure a wes-
tern education in foreign lands. But as early as 1872 a group
of 120 Chinese boys was sent to America to study. The in-
centive to take this step came from a graduate of Yale Uni-
versity, Dr. Yung Wing, who was able to show the able Vice-
roy, Tseng Kuo-fan, the value of such a proceeding. In 1873
another detachment was sent to England to study her navy.
China's defeat by the Japanese, a people closely akin to the
Chinese in many ways, gave to modern Japan a great interest
for the Chinese people. If Japan, a nation whose civilization
was based on that of China, had suddenly become so strong,
there must be, they thought, a reason for it. Those who
came into contact with the Japanese either at home or abroad
ascribed the change to the adoption of western political meth-
ods. "Why then," they asked, "could not China become
strong by adopting the same ideas"? There were, however,

Modern Constitittional Development in China 31

very few who had been able by 1898 to study the changed
Japan.

While a beginning had been made, then, in the introduction
[1 of the Chinese to the civilization of the West through con-
' tact with the trading class, by the sending of students abroad,
and, to a greater extent, through the activities of the mission-
aries, it had not extended far from the treaty ports. The
Chinese people as a whole, and the officials as a class, were as
conservative as ever, and as wedded to the old institutions.
They were still opposed to foreign ideas because they were
foreign, and because it was felt that things Chinese, by the
very fact of being Chinese, were superior to anything that
came from abroad. They had not yet been brought to a
realization of the fact that the old institutions were no longer
adapted to the new needs of the State. Many felt the neces-
sity for administrative reform, but few perceived that the
system itself was antiquated and no longer capable of meeting
the needs of the Empire.

As has been stated, the alignment of officials either on the
side of the Empress Dowager or with the Emperor Kwang
Hsii was determined by the feeling of the official that either
the one or the other would be victorious in the struggle for
power. And it was only after the Emperor began his career as
a reformer that the officials developed any feeling for change.
To quote again the conversation with K'ang Yu-wei:
"Whereas any given official might previously have felt assured
that if he adhered to the Emperor's side and the Emperor
ousted the Empress from power he would have the reward
of comfortable continuance in office on the old lines, it was
now evident that supporting the Emperor meant acquiescence,
if not zealous cooperation, in changes that might seriously
affect the whole position of the official class, curtailing their
authority, and diminishing their pecuniary gains, besides ex-

32 Modern Cotistittitional Development in China

posing them to the risk of being removed to make place for
younger men in fuller sympathy with the sovereign's ideas."*

At the beginning of 1898 affairs were much as they had
been since Kwang Hsii had reached his majority. The rela-
tions of the Emperor with the Empress Dowager were seem-
ingly friendly. "Kwang Hsii never failed to consult Her
Majesty before the issue of any important Decree, and Tzu
Hsi was usually most cordial in her manner towards him. . . .
Whenever the Empress came to Peking, he (Kwang Hsii)
obeyed strictly the etiquette which required him reverently to
kneel at the Palace gates to welcome her." But "when visit-
ing her at the Summer Palace, he was not permitted to an-
nounce his arrival in person, but was obliged to kneel at the
inner gate and there await the summons of admission from
the Chief Eunuch. ... At each of these visits he was com-
pelled, like any of the Palace officials, to pay his way by large
fees to the eunuchs in attendance on Her Majesty, and as a
matter of fact these myrmidons treated him with consider-
ably less respect than they showed to many high Manchu dig-
nitaries. Within the Palace precincts the Son of Heaven was
indeed regarded as of little account."^ In these and many
other little ways the Emperor was constantly reminded that
he was only the ruler in name, and was so regarded by many
of his officials.

The atmosphere of Peking, and especially of the Imperial
City, was however, most favoral)le to the growth of cliques
and parties. This condition befriended Kwang Hsu as it
caused those not in the favor of the Old Buddha to look to
him for preference. Since the beginning of his reign there

* Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China (British), 1899.
Inclosure No. 2 in 401.

^ Bland and Backhouse, "China under the Empress Dowager,"
p. 179.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 33

had been growing up two parties in Peking, and from their
leadership these parties had developed as representative of the
North and the South. The leaders of the northern party were
Hsii T'ung, one of the Chinese Bannermen, a devoted ad-
herent of the Manchus, and tutor to the former Emperor
T'ung Chih; and Li Hung-tsao, a native of the metropolitan
province of Chihli. The southern party was led by Weng
T'ung-ho, the tutor of His Majesty Kwang Hsii, and P'an
Tsu-yin, both of them eminent scholars, as were also the lead-
ers of the northern group. All of the literary graduates grad-
ually ranged themselves on the one side or the other. Both
Li and Weng were appointed to the Grand Council in 1894.
and thereafter the Empress espoused the cause of the north-
erners while the Emperor looked to the southern party for
support.

In less direct contact with the Manchus, the South had
always been a source of trouble to the Dynasty. Any discrim-
ination against the Chinese in favor of the alien Manchu was
more immediately felt in the southern provinces than in the
northern, and since the Empress Dowager had always been of
pronounced Manchu tendencies the Southerners naturally
wished for an end to her control over the government. It
was in the South, too, that foreign ideas had gained the greater
hold, most of the reformers from this time on being men from
the southern provinces and in many cases the reforms advo-
cated being directed largely against the Manchu supremacy in
the State.

On May 29, 1898, Prhice Kung, one of the most capable
of the Manchu statesmen, died. His death removed a great
restraining influence from both parties in the Empire. "On
the one hand the Manchu party lost in him its senior repre-
sentative, an elder whose wise counsel had guided them, and
a statesman whose influence had been steadily against their

34 Modern Constitutional Development in China

tendencies toward an anti-Chinese and anti-foreign policy.
, . . On the other hand the Emperor had always deferred to
Prince Kung's advice, and it was not until after his death
that he embarked headlong on the reform schemes of K'ang
Yu-wei and his associates, many of which the Prince, though
no bigoted conservative, would certainly have condemned."®

Soon after the death of Prince Kung, Weng T'ung-ho
recommended K'ang Yu-wei to the Imperial favor. Un-
doubtedly he took this step in the hope of strengthening him-
self and his party. Prince Kung had been his best friend at
Court, and with his moderating influence removed it was
necessary to take steps to counteract the growing influence of
the pro-Manchu party, which was hostile to Weng. The Em-
peror acted on the recommendation and K'ang Yu-wei was
summoned to audience on the 13th of June, 1898,^ by an Im-
perial Edict. He found Kwang Hsii favorably inclined to
reform and soon gained considerable influence over him.
K'ang's ideas had already been presented to His Majesty in
the form of a memorial. As early as the third of January he
had been accorded an interview with the members of the
Tsungli Yamen, through the influence of Weng T'ung-ho, and
in that conference he offered for their consideration his pro-
posals for reform, w^hich were embodied in the memorial
subsequently presented at the request of the Emperor.

This memorial pointed out "that under the present system
there was no way of ascertaining the desires and opinions of
the people. The present Ministers and Viceroys could act
only upon orders given them, and were unable to do any
original thinking. It was necessary to select young, intelli-
gent men, imbued with Western ideas, to assist in the regener-

^ "China under the Empress Dowager," p. 184.
^ North China //^raW-Translation of Edict given Sept. 5, 1898.
China Year Book 191 3 gives date as June 14.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 35

ation of the Empire, to confer with the Emperor every day,
discussing measures of reform, but first devoting their ener-
gies to a revision of the laws and the administration."* K'ang
advocated the dispensing with old officials, and he suggested
the creation of twelve new departments. In view of the fact
that they hit directly at the official class, it is no wonder that
the Tsungli Yamen reported unfavorably on these proposals
when the Emperor asked for an opinion on them. It was
only after his audience in June that K'ang Yu-wei had an op-
portunity to carry out some of his ideas.

In an edict issued a few days before the audience with
K'ang Yu-wei, the Emperor set forth some of the reasons why
reform was necessary for the good of the Chinese Empire.
"In the present condition of Imperial Affairs, with an un-
trained army, with limited funds, with ignorant 'literati,' and
with artisans untaught because they have no fit teachers, is
there any difficulty in deciding, when China is compared with
foreign nations, who is the strong and who is the weak? It
is easy to distinguish between the rich and the poor. How
can a man armed with a wooden stick smite his foe encased
in a coat of mail? , , . We cannot in these modern days
adhere to the ways of the five Kings (circa B.C. 2500) ; even
they did not continue after the manner of their respective

ll predecessors. It is like wearing thick clothes in summer and
thin ones in winter."^

The "hundred days" of reform came as a great surprise to
the Empire in spite of the known leaning of the Emperer
toward reform. The decrees issued involved educational, in-
dustrial, agricultural, and army changes and reorganization,

|j as well as some alterations in the administrative organization.

* Smith, "China in Convulsion," p. 132.

° Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China (British), 1899.
No. 266.

36 Modern CuiistitiUiuiial Development in China

The first of the Edicts" dealt with the need for change in
the system of education in China. After urging the officials
and literati to be diligent in their attempts to extend their
knowledge, and not to be satisfied with a mere superficial
learning, the Edict provided for the initial steps to be taken
toward the establishment of a central University in Peking.
Those eligible to enter this highest school in the Empire were :
"Any of the compilers and graduates of the Hanlin College,
the Secretaries of the Boards, the officers of the Palace Guards,
expectant Intendants, Prefects, District Magistrates, and
subordinate officials, sons and brothers of officials, the heredi-
tary officials of the Eight Banners, and the sons of the mili-
tary officials of the Empire."

By later^^ supplementary Edicts schools and colleges were
to be established in the provincial capitals and all large cities
throughout the country. These provincial schools were to
act as feeders for the central University. Dr. W. A. P.
Martin was appointed the head of the University faculty. It
was made clear from the beginning that the primary purpose
of the new schools was to be the dissemination of Western
rather than of Confucian learning, although the latter, the
old classical study, was not to be done away with. The fac-
ulty of the University was to consist largely of foreigners.
The work of establishing the provincial schools was left to
the Governors and other provincial officials, and they were
asked to memorialize the Throne in regard to the progress
made, presenting any suggestions for reform that they might
desire to offer.^"

^° Issued June 11, 1898.

^^ Issued July 10, July 29, and August 4, 1898.

^^ The attitude of the officials toward the reform program may
be inferred from the fact that the Emperor was forced to re-
prove two of the most progressive Viceroys (Liu K'un-yi and
Fan Chung-lin) for dilatoriness.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 37

Even more radical than the changes in the educational sys-
tem were those made in the examination system. When it is
remembered that by far the most influential class in the State
was that of the scholars, and that it depended for its suprem-
acy on the maintenance of the old method of study and of ex-
amination, it can be seen what powerful forces Kwang Hsti
was arraying against himself and the party of reform.

On June 23d an Imperial decree abolished the literary essay
as the standard for examination." For the old literary effu-
sions it was proposed to substitute practical essays on subjects
connected with and drawn from the new learning. The edict
stated: "We have been compelled to issue this decree be-
cause our examinations have degenerated to the lowest point,
and we can see no way to remedy matters other than to change
entirely the old methods of examination for a new course of
competition."^*

From this change it naturally f<3llowed that the old methods
of instruction and of preparation for examination would be
obsolete, and that the influence of the old time scholars would
he reduced greatly, eventually if not immediately. The long-
nailed, stoop-shouldered, shuffling- footed scholar of the old
regime could have only a minor place in a world where the
primary emphasis was placed on practical knowledge and effi-
ciency. And it was on those two things that the attention of
the Chinese would have to be focused if they were to attempt
seriously to maintain themselves against the aggressiveness of

^^ Under the old system the candidate was required to write
an essay on some subject taken from the classics. Practical ad-
ministrative knowledge was never required for success in these
examinations, although it was from the successful candidates
that the officials of the Empire were invariably chosen.

^* The Confucian Analects and the Classics were still to be
studied in the schools, but studies of a practical nature were to
be emphasized.

38 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the younger nations of the West. This change in the ex-
aminations was but the logical forerunner of still more radi-
cal changes, all of which would menace the predominance of
the literati. In the face of their self-evident interest, (for
the literati and the officialdom were largely one), it is hardly
to be w^ondered at that the Emperor complained of the laxity
of the officials in giving effect to his edicts.

Together with the reform in education and in the system of
examination came a plan for the systematic translation of the
European books necessary to educate the older people in the
new ideas, and for use in the schools. A translation bureau
was to be established at Shanghai with Liang Ch'i Ch'ao^^ at
the head. Its work was to be the "putting into Chinese West-
ern w^orks on science, arts, and literature, and text books for
the schools and colleges."

The importance of such a step can be immediately seen.
Before the new system of education could be put into opera-
tion it was necessary to have some sort of an approach to
the new learning. Either the educated class in the future
would have to rely on a foreign language for their knowledge,
and instruction in the schools would have to be in a foreign
language so far as modern science and learning were con-
cerned, or the great field of Western investigation would have
to be put into the Chinese language. The magnitude of this
latter task was greatly increased because of the limited few
who were competent to undertake such work, which, to be of
any value, demanded a thorough training in foreign lan-
guages. Furthermore, it involved the creation of a vocabu-

^^ Liang Ch'i Ch'ao has since done a very valuable work along
that line, although not working under the government, as planned
in this edict. Among other works he has put into Chinese the
lives of Cavour and of Bismarck. His translations are widely
read by the students in China.

I

Modern Constitutional Development in China 39

lary, such concepts as spirit, patriotism, etc., being entirely
new to the Chinese language.^®

Foreigners, especially the missionaries, had been working
along this very line in their attempts to reach the Chinese, but
their work had been limited largely to the translation of re-
ligious literature, the field of science being untouched. Liang
Ch'i Ch'ao was then, and is today, one of the foremost of
Chinese scholars. But he had only a limited knowledge of
any language except his own and Japanese, and was hardly
competent to go to the originals for the Western texts. Work-
ing with foreigners who had a knowledge of Chinese his schol-
arly ability might have surmounted the limitations of his own
knowledge and training. But cooperation with foreigners in
the task does not seem then to have been contemplated.^^ The
great importance of this mandate lies in its emphasizing one
of the greatest tasks incident to educational reform.^®

The reformers of this period recognized that one great diffi-
culty in their way was the unwillingness of officials to carry
out the provisions of the edicts. It was also clear that mis-
understandings would arise because of the ignorance of the
people as to the importance of the steps being taken, and as to
the reasons for any change being inaugurated. To avoid
this two steps were taken. Official gazettes were to be pub-
lished and distributed all over the Empire. The Shanghai
publication, Chinese Progress, which had been edited by

*® In making public addresses in Chinese, it is common for the
speaker to give an English word, and then take three or four
minutes explaining in Chinese its meaning.

^^ That is, no cooperation in China, although the Ministers to
European Courts were ordered to carry on this work of trans-
lation in the countries where they were residing.

^^ This work of translation has become increasingly important
in the past fifteen years. Further reference to it will have to
be made later.

II

40 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Liang Ch'i Ch'ao was made the leading organ of this nature.
It was hoped that these pubHcations would establish a direct
relationship between the Central Government and the people.
Formerly newspapers had been confined largely to the treaty-
ports and were more in the nature of propagandist pamphlets
than general news sheets. They had been used largely for
anti-government agitation, being frequently under the ban of
the authorities. The proposed gazettes were to be official
newspapers, subsidized by the government and privileged to
call attention to all kinds of abuses and evils.

The other attempt to bring about a closer understanding be-
tween the provinces and the Central Government was through
an enlargement of the right of petition. Formerly only the
highest officials and the censors were allowed directly to me-
morialize the Throne. The edict issued on September 12th,
after rebuking officials severely for refusing to transmit me-
morials which had come in, extended the right of petition
"to practically every soul in the Empire." "Next day, the
thirteenth of September, another decree repeated the terms of
the above in clearer detail, and laid down precisely the pro-
cedure each class was to observe, in making itself heard. The
severest penalties were threatened should there be any inter-
ference with the free exercise of this privilege by the high
officers of government, who were commanded to report by
telegram the steps they were taking to fulfil the Imperial
wishes."" Honestly carried into effect, this change would
have brought the Central Government into actual touch with
the problems and abuses of the provincial administration, and
enabled it to make the changes necessary to rectify these abuses
and purify the administration. It would also have brought
new life to the only body in the Empire whose function was

1^ (British) Correspondence Relative to China, 1899, No. 371.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 41

criticism — the censorate. Under the system existing in 1898
the Emperor was forced to rely for information on the high
officials, themselves the very men most interested in keeping
from him a knowledge of abuses. The censors, too, had be-
come open to bribery, and were kept, by fear of punishment,
from too great criticism of the acts of the high officers of
the government.

Other decrees, following one another in rapid succession,
dealt with the need of agricultural, industrial, and military re-
form. A bureau of agriculture, arts and commerce was estab-
lished. Agricultural education was to be undertaken and all
new ideas calculated to improve land cultivation were to be
investigated and made use of where they proved to be of value.
Progress in invention was to be encouraged by the giving of
exclusive rights to the inventor for a number of years, —
really a provision for the granting of patent rights. "Re-
wards were also to be given to those who, with their own re-
sources, establish colleges, open up mines, or set up arsenals
for the manufacture of rifles and cannon."^" As to army
reform "two decrees, published on June 27th and July 5th,
have reference to reform in the Chinese army, but they throw
no light on the nature of them, and merely refer certain sug-
gestions to various departments for examination."^^ In order
to further the reconstruction of China's fleet the establishment
of naval colleges was ordered.

Mention should also be made of the announced intention of
the Emperor to hold military reviews both in Peking and
Tientsin. In connection with the latter review it was planned
to go by rail to Tientsin, the Imperial party including the
Empress Dowager."' This would have been the first time

"" (British) Correspondence Relative to China, 1899, No. 297.
^^Correspondence Relative to China (British), 1899, No. 297.
^- China under the Empress Dowager, pp. 196-7.

42 Modern Constitutional Development in China

either the Emperor or Empress had travelled by rail, their
experience with foreign locomotion being limited to the toy
railroads that had been installed in the pleasure grounds of the
Palace. This suggestion came as a great shock to the Man-
chu officials who felt that it would be a terrible thing for
Their Majesties to demean themselves by breaking so far
away from tradition. Tzu Hsi however was delighted at the
prospect of such a novel experience. Later developments
caused the abandonment of the plan.

When, in the course of his career as a reformer, the Em-
peror struck directly at the official class by the abolition of
useless offices he sounded the death knell of the whole move-
ment. Many who had been content to stand by without op-
position so long as they were not directly affected and who
were even believers, in theory, in the need for reform were
immediately antagonized when they saw a possible attack on
their pocketbooks. An edict of August 30 abolished six
offices — i.e., the Imperial Supervisorate of Instruction, the
Office of Transmission, the Grand Court of Revision, the
Court of Imperial Entertainments, the Court of the Imperial
Stud, and the Court of State Ceremonial. These offices had
provided lucrative employment for Manchu idlers for many
generations. "This decree was loudly denounced as contrary
to the traditions of the Manchu Dynasty, and from all sides
came urgent appeals to the Old Buddha to protect the privi-
leges of the ruling class, and to order its cancellation."^^ The
reform was called a direct blow at the Manchus, the first step
in a movement calculated to overthrow the Dynasty. Further,
"the decree specified the Governorships of Kuangtung, Hupei,
and Yunnan, as well as the Director-Generalship of the Yel-
low River, as posts which could well be transferred to other

2^ "China under the Empress Dowager," p. 197.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 43

officers, reducing many overgrown salaries and perquisites.
The Tribute Rice Transport by the Grand Canal (one of the
most wasteful extravagances even in China) was also abol-
ished, and other offices pertaining to the Salt Revenue were
cut ofif with a stroke of a pen."^*

It is always much easier to create new positions without
opposition than it is to abolish those which have been in ex-
istence even for a short time, so that it can readily be imagined
how great an outcry arose among all the officials, since no one
knew where such changes would stop. Many less important
sinecures had been filled with the proteges of the high officials
who were expected to provide for the members of their own
families. They were also looked to as the source of official
preferment by many of their fellow-provincials who had been
successful in the examinations and were on the list of "ex-
pectant" officials.

Officialdom was affected in yet another way by this attempt
to better the administration. With very few exceptions, every
officer in the Empire had been forced to buy his place at a
figure proportioned to its importance, so that he stood to lose
materially by its abolition.

This fear on the part of the officials was intensified by the
dismissal from office, two days after the issue of these de-
crees, of all of the high officials of the Board of Rites"^ for
suppressing a memorial because of its radical suggestions.""

2* "China in Convulsion," p. 144.

^^ Hsu Ying-k'uei and Huai T'a-pu, the two Presidents of the
Board, and also the two Senior and two Junior Vice-presidents.

^^ This memorial, submitted by a third class secretary of the
Board of Rites, is said to have advocated: "the abolition of the
queue and the changing of the Chinese national dress to that of
Western lands ; the embracing the Christian religion as that of
the State, with a national Parliament in prospect ; and a journey
by the Emperor and Empress Dowager to the Mikado, that they

44 Modern Constitutional Development in China

The Empress Dowager had been sitting quietly by during
this period waiting for the opposition to the reformers to be-
come sufficiently pronounced to warrant her resuming the di-
rection of the affairs of State. It was not until she learned
that the reforms were to be safeguarded by rendering her in-
capable of interference that Tzu Hsi took drastic steps against
the party of the Emperor. The details of the plot against her
life are now a matter of history : How Yuan Shih-kai was
entrusted with the task of securing control of the foreign
drilled army of Chihli, and the destruction of the faithful ad-
herent of the Empress, Jung Lu, then Viceroy of Chihli
Province. It is equally well known how Yuan went to his
blood-brother, Jung Lu, and disclosed the plot" instead of
killing him, thus enabling Jung Lu to carry out what has be-
■ come known as the coiip d'etat of 1898, by which the Empress
assumed control and Kwang Hsii became a virtual prisoner
until his death in 1908.^*

After the restoration, edicts began to appear in rapid suc-
cession cancelling all of the reform measures enacted during
the "hundred days," and providing for the punishment of
K'ang Yu-wei and his followers. K'ang himself escaped to
Tientsin and from there to Shanghai where he was enabled
to elude the Imperial authorities by the aid of British officials.
Many of his adherents made good their escape, principally to

might see for themselves the pitiful condition of China as com-
pared with Japan." "China in Convulsion," p. 145. (See also
British Correspondence Relative to China, 1898, No. 371.)

"^ For Yuan's version of the affair see his account in the Times
reprinted and commented on in Kent's '"Passing of the Manchus,"
pp. 17-22.

-^ As a matter of form a mandate was issued in the name of
the Emperor calling the Empress Dowager into consultation on
affairs of State. Tlius the Emperor was forced to authorize his
own virtual deposition.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 45

Japan, and from foreign shores entered upon a new propa-
ganda of reform ideas.

The very nature of the changes proposed in 1898 revealed
a lack of an appreciation on the part of the reformers of the
fundamental nature of the weakness of the Chinese adminis-
trative system. The reforms inaugurated would have been oi
undoubted value, and they marked an advance in the breaking
away from the past. But even if Kwang Hsu had retained
the power to put them into effect, many of the changes would
have remained only on paper. The old theory that the relation
of the Central Government to the Provinces was merely super-
visory was not disturbed in the least by these decrees. The
general policy of reform along certain lines was adopted by
the Imperial Government, but it was left to the provincial
authorities to put this programme into execution, and it has
been pointed out already that the officials would act only when
it was to their interest to do so, or when strong pressure was
brought to bear on them forcing them to act against their in-
clinations.

The most essential step in carrying out any reforms of per-
manent value in China is the establishment of a direct rela-
tionship between the Central Government and the people. The
mere power of appointment and dismissal, together with a
general supervision and direction, is not sufficient to ensure a
uniform administration. The reforms of 1898 provided for
the introduction of new ideas, and, to a certain extent, en-
larged the scope of parts of the existing machinery of govern-
ment, such as the right of memorializing the Throne, but did
not alter the structure or the form of the government. Neither
did the history of the years following 1898 show that the re-
form movement of that year was the result of any "national
and intellectual movement that permeated the provinces and
moved the mind of the nation." It was simply the work of

46 Modern Constitutional Development in China

a group of thinkers who had come in touch, in a Hmited way,
with the civiHzation of the West, and who were able to take
advantage of the factional struggles in Peking to gain a hear-
ing for themselves and their ideas. The movement failed be-
cause the reforms attempted came into conflict with the self-
interest of the ruling class, including those who would have
been glad to see China strengthened by changes that did not,
at the same time, harm their own interests.

It is true that if the Emperor had been strong enough to
maintain himself as the real ruler of the country against the
opposition of the Empress Dowager he might have been able
to play the benevolent despot, forcing officialdom and the na-
tion to see with him, and aid him to carry out in good faith
the regeneration of the State. But he seems to have become
interested first in the idea of change because he perceived the
evils of the system as shown in the government of the
Empress. Until he was carried along by the influence of
K'ang Yu-wei, his conviction of the need for reform was
based on the feeling that he was being defrauded of the
power that should have been his, and his action was dictated
by a desire to gain that power. The "outs" are always bet-
ter able to see a weakness than those in the supremacy.
Kwang Hsii would have been no great exception probably if
he had been the de facto as well as the de jure ruler of the
Empire.

The chief importance of this movement in 1898 lay in the
fact that it was the first definite attempt to adjust the admin-
istration of China to the new conditions that had arisen. It
has been dealt with at greater length than its ultimate impor-
tance would warrant because from its failure came a new di-
rection to the movement toward political reform. On the
one hand this failure gave an impetus to the work of those
men who felt that change could only come, and progress be

Modern Constitutional Development in China 47

made, with the overthrow of the Alanchu Dynasty. While
on the other hand the direction of the movement, together
with the failure of the Boxer uprising, aroused a feeling
among the Manchus and the high Chinese officials that only
by admitting the necessity of change and assuming the con-
trol and leadership of a conservative party of reform could
they hope to preserve their ascendency in the State.

To the failure of the K'ang Yu-wei movement and the con-
sequent domination of the ultra-conservatives and reaction-
aries, both Manchu and Chinese, can be ascribed the growth
of the Boxer movement, especially in its anti-foreign phase,
which culminated in the uprising of 1900. The failure of
that attempt to drive the foreigner and his demoralizing in-
fluence from the "Middle Kingdom" opened the door for the
more gradual progression toward reform which marked the
i period from 1901 to 1910.

CHAPTER III

The failure of the Boxer movement has a direct bearing on
the inauguration of reform by the Empress Dowager in 1901
so that a few words may be advisable in explanation of that
strange and yet natural attempt to drive the foreigners from
the "Middle Kingdom." In 1894, when war broke out be-
tween Japan and China, the latter, in her great potential
strength, was feared by the Powers of Europe. They might
push their demands, and force redress for the injuries of
their citizens, but they took aggressive action always with
the fear of going too far and awakening the "Sleeping
Dragon." Japan, on the other hand, was not considered
formidable. She shook off foreign interference more quickly
and easily than China has, but she did it by accepting the
West and adopting and adapting to her own needs its ideas
and institutions. When war came between the two countries
it appeared to be a contest between unequals — between a giant
and a dwarf. When, in the struggle, the dwarf was easily
victorious, it caused the Western governments to go to the
other extreme in their thoughts of China. No longer was
she feared as the "Dragon" whom all dreaded to see awake !
The decay of the Empire was seen in the ease with Avhich
Japan had imposed her will on China. Consequently the
Powers became more aggressive and imperialistic in their
policy and the "concession grabbing" period in Chinese his-
tory was inaugurated. Germany, Russia, France and England
all staked out their spheres of interest and secured leased ter-
ritorial footholds in the Empire. The actual partition of the
country was freely predicted. When the Powers stopped for

48

Modern Consfitnfional Development in China 49

breath before taking the final phinge, the Emperor embarked
upon his ill-fated reform adventure in an attempt to check the
process of internal disintegration. Had the cause of reform
triumphed the western governments still had a sufficiently
wholesome fear of China and her recuperative powers to
stand aside. When reform failed the last hope of China
seemed gone.

The people of the country, however, felt that China might
yet be saved. Their unrest and dissatisfaction, which well
might have been directed against the Manchus at that time,
because of this foreign aggression, was diverted from their
rulers and directed against the foreigners. Anti-foreign so-
cieties known as Boxers (Societies of Harmonious Fists)
sprang up all over the North and Central parts of China.
Their one great aim was to drive the foreigner into the sea,
after which China could enjoy again the old peace and quiet.
The relation of the Government to the movement in its incep-
tion has never been fully established. After its growth Tzu
Hsi seems to have thrown her weight definitely with the
Boxers. The legations in Peking finally were beseiged, but
later were relieved by the allied force of Europeans, Ameri-
cans and Japanese thrown into the country. The Court, for
a second time, fled from the capital and negotiated a peace set-
tlement that meant the end of the anti-foreign phase of
recent Chinese history.

The Boxer uprising and its failure logically should have
hastened the movement toward the partition of China among
the Powers. That it did not is due largely to the position
taken by the government of the United States in 1899, when,
in an attempt to protect potential American commercial in-
terests in China, by preserving the country from a division as
colonial territory among the European nations, the policy of
the "Open Door" was enunciated by John Hay. This policy

50 Modern Constitutional Development in China

directed to the preservation of the territorial integrity of
China, and thus the preservation of an equaHty of commer-
cial opportunity for all nations, was reaffirmed during the ne-
gotiations leading to the protocol of 1901 reestablishing peace
between the Chinese Empire and the other States of the
world.^ The overthrow of Boxerism marks the end of the
period of active hostility to change in China. It was recog-
nized that either progress along modern lines would have to be
made or China would lose her place as an independent mem-
ber of the family of nations.

After the failure of the Boxer movement the Empress Do-
wager herself recognized the inevitability of some sort of re-
form in the Chinese Empire. There were three ways in which
changes might be made : an honest reform of the government
by the Manchu Dynasty itself, thereby strengthening its hold
on the Empire, and enabling it to regain the position which had
been lost during the nineteenth century by inefficient and cor-
rupt administration; on the other hand, if the Manchus persis-
tently refused to set the house in order, the ever-increasing anti-
Manchu agitation in the South and overseas would attain its
object of a reform which would eliminate the Ta Ts'ing Dyn-
asty altogether. The third alternative, feared by Manchu and
Chinese alike, was a forcible reform through foreign domina-
tion of China.

1 The Russian activity in Manchuria was primarily responsi-
ble for the United States asking the Powers a second time to put
themselves on record as favoring the maintenance of China in
her territorial completeness, in spite of her attempt to maintain
herself entirely apart from contact with the world. England
and Japan, because of their peculiar interest in the developments
in the Far East, threw their weight behind the proposals of the
American government, thus forcing the other Powers, including
Russia, to give a reluctant reaflirmation of their adherence to
the general principle of the "Open Door" for commerce in China.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 51

Tzu Hsi accepted the situation and, even before the return
of the Court to Peking, had announced her decision. The
decree in which, in the name of the Emperor, she proclaimed
the need of reform, is a remarkable document. The Empress
Dowager was under the necessity of "saving her face" by-
making it clear that, carried out under her direction, the re-
form ideas were something radically different from and su-
perior to those which she had opposed in 1898. It was also
essential that the opponents of the early reform movement
should be reassured, and at the same time she must convince
the reformers themselves of her sincerity. This first reform
edict of the Empress Dowager was issued from Hsianfu on
January 28, 1901.

It is unnecessary to reproduce the entire edict, but certain
portions bearing directly on government change are well-
worth quotation. The text runs:

"Throughout the entire universe there exist certain fixed prin-
ciples which govern the conduct of men, but nowhere do we find
any finally fixed form of government. It is written in the Book
of Changes that when any given condition of affairs has run its
natural course, and has been succeeded by another there is no
saying how long this new State may last; also in the Dialogues
of Confucius it is written that there is no difficulty in tracing the
changes and reforms which each Dynasty has made in regard to
the methods of its predecessors. . . . Looking at the matter
broadly, we may observe that any system which has lasted too
long is in danger of becoming stereotyped, and things which
are obsolete should be modified. The essential need which con-
fronts us is at all costs to strengthen Our Empire, and to im-
prove the condition of Our subjects. ... At this moment when
peace negotiations^ are proceeding, it is a matter of urgent neces-
sity that steps be taken to reorganize our system of government
so that hereafter Our Celestial Empire may recover its ancient
place of wealth and power. The Empress Dowager has now de-
cided that we should correct our shortcomings by adopting the

^ With the Powers after the Boxer uprising.

c,2 Modem Constitutional Development in China

best methods and systems which obtain in foreign countries,
basing our future conduct on a wise recognition of past errors.^
. . . The chief defect in our system of administration is un-
doubtedly too close an adherence to obsolete methods, a too
slavish devotion to the written word; the result is a surfeit of
commonplace and inefficient officials, and a deplorable lack of
men of real talent. The average commonplace man makes a god
of the written word, whilst every bureaucrat in the land regards
it as a talisman wherewith to fill his purse so that we have huge
mountains of correspondence eternally growing up between one
government office and another, the value of which is absolutely
nil so far as any good to the country is concerned. On the other
hand men of real ability lose heart and give up the public service
in disgust, prevented from coming to the front by the mass of
inefficiency that blocks the way. Our whole system of govern-
ment has come to grief through corruption, and the first steps of
progress in our Empire are clogged by the fatal word 'precedent.'

"Up to the present the study of European methods has gone
no further than a superficial knowledge of the languages, liter-
ature and mechanical arts of the West, but it must be evident
that these things are not the essentials upon which European
civilization has been founded. The essential spirit of that civi-
lization is to be looked for in the fact that real sympathy and
understanding exists between rulers and people, that officials are
required to be truthful in word and courageous in action. The
teachings handed down to us by our sacred Ancestors are really
the same as those upon which the wealth and power of European
countries have been based, but China has hitherto failed to real-
ize this, and has been content to acquire the rudiments of Euro-
pean languages or technicalities while changing nothing of her
ancient habits of inefficiency and deep-rooted corruption. Ig-
noring our real needs we have so far taken from Europe nothing
but externals ; how can we possibly hope to advance on such
lines? Any reforms to be effective and permanent must be made
with a real desire for efficiency and honesty.

"We therefore hereby decree and command that the officials

^ Here follows a paragraph repudiating connection with the
K'ang Yu-wei reforms, stating that they were dangerous and
treasonable. "Their main object is not reform but a revolution
against the Manchu Dynasty."

Modern Constitutional Development in China 53

concerned shall now make close inquiry and comparison as to the
various systems of government in force in European countries
with special reference to those which obtain in China today, not
only as regards the constitution of the Court and Central Gov-
ernment, but also concerning those things which make for the
prosperity of our subjects, such as the system of examination and
education, the administration of the army and the regulation of
finance. They will be required to report as to what changes are
advisable and what institutions should be abolished; what meth-
ods we should adopt from abroad and what existing Chinese in-
stitutions should be retained. The things we chiefly need are a
constant supply of men of talent, a sound basis of national
finance, and an efficient army. Reports on these matters must
be forwarded within two months, and upon them we shall humbly
address Her Majesty,* and ask for Her decision before we take
any definite action."^

While foreigners looked skeptically on, the work of the
Dowager Empress was begun. That the reactionary, auto-
cratic "Old Buddha," who had brought to naught the previous
movement partially to modernize the Empire, and who had
connived at the abortive attempt in 1900 to drive all foreign-
ers into the sea, should seriously intend to lead in the intro-
duction of Western institutions into China seemed incredible.
And, granting her sincerity, could even the dominating and
masterful Tzu Hsi overcome the passive resistance of her
Court and the official class?

The years from 1901 to 1905 witnessed the acceptance by
the country of many of the changes advocated by the reform-
ers in 1898. The old examination system was abolished; the
educational system was brought into harmony with Western
ideas, largely under the guidance of two men, Yuan Shih-k'ai
and the well-known \'iceroy Chang Chih-tung;'' and steps

* This edict purported to be from the hand of the Emperor,
although written by the Empress herself.

^ "China under the Empress Dowager," pp. 419-424.

'^ Author of the widely read book, "China's Only Hope."

54 Modern Constitutional Development in China

were taken looking toward the consolidation of governmental
posts, with the practical effect of doing away with a good
many sinecures.

In 1905 a Special Commission was sent abroad to study for-
eign constitutional systems. From the return of this Commis-
sion in 1906 dates the beginning of the period of constitutional
reform under the Manchus, as distinguished from the reform
movements of previous years. The feeling had gradually been
growing that there must be some germ of strength in Occi-
dental governments that was unknown to the Chinese. To
locate and introduce that source, it was thought, was all that
was needed to enable China to regain her position of superior-
ity in the world. The ten years from 1895 to 1905 had pre-
pared the people of the Empire to accept conservatively radi-
cal innovations in their government. The foreign impact had
served in the place of what Mill lays down as one of the es-
sential functions of a good government — educating the people
for a better form of government. In China this meant, first
of all, breaking down the conservatism of the official class
and extending the view of the class known as the literati.
This had been brought about to a limited extent by a combina-
tion of several factors.

One of the most promising fields for the investment of
foreign capital in China was early seen to be in the develop-
ment of railways and allied means of communication. It took
a long time to overcome the prejudices of the Chinese against
such an innovation as the steam engine. After the war with
Japan, however, the government felt itself unable to resist
the demands that were being pressed continually for conces-
sions to build railways, develop mines, etc. Consequently the
period from 1895 to 1905 saw projects under way which bade
fair to connect up the whole country in a system of railways.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 55

The Chinese attitude gradually changed from that of hostility^
to the building of railways to a recognition of the dangers
involved in the political influences which, through such con-
cessions, were gradually marking off China into spheres of in-
terest. This change of attitude did not check development
but rather tended to promote it by causing the Chinese them-
selves to go into the work.

These railways, together with the postal and telegraph sys-
tems that had been developed under foreign supervision,
brought Peking into direct and immediate touch with the
provincial governments, and made it possible for the central
governn^ent to exercise a greater degree of control over its
agents in the provinces. The very fact that the initiative had
been taken by the Imperial authority instead of coming from
the provinces individually and that the work was thus under
its immediate control gave a direct impetus to the movement
toward centralization of the government. With easy and
rapid communication, problems arising in the provinces came
to be referred to Peking for settlement to a much greater ex-
tent than had been possible in the past, so that not so great a
necessity remained for the former practical autonomy of the
provinces. Naturally the gentry in the provinces fought
against being brought under the control of what was to them
almost a foreign authority, and their opposition was far from
negligible. But certainly, up to the beginning of the attempt
at constitutional reform in 1905, the growth of the new systems
of communication had made practical the endeavor of the Im-
perial Government to centralize the administration at Peking.

Perhaps the greatest incentive to constitutional change in
China came from Japan. That country owed all of her early

^ The Woosung Railway, opened June 30, 1876, was 're-
deemed' by the Chinese, and in 1877 the rails were torn up and
shipped to Formosa.

56 Modern Constitutional Development in China

civilization to China. Confucianism had as much weight in
Japan as in China. Buddhism had come to the Islands by
way of China. The Japanese Hterature was Chinese in origin
as was their written language. Their art was developed under
Chinese tutelage. The Chinese people in thought and feeling,
consequently, refused to admit their neighbors to a position
of equality. But of recent years a change had come in the
relations between the two countries. Japan was getting her
inspiration from foreign sources, and under this inspiration
was continually growing stronger while China had become
the prey of foreign nations. The Japanese had grown so
strong that they had been able to secure release from the hu-
miliating system of exterritoriality, at the same time gaining
control of their customs service. China herself had felt the
humiliation of defeat by Japan, who had then asserted her
right to a voice in Chinese affairs and had ranged herself with
the despoilers of the "Middle Kingdom." The great and
powerful England had come to Japan to ask her friendship
and alliance.^ And, finally, Japan had become strong enough
to wage a successful war against the colossus of the East,
Russia. When the Chinese asked himself what the reason for
this change in the respective positions of Japan and China
could be, he found the answer ready-made, — Constitutional
Government. Japan's growth in strength and power dated
from 1867 when she had accepted the inevitable and begun
to study and adopt Western institutions. This study had re-
sulted in the promulgation of a constitution. In that consti-
tution was to be found the source of power. Had not all
the Powers of the West, with the exception of Russia, con-

^ While England did not take the initiative in opening nego-
tiations for an understanding with Japan, the Chinese justifiably
felt that the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902,
and alliance of 1905 were visible signs that Japan had been raised
to an equality with the Powers of the West.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 57

stitutions? This sort of reasoning led to the conclusion that if
only China was governed under a constitution she too might
be able to grow strong and regain her ancient position as dic-
tator of the terms of intercourse with the "outer barbarians."

The nature of constitutional development under the Man-
chu Dynasty shows clearly the influence of the study the Com-
mission made of the Constitution of Japan. In that country it
was found that constitutionalism and Imperial authority were
far from antagonistic. P\mdamentally the power of the Em-
peror and of the great Lords had not been weakened. A study
of the political institutions of Japan might well have convinced
the Empress Dowager of the innocuous nature of foreign in-
novations in the government of that country. And the ad-
Vantages were readily apparent that would accrue to her and
to the Dynasty through a reform which would show the people
that she had their welfare at heart, and at the same time would
not limit her own power. So it was not long after the return
of the Special Commission until the Manchu Dynasty had defi-
nitely committed itself to a programme of constitutional
change.

The members of the Special Commission sent abroad to
study governmental systems submitted their reports in 1906.
An Imperial edict ordered that these reports should be con-
sidered by Tsai Feng, the Prince of Ch'un, with the Ministers
of the Grand Council, the Ministers of the Council of State,
the Grand Secretaries, and Yuan Shih-kai, the Superintend-
ent of Trade for the North; and that after such joint consider-
ation they should "request an Imperial decree authorizing the
proper form of procedure." The programme of reforms laid
down in the decree issued^ as a result of the joint memorial
was very far reaching in its provisions, and laid an enormous
task on the government if honestly carried into effect. The

® September i, 1906.

58 Modern Constitutional Development in China 4

weakness of China was stated to be due to the lack of confi-
dence between the highest and the lowest — "between the
Throne and the Ministers and the Masses." The strength of
foreign nations was found to be in the constitutions granted
to the masses, and in universal suffrage. Applying this prin-
ciple, the Empress laid down the fundamentals which must
guide the Throne in introducing this universal panacea into
China.

"As for ourselves, it is necessary at present to make a care-
ful investigation into the matter, and prepare ourselves to
imitate this government by constitution, in mJiich the supreme
control must be in the hands of the Throne, while the interests
of the m<isses shall he given to the elect, advanced to such po-
sition by the suffrage of the masses."^^

The Empress Dowager knew instinctively where the differ-
ence lay between representative government and constitutional
autocracy. As Mill so well says : "the meaning of representa-
tive government is, that the whole people, or some portion of
them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by them-
selves the ultimate controlling power, which, in every consti-
tution, must reside somewhere. This ultimate power they
must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters.^
whenever they please, of all of the operations of govern-
ment."^^

It was no part of Tzu Hsi's programme of constitutional re-
form that the ultimate power should pass from the Throne to
the people. So she stated as the first principle of China's con-
stutionalism that the supreme control lay in the hands of the
ruler. From this it followed that the representatives of the

^^ China Year Book, 1912, p. 353. The italics are the author's.
See also Am. For. Relations, 1906, p. 349-50. Inclosure i in No.
386, for a similar translation.

" "Representative Government," Ch. V. Everyman Ed., p. 228.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 59

"masses" were merely to be periodically called into consulta-
tion, their advice being accepted or rejected at the will of the
Throne. In their attempt to introduce constitutional forms
and at the same time preserve autocratic power the rulers of
the Empire had a guide close at hand, as has already been
pointed out. The Japanese constitution reserves the ultimate
control to the Emperor and his advisers, leaving only the right
of criticism and of petition to the Assembly or Diet. The ten-
dency, of course, has been for the Diet gradually to extend its
sphere of action, and one of the interesting features of Japa-
nese political development has been the struggle to bring the
Ministers of the Crown under the control of the Assembly.
But the fact still remains that the final control lies with the
Crown. The essence of Japanese constitutional government
is autocracy, and it was that principle which Tzu Hsi tried to
transplant to China in her endeavor to strengthen the hold of
the Manchu Dynasty on the Empire. To anyone familiar
with the history of constitutional development in Japan, the
similarity of the Manchu movement in China will be increas-
ingly apparent as the different steps leading up to the estab-
lishment of the Constitution and the summoning of the first
Parliament are considered.

In a constitution, then, the Empress Dowager expected to
find the means of strengthening the Empire, and at the same
time of preserving the supremacy of the Manchu. She was
wise enough to perceive, however, that the transition from
the old form to the new could not be made in a day ; that be-
fore the Chinese could hope to derive any benefit from the
introduction of constitutional government they must be edu-
cated and prepared for it. There was the further necessity
for her to let it be definitely understood that her programme
involved gradual rather than precipitate reform in order to
conciliate the conservatives and secure their support.

6o Modern Constitiitional Development in China

"Any impetuosity shown in introducing these reforms,"
said Her Majesty/" "will at the end be so much labor lost.
How can we then face our subjects in such circumstances, and
how regain their confidence and faith in us? It is incumbent
upon us as a beginning, therefore, to reform the official sys-
tem; next to revise carefully the laws in their most minute de-
tails ; promote and encourage universal education ; regulate the
finances and sources of revenue of the Empire; reorganize
the army; and establish a strong gendarmerie throughout the
Empire. The gentry and people will then understand the kind
of government needed for the country, and be prepared to
start the foundations of a Constitutional Government, whilst
the officials, high and low, in Peking and elsewhere, will use
their best endeavors to bring our desires to a triumphant com-
pletion. In a few years time, when it is found that there is
a rough outline of what is needed, the time will come for ap-
pointing a day for the inauguration de facto of a Constitu-
tional Government." The Edict concludes with the usual ex-
hortation to high officials "to issue proclamations to their peo-
ple, to show an enthusiastic desire for education, to be loyal
and patriotic, to sacrifice for the good of all, and to refrain
from destroying a grand structure through petty strife and
private quarrels. Let all observe law and order, and prepare
themselves to enjoy the solid advantages of a Constitutional
Government."^^

The first of the reforms preparatory to the establishment
of a constitution was the reorganization of the administrative
system. An Imperial edict issued on November 6, 1906^* set
forth the changes that were to be made, following the sugges-
tions of the Royal Commission that had been appointed to

^^ Edict of Sept. i, 1906.

^^ China Year Book, 1912, p. 353. Ch. XXI.

^*Ibid., p. 354. . . >

Modern Constttttional Development in China 6i

consider administrative reform. In effect the changes made
amounted either to a mere alteration in the name of a depart-
ment or Board, or to the consolidation of Boards under the
old or a new name. Thus "the Hsunchingpu (Board of Public
Safety) is changed to the Minchengpu (Board of the In-
terior)"; and "the Board of War (Pingpu) is to be changed
to the Army Board (Luchunpu), and the Council of Army
Reorganization and the Court of the Imperial Stud are to be
amalgamated with it.""

Before this time each Board had two Presidents and four
Vice-Presidents, divided equally, in theory, between Manchu
and Chinese. This edict provided, however, that no distinc-
tion should be made in the future between the two peoples,^^
and that each Board, with the exception of the Waiwupu,^^
should have only one President and two Vice-Presidents.
Ostensibly aimed at promoting a closer feeling of union be-
tween the two races by removing the distinctions between
them, this provision had the opposite effect, for it resulted in
the appointment of Manchus to the greater number of im-
portant offices," where formerly the Court had been under
the necessity of bala|jM^Ing a Manchu appointment with a
Chinese. The first direct reference to a National Assembly
(Tzechengyuan) was also made, this edict stating that it was
to be created as an additional department.

The zeal for constitutional reform, or the introduction of
representative government, did not abate during 1907. But
in spite of all the exhortations of the Throne to the officials

^^ For a description of the reorganized Boards of Ministries
see China Year Book, 1912, Ch. XIV. The Government.

" See also edict August 10, 1907 and Sept. 27, 1907, giving in-
structions for abolition of privileges of Manchu Bannermen.

^■^ Board of Foreign Affairs, known before 1900 as the Tsungli
Yamen.

^^ China Mission Year Book, 1910, Ch. Reforms and Changes.

62 Modern Constitutional Development in China

urging- the education of the people and the introduction of
local self-government, there was little real progress. It is true
that the "Office for the Investigation of Administrative Meth-
ods" which had been established with Prince Ch'ing at its
head, was specialized and made an "Office to arrange for Con-
stitutional Government." Furthermore, in response to a me-
morial from Prince Ch'ing and H. E. Sun Chia-Nai, regula-
tions for the reorganization of the Provincial Governments
and of the Manchurian Administration were drawn up and
promulgated, but these naturally had very little immediate
effect. It is not necessary to dwell at any great length on
many of these memorials and edicts.

Nevertheless a few steps in advance were taken and must be
noted. Hitherto while there had been recognition of the need
for a National Council or Assembly no move had been made
to establish such a body. By an Imperial decree of September
20, 1907, the declaration was made that "as the principle of
constitutional government requires that political questions be
decided by public opinion, and as the Upper and Lower
Houses of a Parliament are the source of political acts, it is
extremely urgent that a National Asfjlmbly (Tzechengyuan)
be created to serve as the foundation of a Parliament, inas-
much as the latter cannot be established at present. Accord-
ingly We hereby appoint Pu Lun and Sun Chia-nai to be
Presidents of the said Council, who, in conjunction with the
Grand Council, shall carefully draw up detailed regulations
therefore for promulgation."

The making of regulations is both a pastime and a profes-
sion of the Chinese official class, so that very often drawing
them up becomes an end in itself, instead of merely the means
to an end. Frequently, with the promulgation of regulations
the reform is considered to be accomplished. Thus a month
after the above provision was made for establishing the As-

Modern Constitutional Development in China 63

sembly it was considered to have been duly instituted. ^^ The
National Assembly having been provided for, the Empress
next proceeded to outline another step in her constitutional
programme.

One of the great benefits that foreign countries were sup-
posed to derive from their constitutional governments was a
closer sympathy between the governed and their rulers. In
order to realize this advantage there must be some way for the
Central Government to ascertain and direct public opinion.
The administrative officers could not be expected to point out
the evils in their own administration of the laws, or to suggesf
changes by which their authority might be limited. There
were, it is true, the censors, of whom mention has been made.
The Censorate consisted of about fifty-six men,^° but they
were scattered throughout the Empire, usually two to a prov-
ince, and they lacked the intimate touch with local conditions
and needs necessary to make them effective spokesmen for
the people of China. Furthermore, their representative ca-
pacity was limited by the method of their appointment and by
the nature of the duties laid upon them. They were not ex-
pected to represent the people, but were rather agents of the
Imperial Government sent out to report, not on the needs of
the people, but on the acts of the various officials: whether
they were faithful to the Dynasty, and how well they were
carrying out the wishes of the Emperor. Sometimes their
criticisms were expressions of public opinion, as in the case
of the memorials sent in urging the necessity of providing an
heir for the Emperor T'ung Chih, to carry on the worship at

19 "We some time ago issued an edict establishing a National
Assembly in the Capital to serve as the foundation of the future
Parliament" states a decree issued a month after the one quoted
above.

^° "China in Law and Commerce," p. 156,

64 Modern Constitutional Development in China

his tomb. But as a rule they gave voice to the views of the
literati and the official class rather than the sentiment of the
masses.

While the National Assembly was intended to advise the
central government concerning the needs and desires of the
people, the freedom of action left to the governors of the
provinces made it advisable to establish similar informative
Councils at the seats of provincial government. These pro-
vincial assemblies were in the nature of training schools for
service in the National Assembly.

Although the elective principle was introduced, membership
in the assemblies was in fact by appointment. The Gover-
nors and Viceroys were "carefully to select upright and ex-
perienced officials and gentry to begin the work, and to order
qualified people to elect worthy and able men to be the mem-
bers of the said assemblies, and vigilantly to guard against the
entrance of persons of an insubordinate disposition or of dis-
orderly conduct, of selfish pursuit, or of wilfulness."'^

The function of the assembly was purely advisory. The
members were authorized to discuss local affairs and make
recommendations to the Viceroy or Governor, but they could
not enforce their will in opposition to that of the administra-
tion. The Throne reserved to itself the right of final decision
on all matters of importance. Provision for a degree of co-
operation between Peking and the Provinces was made through
the National Assembly being empowered to communicate di-
rectly with the provincial assemblies and vice versa, in addition
to the right of address through official channels.

This edict was followed by one issued just before the close
of the year" reiterating the need of constant preparation be-

"^ Edict of Oct. 19, 1907, China Year Book, 1912, pp. 355-56.
^-December 25, 1907, China Year Book, 1912; December 24,
1907, American Foreign Relations, 1908.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 65

fore the Constitution could be promulgated. The need for
orderly progression was emphasized and the people were urged
to leave the decision of public matters to the duly constituted
assemblies, which would discuss all popular grievances. When
the provincial assembly reached an important conclusion its
decision was to be forwarded to the National Assembly for
further consideration. The communication was to be made
through the highest provincial officer. The edict announced
that regulations governing the press and public meetings were
being drawn up in order to check the tendency manifested to-
ward unlicensed and revolutionary criticism of the govern-
ment and the Dynasty.'^

It can of course be seen, from the nature of these later
proposals and changes, that the Empress was facing a grow-
ing feeling of unrest in the provinces. Hard times resulting
from poor harvests brought forth the usual results, — brigand-
age and an outspoken criticism of a government which could
not bring peace and plenty to the people. It must be remem-
bered that the Emperor and his people stood in the relationship
of a father to his children. So long as there was food in the
larder and clothes on the backs, the people would find little
reason for censuring the government. But during these years
conditions were changing from bad to worse and immediately
the Manchus were blamed. General criticism might easily be-
come so widespread as to lead to revolution. For this reason
Tzu Hsi called attention to the fact that steps were being
taken to relieve the condition of the people by giving them a
constitutional government; that agencies had been created

23

This edict was generally considered to have been called
forth by the popular meetings which had been held in the prov-
inces protesting against certain policies of the Imperial govern-
ment in connection with railway loans, policing of the West
River, etc. See Am. For. Rel., 1908, p. 176-7. Inc. in No. 804
and No, 804.

66 Modern Constitutional Development in China

through which abuses could be pointed out and criticisms
made; and finally that it was essential to the maintenance of
peace and order that the people should not harass the officials
but should make known their wants through the agencies pro-
vided and wait patiently for a change for the better.

The steps taken by the beginning of 1908 may be summar-
ized as : ( I ) the acceptance in principle of the idea of Con-
stitutional Government; (2) the establishment of a commis-
sion to investigate procedure; and (3) the issuance of instruc-
tions for the institution of a National and of provincial As-
semblies. It should be noted however that these instructions
were vague in nature and were so enacted as to free the Throne
of responsibility for their observance. No time was set within
which the assemblies were to be constituted, and there was
danger that they would exist only on paper.

CHAPTER IV

In China more than in most other countries internal prog-
ress has been both hastened and retarded by forces apparently
unconnected with those definitely at work to bring about in-
stitutional changes. From the standpoint of international af-
fairs, even after the second enunciation of the policy of the
"open door" in 1901, Chinese integrity was menaced by the
maintenance of Russian power in the North which might at
any favorable moment be directed against the Empire. The
Russian menace was removed by the success of Japan in 1905,
and it was some time before Japan's policy unfolded itself so
fully as to cause her to be regarded as threatening China. In
addition to the struggle in the North between Japan and
Russia, however, the foreign contact was being felt by China
in the economic field. Railway concessions were granted and
the Empire bade fair to be bound together in that way. But
during the first few years of the century the old policy of the
Powers of using railway concessions to develop spheres of
interest was continued and it again appeared as though the
integrity of the Empire was menaced by this comparatively
new process of so-called peaceful penetration. In the years
preceding the revolution of 191 1, however, came the begin-
ning of the movement toward international cooperation in-
stead of competition in railway development in China. But
before this the building of railways by foreigners and their
operation under foreign supervision began to be looked upon
with suspicion by the Chinese people. This suspicion was not
unjustified, especially during the six or seven years after 1900.
One result of this suspicion was the attempt of the Chinese

67

68 Modern Constitutional Development in China

themselves to build railways. Another was an increased hos-
tility to the Central Government, and this strengthened the
lack of belief in its reform programme. Again, the building
of roads under the old sphere of interest idea led the Manchu
government to embark on the policy of centralization of con-
struction and operation which brought it into direct conflict
with provincial interests and which precipitated the outbreak
of 191 1.

The ability of the Powers to dictate to China, after the
Boxer uprising had been put down by foreign arms, led them
to insist on modernizing the governmental and also the eco-
nomic system. From the latter point of view the Powers de-
sired to see the abolition of the internal customs barriers and
wanted a thorough investigation and reform of the currency
system. Up to the outbreak of the revolution nothing had
been done, but the Ministers at Peking continually agitated the
question of these reforms. Governmentally the Powers de-
sired to see an extension of the control of the Central gov-
ernment over the provinces in order that treaty provisions
might be uniformly carried out, and so that they could hold
the Imperial government responsible for the protection of for-
eign interests throughout the Empire. For these reasons they
were interested observers of the movement toward constitu-
tional government and served as a continual stimulus to the
reform zeal of the Manchus.

The events of the years after 1894 served in another way
to complicate the task of the Central government. The war
with Japan left China with an indemnity to pay as, to a far
greater extent, did the Boxer uprising. Necessary military re-
organization, currency reform if undertaken, and the abolition
of the internal customs all presented new and serious financial
problems to the government. Taxes were fixed by custom
rather than by the changing needs of the State, and to gain

Modern Constitutional Development in China 69

the sums needed by increased taxes meant the arousing of
certain antagonism at the time when the Manchus needed to
conciliate instead of stirring up ill-feehng. To borrow meant
the pledging of revenue services or the granting of conces-
sions and could only give temporary relief. In both cases the
people were certain to be aroused against a government which
was apparently giving over the country to the foreigner.

During the first half of the decade of Manchu reform the
government itself did not see clearly what was happening.
Consequently the Manchus were not so interested in reforms
that would really strengthen China as they became in the last
two years of the period. As has been pointed out already not
much was really accomplished in the way of reform, except
on paper before 1908. The edicts issued were vague in their
pronouncements and the activity of Peking was mainly horta-
tory.

A much greater definiteness characterized the important en-
actments of 1908 than had been shown in any of the edicts of
previous years. The movement began to assume a more con-
crete form. The action taken during 1908 followed three dis-
tinct lines: i) regulations governing the provincial assem-
blies were sanctioned by the Throne, the assemblies to be sum-
moned within a year; 2) the fundamental principles of the
Constitution were promulgated; and 3) a definite programme
of constitutional change, leading up to the calling of the Na-
tional Parliament within nine years, was issued under the Im-
perial sanction.

The provincial Assemblies were provided for as part of the
national constitutional machinery, and not merely as local self-
government bodies, so that an examination of their organiza-
tion, powers, and limitations is essentially a part of a study
of constitutional development.^

^ "The method of operation of the Parliament and the pro-

yo Modern Constitutional Development in China

The difference between the existing provincial system of the
Chinese Empire and local government in foreign countries like
England or Germany seems to have been clearly recognized
by the "Office" to which had been given the task of drawing
up regulations governing the provincial Assemblies. The
regulations were embodied in a memorial submitted to the
Throne, and sanctioned by an Imperial Rescript of July 22,
1908. The memorialists stated that "owing to the size of the
Chinese Empire local administration centers in the Viceroy
and Governor, thus marking a differentiation from the for-
eign type of government. The provincial authorities are un-
der the direct control of the Throne, another point of differ-
ence. The provincial assemblies, while concerned with local
government and designed to voice popular opinion, cannot be
held to diminish the supreme authority of the Central Gov-
ernment. It must not be forgotten that all deliberative bodies
are restricted in their functions to debate. They have abso-
lutely no executive powers."^ The next few sentences indi-
cate the countries from a study of whose institutions had been
drawn the principles of constitutional government applicable
in China. "In foreign constitutional governments the pow-
ers of popular deliberative bodies are similarly restricted. In
Germany the promotion and removal of officials is expressly
reserved as a prerogative of the Throne, likewise in Japan.'"

We have seen that the Empress Dowager based her whole
programme on the principle that constitutionalism did not
imply a lessening of the Imperial power. It followed, then,
that the functions of the assemblies would be so limited as not

vincial deliberative assemblies will be identical" wrote the me-
morialists whose regulations for the provincial Assemblies re-
ceived the Imperial sanction,

^ Translation, Inclosure in No. 989, Am. For. Relations, 1908.

3 Ibid.

Modern Constitutional Development in China yi

to infringe on Royal prerogatives. Tlie provincial deliber-
ative assemblies, according to section i of the regulations, were
to "act as places where the public opinion of the respective
provinces may be ascertained; they shall also deliberate as to
what would seem to be beneficial for the Province and shall
advise their superiors of their opinions. The above shall be
their principal function."*

The assemblies were not expected to act as critics of the
government nor to hold it to accountability for its acts. It
would seem that a large scope for discussion and action by
the assemblies was allowed since they might : i ) determine
the policy of the province; 2) make preliminary estimates of
the income and expenditure of the province; 3) settle the
amount of the above; 4) determine the taxes to be levied and
the funds to be borrowed; 5) decide as to innovations in the
provinces (additional taxes, etc.) ; 6) decide as to changes in
the administration of the provincial government; 7) elect dele-
gates to the constitutional assembly; 8) answer questions put
by the constitutional assembly; 9) answer questions put by the
Viceroy or Governor; 10) supervise the local self-government
societies; and 11) receive and consider the proposals of the
local self-government societies and the people.^

But in their discussions on the first seven topics enumer-
ated they were limited to a consideration of specific proposi-
tions brought before them by the Viceroy or Governor. No
debates were allowed on the budget, the assembly only mak-
ing estimates and settling the amounts. If the recommenda-
tions of the assembly were considered unwise by the authori-
ties they were to be reconsidered. If they did not choose to
revise or withdraw their proposals after reconsideration, the

* Trans. Incl. in No. 989, Am. For. Relations, 1908, p. 183.
^ Ibid., p. 186. Art. VI, Powers and Duties of the Assembly
sec. 21.

^2 Modern Constitutional Development in China

provincial officials were empowered to lay the matter be-
fore the assembly in Peking, whose decision was final. Ow-
ing to the limitations imposed on the National Assembly, ref-
erence to Peking amounted simply to bringing the difference
of opinion before the Imperial administration. While the
Viceroy or Governor had the right to question the assembly on
any matter, the converse did not hold true. The assembly
could request information from the administration but a de-
tailed answer could be avoided on the ground that a certain
amount of secrecy was necessary.®

The indirect method^ of selecting members of the assem-
blies was chosen as more applicable to a country in which rep-
resentative government was a novelty. The right to vote for
electors was extended to all males twenty-five years of age
who possessed any one of five sets of qualifications. These
were: i) Having been successfully engaged for three years or
more in teaching or in some other occupation conducive to the
public good; 2) having graduated from a middle school, or
school of corresponding grade, in China or abroad, and pos-
sessing proof of the same; 3) having the former literary de-
gree of a senior licentiate (kung-sheng) or a higher one; 4)
having held any substantive official post of the seventh civil
or fifth military rank or higher, and not having been degraded

^ Ibid., Arts. 22-30, sec. 26.

'' "The method of election is a double or indirect one, the mem-
bers of the Council (Assembly) being elected by electoral col-
leges, one college in each Fu. The members of the electoral col-
leges are elected by the voters of all the hsien in one Fu. Each
hsien elects so many voters to the electoral college, each voter
casting a single vote irrespective of the number of members to
be elected from the particular hsien. In the second election each
Fu electoral college elects so many members of the Council, each
voter in the electoral college casting only one vote." Prof. L. R.
O. Bevan, China Mission Year Book, 191 1. Ch. III. The New
Chinese Constitution.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 73

on impeachment; 5) having any business capitalized for
$5,000 or possessing real estate to that value. ^

The reasons for not granting universal suffrage were stated
by the memorialists to be that "at the present time when a
beginning is being made in the establishment of elective offices,
the universal franchise cannot be granted. If a property
qualification alone were demanded it would tend to inculcate
money greed among the people and lead them to honor the
rich. So various cjualifications have been selected and the
range has been widened to include other things besides ma-
terial wealth. There have been added qualifications of repu-
tation, learning and official office, all of which are adjudged
of equal importance with wealth, and any one of which will
entitle a man to vote. And thus the admission of unqualified
men to vote will be avoided and no partiality will be shown."®

Each regular session of the assembly was to last about
forty days, but provision was made for continuity through

^ Am. For. Relations, 1908, p. 184. Art. Ill, sec. 3. Sec. 4 pro-
vides that men who were not natives of the province but had
lived there ten years and had money invested there to the amount
of $10,000 might vote. Further, any native of a province or
any non-native over 30 years of age, who had lived ten years in
the province, might be elected to the Assembly.

^ Sec. 6 — disqualifications were i) any turbulent or lawbreak-
ing person; 2) any person who has suffered imprisonment or
any more serious penalty of the law ; 3) any person who has been
engaged in a disreputable business ; 4) any person who has been
put under suspicion in a business matter and not been exoner-
ated; 5) any opium user; 6) any insane person; 7) any who
himself or a member of whose family is engaged in a disreputable
pursuit ; 8) any illiterate person. Sec. 7 — Occupational dis-
qualifications— i) tenure of public office in province or acting as
private secretary to any official; 2) enrollment as a soldier, or
in first or second reserves; 3) holding a commission as a police
officer; 4) religious occupation as Taoist or Buddhist priest or
teacher in any other creed; 5) being enrolled as a student in
any school.

74 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the establishment of a permanent committee which should
carry on the work of the assembly while it was not in session.
Furthermore when necessary, special sessions could be called
by the Viceroy or Governor.

The power of adjourning the assembly for cause was vested
in the head of the provincial administration, as was also the
right to dissolve it with the sanction of the central authori-
ties. The acts for which an assembly might be dissolved were
four in number: The expression of sentiments reflecting un-
favorably on the Throne; any act calculated to disturb the
peaceful rule of the country; refusal to adjourn when ordered
to by the Viceroy or Governor, or refusal to yield after hav-
ing been adjourned several times; and, finally, the refusal of
a considerable number of the members of the assembly to at-
tend its meetings, after having been summoned several times. ^°

It is hardly necessary to point out that in no way had the
hold of the official class on the administration been directly
relaxed by the creation of these assemblies. They did offer
a point of departure for resistence to disliked governmental
policies, it is true, and they were so used subsequently. But
their chief value to the cause of reform in China lay in their
ability to bring the government into touch, to a certain extent,
with local sentiment. Public opinion is far from being de-
spised in China, the great necessity being to devise a way to
give it true national expression. The provincial assemblies,
in spite of their limited sphere of action, were able to bring
a surprising pressure to bear against unpopular government
measures from the very fact that they did give a voice to the
popular opinions. ^^

1° Art. VII and Art. VIII. The italics are the author's.

^^ Furthermore, they were stronger relatively than the national
assembly from the beginning because of the traditional admin-
istrative decentralization of the country which resulted prac-
tically in provincial autonomy.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 75

In this connection it is interesting to note that the greatest
efforts of the assemblies were bent towards checking the in-
creasing assumption of authority by the Central Government
over the provincial administration ; in other words, as we shall
see later, the creation of these assemblies checked the Imperial
policy of centralization.

Turning our attention again to Peking, an edict was issued
on August 27, accepting the "Principles of the Constitution"
as presented in a memorial from the officials to whom had
been given the task of framing the constitution. In the me-
morial was embodied a discussion of the different ways in
which constitutions are gained — some being granted from
above, and some coming from the pressure brought to bear on
the Government by the people. "It should be noted," the
memorialists wrote, "that the nations of the East and the
West all have established constitutional governments. Some
have done so by pressure from below and some under infl-
ences from above. All have constitutions and Parliaments.
Those which have established their constitutions under pres-
sure from below have commenced with strife between sover-
eign and people, and have ended the work by mutual con-
cessions between sovereign and people. Those that have es-
tablished their constitutions under influences from above have
first determined the ultimate authority of the Court, and there-
after there has been granted to the people the advantage of
inquiring about the affairs of government. ... In most of
the nations in which the constitution has been 'granted from
above the origin of all powers is in the Court. The Parlia-
ment must grow out of the Constitution, not the constitution
out of the Parliament. The government of China is to he
constitutional by Imperial decree. This is an unchangeable
principle. Therefore in regard to establishing a parliament,
the general principles of the constitution will be settled as a

y6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

preliminary. When they are announced the Parliament may
be assembled. The principles of the constitution are the great
lazvs ivhich may not he discussed. Once fixed they may not be
lightly altered. . . . The constitution is designed to conserve
the power of the sovereign and protect the officials and the
people.'"^

The general purport of the "principles" is so clearly laid
down in the above passage that it is only necessary to examine
the method by which the powers of the sovereign were to be
conserved, and parliamentary institutions operated without im-
pairing them.

From the first section of the "principles" which provided
that "the Ta Ts'ing Dynasty shall rule over the Ta Ts'ing
Empire for ever and ever, and be honored through all ages"
to the last clause of section fourteen "Parliament cannot inter-
fere" the supreme power of the Emperor was jealously pro-
vided for and safeguarded. All legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial power was to remain concentrated in his hands. The
Emperor alone could appoint and dismiss officials, and fix
their salaries. As commander-in-chief of the army and navy
he was to have the power to make laws and regulations for
both forces. In addition to the general legislative authority,
the Emperor was given the right to issue ordinances within
the limit of the law. All control over foreign relations was
vested in the Crown, as was the right to declare war and make
peace. Naturally the affairs of the Imperial Household and
the Imperial Ceremonies including the expenses of the Court
were withdrawn from outside interference. Unwilling to
leave anything to chance the framers of the constitution put
in two emergency clauses : one giving the Emperor the au-
thority, if circumstances required it, to issue edicts restricting

^- Am. For. Relations, 1908, Incl. i in No. 1005, p. 192. The
italics are the author's.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 7/^

the liberty of his subjects; and the other providing that "in
time of emergency, when Parhament is not in session, the
Emperor may issue edicts for the purpose of carrying on the
government, and for raising the necessary funds — these meas-
ures however must be submitted to Parhament when it next
assembles. "^^

All regulation of the time of meeting or adjournment of
Parliament was taken from its hands and maintained as one of
the prerogatives of the Crown. While the Assembly was
created ostensibly to aid in the government of the Empire the
sphere of parliamentary activity was so hedged about with
limitations as to render it impotent as a controlling or di-
recting organ. The fact that it did exercise an influence on
the administration was due not to its granted but to its usurped
powers, and to the political condition of the Empire at the
time it was first summoned.

Parliament was given power to propose legislation for the
consideration of the government; it might adopt measures of
government; and it might impeach Ministers for illegal acts,
but no action it took had any weight or validity save that de-
rived from the Imperial sanction. All matters affecting a
single province were removed definitely from its consideration.
It was granted the privilege of assisting in the compilation of
the budget of the Empire, but nowhere was the Assembly
given any control over it. Indeed such control was expressly
denied, since the Constitution provided that "regular expendi-
ture, authorized by the Emperor, and expenditure already
fixed by law shall not be abolished or reduced except in con-
sultation with the government."^*

^' "Principles of the Constitution," Powers of the Sovereign,
14 sections. Am. For. Relations, 1908. Incl. i in No. 1005, pp.
194-6. See also China Year Book, 191 2, for synopsis.

^* Sec. 3, 12 clauses. Am. For. Relations, 1908, Incl. i in
No. 1005, p. 195. Also China Year Book, 1912, Ch. XXI.

78 Modern Constitutional Development in China

In order to give effect to their decisions, after agreement
had been reached in both houses of Parliament, the conclu-
sions formulated had to be embodied in a memorial to the
Throne, transmitted through the President of the Upper
House. The presiding officer was not elected by the House
but was appointed by the Emperor. He was given control
over deliberations in the Parliament, wnth the right to order
anyone committing a breach of parliamentary rules to desist
from speaking, or to retire from the House. In addition to
this right, the President was empowered to strike off the roll
of the House any member found to be unqualified or unfit for
membership.^^ Thus the Parliament was not even allowed to
pass on the qualifications of its own members, and their free-
dom of expression was restricted by the condition that they
must not use disrespectful language concerning the Court or
abuse other persons.

In addition to the above provisions of the Constitution, a
section was included laying down the duties and privileges of
subjects of the Empire. The usual provision was made for
freedom of speech and meeting, subject to law; for the right
of legal trial in properly constituted courts; and for freedom
of property and residences from interference without due
legal reason. Their duties were to pay duly imposed taxes,
to perform military service, and to generally obey the laws.^^

The limitations imposed on both the provincial assemblies
and the National Parliament certainly justified the conclusion
reached by Mr. W. W. RockhilP^ that the object of the Im-

^^ The principles governing elections were laid down in the
"Principles of the Constitution." They were general in nature,
principally providing for supervision and due care in elections.
Ibid.

^^ Sec. 2, The Duties and Privileges of Subjects, 9 clauses.
Am. For. Relations, 1908. Incl. i in No. 1005, p. 195.

^^ American Minister at the Court of Peking.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 79

perial Government w^s "no other than a perpetuation of the
existing system under a thin veil of constitutional guarantees."
But as a matter of fact the institution of organs representa-
tive in their nature was a step so far in advance of anything
previously attempted that due credit must be given the hither-
to reactionary Empress Dowager and Court for having any
connection with such reforms. Furthermore such is the force
of what may be called public opinion in China that it would
have been almost fatal to the Dynasty continually to disregard
the recommendations of a legally constituted Parliament, espe-
cially in matters vitally affecting the interests of the nation.
That one is justified in assuming that Parliament would have
been able to exercise a considerable and ever increasing in-
fluence is evident from the pronounced activity of the National
Assembly in the last days of the Manchu rule/® and from the
influence exerted from the first by the provincial assemblies.

Simultaneously with the promulgation of the "Principles of
the Constitution," a programme of constitutional prepara-
tion, covering a period of nine years, was adopted. Each
year was to witness certain changes, such as the introduction
of local self-government, law reform, census taking, police
reorganization, the extension of the educational system so as
gradually to reduce illiteracy, the introduction of a budget and
auditing system, and the issue of constitutional laws, Im-
perial House Laws and Parliamentary Laws. The whole pro-
gramme culminated in the establishment of a Parliament and
the organization of a Privy Council and a Cabinet in the
ninth year.

The idea of extended preparations before the summoning of
a Parliament was undoubtedly borrowed from the Japanese
who had gone through a somewhat similar process before the

^® The work of the National Assembly is discussed in the fol-
lowing chapter.

8o Modern Constitutional Developrnent in China

granting- of their constitution. What the Manchu Dynasty
needed more than anything was a breathing space, — a time in
which to take stock of themselves, their weakness and their
strength as rulers of the Empire. This nine year period would
give just the opportunity so badly needed. Further, it was
felt that the reforms outlined would serve to convince not
only the Chinese but foreigners as well, of the zeal of the gov-
ernment for reform and change. If these nine years had been
conceded to the Manchus, the Dynasty might have been able
to control the situation so as to introduce political institutions
of a constitutional nature much better fitted to China and the
state of western political education of the Chinese people than
anything the Republic has been able thus far to develop. But
the very elaboration of the programme, bringing home to the
radicals in the Empire the slowness of the movement, served
to defeat its purpose, for it immediately called forth an agi-
tation for a material reduction of the time alloted to prepara-
tion. The times were out of joint for the Manchus; things
were moving too rapidly to suit them, and after 1908 they
were forced to bend every effort to stem the rising tide of
radicalism, anti-dynastic in its nature.

The reform movement was controlled and directed by Her
Majesty, the Empress Dowager, until the very hour of her
death. When it was clear that the Emperor Kwang Hsii
would not survive the year (1908) steps were immediately
taken to name his successor. The Empress was not content
even then to allow the reins to slip from her own hands, and
she practically forced the appointment of the infant son of
Prince Ch'un as the heir to the Throne. At the time when
this was done the Empress herself undoubtedly expected to
survive Kwang Hsii, continuing to govern as the virtual re-
gent. However, she caused Prince Ch'un to be named the
nominal Regent.

Modern Constitittional Development in China 8i

The ill-fated Emperor Kwang Hsii passed away October
14, 1908, and within twenty- four hours the death of the "Old
Buddha" herself was reported. With her death one of the
most masterful personalities of Chinese history quitted the
world, leaving an infant on the Dragon Throne, The reign
title of Hsuan T'ung was assumed.

The new Regent, Prince Ch'un, was a brother of the late
Emperor. He had held many high government offices under
Tzu Hsi, and had been connected directly with the work of
constitutional reform. Naturally now that the control was
in his hands all were interested in ascertaining his attitude
toward the changes that were under way.

The year 1909 was marked by the issuance of edicts pledg-
ing the new administration to the continuance of the reforms
outlined by Her Majesty the Dowager Empress in the nine
year programme.^" Thus the work of establishing local self-
government was pushed, the officials being urged to exercise
the greatest diligence in putting into effect the wishes of the
government.'^ One of the greatest dangers was that the offi-
cials would take action only on paper. This was clearly rec-
ognized and deprecated. "It is, however, to be feared, that
committing a long standing error, some of them (i.e. the pro-
vincial officials) may seek to discharge their responsibilities
by presenting a mere memorial, without taking any definite
action. They should bear in mind that these measures are of
the highest importance, and are to be carried out in com-

^° In an edict of November 25, 1909, are the following words:
"We will reverently obey the edict issued on the first day of the
eighth moon last year (August 27, 1908)." This edict contained
the "Principles of the Constitution" and the "Nine year pro-
gramme." See also, edict of March 6, 1909.

^^ Edict of January 18, 1909 — Financial reorganization was dis-
cussed in an edict of January 11, 1909.

82 Modern Constitutional Development in China

pliance with the plans of the late Emperor, as well as to satisfy
the aspirations of the people."^"

The most important event of 1909 was the meeting of the
provincial assemblies for the first time^^ in accordance with
the decree promulgating their regulations, and setting the time
for their initial convocation.^* From the beginning they be-
came a factor to be reckoned with in provincial government."
No detailed account of their labors was published, but it may
be said that these assemblies more than fulfilled expectations.
On the whole, they conducted their deliberations with dignity,
sincerity, and with due regard to the limits imposed on their
powers by the Throne. There were cases of friction between
the assemblies and officials, when the former did not scruple
to denounce what they considered the wrongful practises of
the latter.-^ In addition to their activity in the affairs of the
province, the assemblies led in the agitation for the early con-
vocation of Parliament, bringing all the force of provincial
opinion to bear on the Central Government, and giving real
weight to the agitation of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly met for the first time October 3,

"Edict of November 25, 1909. China Year Book, 1912, Ch.
XXI, p. 367.

^^ Oct. 14, 1909.

-* Edict of July 22, 1908.

^^ The expectations of the Throne with regard to the provincial
assemblies was as follows : "The respective Viceroys and Gov-
ernors are desired to gather and accept without predeliction or
prejudice the suggestions of the Assemblies, and put them into
operation after due deliberation, so that a unity of mind may be
established, and good government attained in course of time.
After the opening of the Assemblies the Viceroys and Governors
are further commanded to superintend their deliberations in ac-
cordance with the regulations and to see that the measures de-
cided upon neither exceed the proper bounds of authority, nor
contravene the laws of the land." Edict, Oct. 13.

^^ China Year Book, 1912.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 83

1 9 10, under regulations that had been sanctioned by an Im-
perial Edict of October 26, 1909. These rules were revised in
a few particulars in 191 1." They were in ten chapters. The
principles governing the Assembly were first laid down. The
President was to be chosen from among the Princes, Dukes,
or Ministers of State "of recognized merit," and he was to
direct all the affairs of the Assembly. In addition to the
President, there was to be a Vice-President, an official above
the third rank. Both of these men were to be appointed by
the Throne. Two principles governed the choice of members
of the Assembly, — i.e. Imperial selection and election. Out
of the total membership of two hundred the Emperor had
the right to choose one hundred, the other half being elected
by the provincial assemblies from their own membership.
The Imperial appointees were to come from seven different
classes, including representatives of the Manchu, Chinese,
Mongolian and Tibetan nobility, as well as representatives of
the official and literary classes, and the class of large tax-
payers.^*

2^ Since the revised rules were substantially the same as the
regulations of 1909 the former alone are discussed here. The
translation used is that given in the China Year Book for 1912,

PP- 377-396-

^® In deciding upon the representatives from these diiterent
classes a method of elimination was adopted. A list of all eligible
candidates in the first three groups was compiled and submitted
to the Throne for a selection of the proper number. Choice was
made from the other four groups by a combination of election
and Imperial selection. First of all an election was held, under
proper supervision, by all of those who were listed as members
of a particular group. This election provided a list of two or
three times the number of representatives the group was en-
titled to have in the Assembly. Then the Emperor selected from
this number those who were actually to serve.

84 Modern Constitutional Development in China

The hundred representatives from the provincial assembHes
were apportioned among the different provinces, according to
their size and estimated population. Thus the ChihH assembly
had the right to select nine, the Kuangtung assembly six,
et cetera. The assembly was to choose twice the number of
representatives it was entitled to have, submitting its choice
to the Superintendent of Elections, — the Viceroy or Gover-
nor of the Province. He then selected the proper number
from the head of the list and confirmed them as the mem-
bers of the National assembly from his province. Since the
members of the provincial assemblies were all chosen indi-
rectly by a carefully restricted suffrage, it can be seen that
little was left to the popular choice in the selection of even
the half of the membership of the National Assembly repre-
sentative of provincial and local interests.

The functions of the Assembly were to be substantially the
same as those laid down for the future Parliament in the
"Principles of the Constitution." It was to consider the na-
tional budget; national revenue and expenditure; revenue col-
lection and public loans; legislation; compilation of new laws
and revision of old ones, with the exception that matters af-
fecting the constitution were excluded from its consideration;
and matters specially referred to the Assembly by the Throne.
However, proposals under any one of the first four classified
heads had to be made by the Cabinet or the ministries and sub-
mitted to the Throne before being considered by the Assembly.
So that in fact it was only empowered to discuss matters sub-
mitted to it by the Emperor.

Chapter IV of the revised regulations dealt with the rela-
tions between the Assembly and the executive. The Ministers
were to be represented in the Assembly either in person or by
deputy, and had the right to present their views on its floor.
In its turn the Assembly might question the Ministers, the

Modern Constitutional Development in China 85

President or Vice-President serving as the medium of com-
munication. But the Ministers of State were not required to
answer these questions, although they did have to give reasons
for a refusal to reply. In case of disagreement between the
executive and the Assembly the final decision rested with the
Emperor. The National Assembly had the right to impeach
Ministers of State in a memorial to the Throne, the memorial
to be drawn up by the President and Vice-President only after
a two-thirds majority of the members present at the meeting
voted for such an impeachment. Here again the final deci-
sion rested with the Emperor.

While the Assembly had the right to call upon the provin-
cial assemblies for information concerning the public welfare,
all other direct communication with the provinces was denied
it. Differences of opinion between the provincial assemblies
and the Governors, as has already been noted, were to be sub-
mitted to the National Assembly for discussion, after which
the final decision would be made by the Throne. "But this
rule shall not apply to questions affecting the executive gov-
ernment. All such shall be sent forward to the Cabinet for its
consideration." The people were to have the right of petition-
ing the National Assembly, providing that the person so ad-
dressing it was guaranteed by a member from his own prov-
ince. The petition could only be considered by the Assembly
if it accorded with the law, and was free from disrespectful
language, and providing it concerned a matter with which the
Assembly was competent to deal.

An Assembly so constituted by Imperial appointment and
indirect election might well have been expected to remain sub-
servient to the Emperor and the Court. But quite the con-
trary was true. From the time of its convocation the Na-
tional Assembly led in the agitation for an early summoning
of Parliament and a shortening of the time of preparation.

86 Modern Constitutional Development in China

The result of the movement was the issuance of an Imperial
decree on November 4, 1910"^ promising the Parliament for
the fifth year of Hsuan T'ung (1913) instead of four years
later. At the same time a modified programme of constitu-
tional preparations was promised. However the Throne did
not give the assemblies the credit for having brought about
the change. The edict says, "there is no need for the high
Ministers and the people to beg and pray. We Ourselves have
arrived at this conclusion." And again, "the shortening of
the time limit is the result of taking the opinions of memorials
from the Viceroys and Governors, and of the most careful
counsel of the Princes and Ministers who have requested Our
decision."^"

While this edict did not satisfy the wishes of the National
Assembly for the immediate establishment of a Parliament,
other matters began to assume a greater importance. From
the first the Assembly and the Council of State came into con-
flict. Once it was over a loan contracted by the Governor of
Hunan province without consulting the provincial assembly.
Again, the Assembly attacked the Ministers because it had
not been consulted concerning some Salt Gabelle matters.
Several times the Assembly w^as on the point of impeaching
the Grand Council in a memorial to the Throne, but gave it
up because of concessions on the point at issue. Finally it did
call the attention of the Emperor to the fact that the Council
was an irresponsible body and should be placed under the con-
trol of the Assembly, demanding the creation of a responsible
Cabinet, and memorializing to that effect. As a result an
edict w^as issued^^ ordering the promulgation of the revised

^^ China Year Book, 1912, pp. 372-3.

3° Ibid.

"December 25, 1910.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 87

programme of constitutional preparation,^^ and also ordering
the Commission of Constitutional Reform to frame the official
constitution of the Cabinet and submit it to the Throne. This
practically conceded the point raised by the Assembly, so it
withdrew the memorial attacking the Grand Council.

According to the promise given the National Assembly, an
edict, creating a Cabinet and containing the regulations under
which it should be organized and carry on its duties was pro-
mulgated on May 8, 1911. By this edict the old advisory
bodies were abolished, the Cabinet taking their place. Far
from meeting the demand for a responsible ministry, the con-
stitution and regulations of the Cabinet showed clearly an
attempt on the part of the government to persuade the As-
sembly to accept the shell for the kernel of the nut.^^ The
new Cabinet was simply the old Grand Council under a new
name. The Ministers were the old heads of the Boards. All
members of the Cabinet were to be appointed by the Emperor
and were responsible to him alone. Nowhere was there the
slightest suggestion that the Assembly would exercise any
control over the Cabinet. The membership was to consist of
a Prime Minister, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Civil Af-
fairs, of Finance, Education, Agriculture, Industry and Com-
merce, Justice, Posts and Communications, and finally, the
Minister of Dependencies. The members of the Cabinet were
to have access to the Throne, but always in company with the
Prime Minister, who might be received at any time and alone.
Only the Ministers of War and of the Navy had the right to
present memorials directly to the Throne, without using the
intermediation of the Prime Minister.

^2 For the revised programme see China Year Book, 1912, p.

376.

^^ For translation of "Constitution of the Cabinet" and regu-
lations, see China Year Book, 1912, pp. 222-226.

88 Modern Constitutional Development in China

The functions of the Cabinet were precisely those of the
old Grand Council : to deliberate and advise on affairs of
State; to supervise the work of the different departments;
and to "formulate the national policy, in obedience to Im-
perial commands, and maintain the executive unification."
The Cabinet had the right to discuss: i) law bills, Imperial
Rescripts, and the official system; 2) budget balance; 3) ex-
penses not detailed in the budget; 4) treaties and important
diplomatic affairs; 5) movements of officials above those ap-
pointed by memorials; 6) conflict of powers of the different
departments; 7) matters submitted for discussion by special
edicts, or petitions of the people transmitted by Parliament;
8) important administrative questions of the different depart-
ments; 9) matters which should be discussed by the Cabinet
according to laws and regulations; 10) matters which, in the
opinion of the Prime Minister or the Ministers of the differ-
ent departments ought to be discussed by the Cabinet. All
questions were to be decided by majority vote.

The decisions reached by the Cabinet were not to have the
force of law, except after the Imperial sanction, which could
be given or withheld at will. In other words the members of
the Cabinet had only the right to memorialize the Throne for
its decision in a matter, and to submit advice on questions
when the Emperor wished their opinion. They received their
appointments from, and were responsible only to, the Emperor.

The same edict of May 8 created a Privy Council, which
was to consist of "personal advisers to the Emperor," This
Council was given no administrative power, but might me-
morialize the Throne on matters of ceremonial, investigation
and interpretation of constitutional laws, treaties and diplo-
matic negotiations, and the revision of its own regulations.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 89

In addition, special matters might be referred to it by the
Throne.^*

The progress of constitutional development during the last
months of 191 1 was strongly influenced by the revolution in
the Yangtze valley. For this reason it should be discussed in
connection with the revolution rather than as a part of the
normal course of constitutional development under the Man-
chus.

The revolution which broke out at Wuchang in October
191 1, created an abnormal condition. It is impossible to do
more than guess as to what would have been accomplished by
way of establishing a limited constitutional monarchy if the
Manchus had been allowed to carry out their programme un-
der normal conditions. Certainly the National Assembly and
the assemblies in the provinces showed from the very begin-
ning a decidedly progressive and at the same time obstreperous
spirit. The members of the National Assembly, many of them
Nobles, and all of them from the higher classes of society,
were practically unanimous in their decision that the essence
as well as the form of constitutionalism must be introduced.
Their ability to take matters into their own hands, to assume
an initiative and a power of direction in the reform move-
ment was indicated clearly during the first session. They did
not accomplish all that they wished to, but they did force
concessions from the Throne and the Ministers sufficient to
show them their power. It is safe to assume that they would
have been able, gradually, to gain the position in the govern-
mental system that Parliament holds in the English system,
relegating the Emperor to the position of a figure-head. Every
concession granted by the Crown to the Assembly would have
become, by usage, an inviolable right in a country where pre-

^* China Year Book, 191 2, p. 226.

90 Modern Constitutional Development in China

cedent is all important. Of course there is the possibility that
as the Assembly grew in power and importance it would have
tended to lose in progressiveness, but, together with the grad-
ual assumption of control by the Assembly would certainly
have gone a growth of political consciousness on the part of
the people of China, perhaps even greater than has resulted
from the introduction of republican institutions. So that,
as the gentry and upper classes established themselves, through
the Parliament, in place of the Imperial family as the supreme
governing power, they would have been subjected to as strong
a pressure from below as they themselves had exerted formerly
on the Crown. At any rate, if the constitutional programme
of the Manchus had been carried out, China would have been
given at least as stable and enlightened a government as that
of the Republic of the last eight years.

A comparison of constitutional development in Japan and
in China during the last days of the Manchu Dynasty is often
made, invariably lauding the success of the Japanese and dis-
paraging the work attempted in China. As a matter of fact
the conditions were so different as to make a comparison value-
less. Japan was a small and compact nation, whose rulers and
nobility were of the same stock as the common people. Com-
pared with China the government of Japan was highly cen-
tralized. The feudal condition of Japan made it possible to
set up a constitutional government which left the actual gov-
erning power in the hands of the small group of nobles, who
had exercised the actual governing power prior to the Restor-
ation, and who were experienced administrators. The Diet,
nominally elective, was in reality controlled by the nobility and
not by the people. In case of a conflict between the Ministers
and the Diet, it was only necessary to call upon the sacred
name of the Emperor to secure the acquiescence of the people
in the wishes of the government. In Japan the people were

i

Modern ConstititHonal Development in China 91

willing to accept an autocratic constitutionalism because it
meant simply the continuance of the old government.

Contrast with this the conditions faced by the Manchus in
China! They wished to gain the consent of the people to a
system intended to consolidate the supremacy of an alien race.
They were bent on centralization of the government, a policy
which found great opposition in the hitherto practically auton-
omous provinces. The work of reform had been undertaken
to placate a hostile people, and to counteract an anti-dynastic
agitation throughout the country. There was no such respect
for the word of the Emperor in China as in Japan. And
finally there was no group of capable administrators with suffi-
cient strength to dominate the administration. China had no
"Elder Statesmen" to lend equilibrium to the government!

There is a better reason to compare the progress made by
the Manchus with the constitutional progress under the Re-
public than to contrast it with the Japanese Restoration, and
the introduction of constitutional government into that coun-
try. It is unquestionable that the Manchus attempted to im-
pose the form of a constitutional government on China which
did not realize the spirit of such a system. But from the first
meeting of the assemblies it was evident that the control of the
situation had passed from the Throne to the representative
body. While neither the National Assembly nor the provin-
cial assemblies were representative of the mass of the people,
they represented, what is more important in a country like
China, different interests in the State. It was a class repre-
sentation undoubtedly but the Chinese people have always
been governed by a distinct official heirarchy and are not fitted
at the present time for anything else.^^ The classes repre-

^^ It must be remembered, of course, that admission to the
official class was open to all who could qualify in the examina-
tions, but this does not mean that the government was any the
less class government.

92 Modern Constitutional Development in China

sented in the assemblies were the Manchu and Chinese nobil-
ity, both representative of the same class of interests; the
bureaucracy, through the members who were selected from the
officials of the ministries; the literati, one of the most influ-
ential of all classes in China; those interested in the govern-
ment because they supported it by the payment of taxes; and,
finally, the provincial interests were given the largest repre-
sentation. The fact of the appointment of the membership of
the National Assembly does not take away from its repre-
sentative character.

As has been stated, all of the signs pointed to an eventual
control of the government by the Parliament, and not by the
Emperor. This change would have come about step by step
instead of all at once as has been the case since republican in-
stitutions have been introduced. It would have left a definite
symbol of power in the person of the Emperor, to which the
people could have rendered homage, instead of giving them
only the abstract conception of the State to hold their loyalty.
One-man-power is something understandable to the Chinese
mind. Representative government as a limitation of that
power is also understandable, but government by an Assembly
without one "Son of Heaven" to personify the power of gov-
ernment is not so easily comprehended.

The main thing emphasized by the constitutional monarch-
ists from the very beginning was the need of preparation in
order to fit the Chinese people to share in the government.
This was partly due to their imitation of the Japanese method
of introducing a constitutional regime; it is to be explained in
part, perhaps, by a desire to placate the people by words in-
stead of acts; but it was certainly owing, to a large extent,
to a realization of the real need for such preparation and
training. That representative or constitutional government
is nothing more than a phrase to many of the Chinese has been

Modern Constitutional Development in China 93

demonstrated beyond question since the establishment of the
RepubHc. The RepubHc itself has done a great deal to justify
the Manchu desire to "make haste slowly."

What China needed was what John Stuart Mill has called
a "government of leading strings." This is what constitu-
tional government under the Manchus would have given. But
such a government is desirable only if it prepares the nation
for higher forms of political institutions. In other words, the
supreme duty of a "government of leading strings" is the po-
litical education of the people so that they may be progressive-
ly better fitted for self-government. This educative function
was emphasized by the Manchus in their insistence on the
need for a period of preparation before true constitutional
government was introduced. It was a debatable question,
certainly, how far the Manchu rulers of China, if left to
themselves, could be trusted to carry out their own programme
in good faith. But the constant criticism and interference of
the National Assembly was calculated to help the Imperial
government to be true to its promises, and warrants the belief
that the ideal of political education would not have been ne-
glected.

Further speculation as to the possibility of ultimately achiev-
ing true constitutional government under the Manchu Dynasty
is useless. A new phase of constitutional development ap-
peared as a result of the series of events which culminated in
the establishment of a Republic at Nanking in 1912.

CHAPTER V

The revolution which accompHshed the overthrow of the
Manchu Dynasty, and the estabHshment of a Republic in
China, broke out at Wuchang on October lo, 191 1. From
a mere mutiny of the Wuchang garrison the movement rap-
idly spread up and down the Yangtze until it had become a
formidible opposition to the Manchu rule. The foreign edu-
cated Chinese and the European and American residents in
China alike hailed it as the first step in the regeneration of
the nation. At last the sleeping Dragon had shaken off its
lethargy! The Chinese people had arisen in their might and
declared their intention of replacing the autocracy of the
Manchu with the democracy of the West. Very few stopped
to question the basis for the claim that the revolt was an ex-
pression of the desire of the people for a free government.
Foreigners saw^ the revolution as an accomplished fact and
were satisfied. The Manchus had never welcomed foreign
trade or foreign innovations of any kind, and it was believed
that the new government, founded on foreign ideas, would be
instrumental in promoting a more friendly intercourse between
the East and the West. The establishment of a Republic in
China seemed to mark the end of the idea that "East is East
and West is West, and never the twain shall meet."

This feeling of the Europeans and Americans was played
upon by the revolutionary leaders to secure the support of the
Powers for the revolution. Great stress was laid on the fact
that foreign interests must be protected, and were protected
by the republican forces. The appeal addressed to the Powers
by Dr. Wu Ting-fang in a communcation to the foreign press

94

Modern Constittitional Development in China 95

is well worth quoting. "The foreign Powers individually and
collectively have stood hammering at the door of China for
centuries pleading for the diffusion of knowledge, a reforma-
tion of national services, the adoption of Western sciences and
industrial processes, the jettisoning of the crude, out-of-date
and ignoble concepts which have multiplied to keep the nation
without the pale of the great family constituting the civilized
world. They have failed. . . . "The Manchu Dynasty has tri-
umphantly carried on its reactionary policy despite the strong-
est pressure exerted from within and without, until the op-
pressed people could endure the disgrace and contumely of
it no longer. They rose, and with what result the history of the
past few weeks has shown. . . . "The Manchu Dynasty has
been tried by a patient and peaceful people for centuries and has
been found more than wanting. It has sacrificed the rever-
ence, forfeited the regard, and lost the confidence freely re-
posed in it by all Chinese. The popular wish is that the Dy-
nasty must go."

Concerning the policy of the revolutionists Dr. Wu wrote:
"We have, in short taken every possible step to protect vested
interests, safeguard international obligations, secure continu-
ance of commerce, and shield educational and religious in-
stitutions; and what is even more important, striven con-
tinually to maintain law and order, sustain peace, and pro-
mote a constructive policy upon sound and enduring grounds.
. . . "We must not be judged by the past; we are trying to
bring China into her own ; to elevate her to the standard that
the people of the Occident have ever been urging her to attain,
and the stumbling block today, as it has been during the past
centuries, is the Manchu Dynasty. Our foreign friends must
from a sheer sense of fairness concede that we have the right
to win the laurels of freedom by fair fight in the field, and
to avoid the rest we again appeal to them to use their influ-

96 Modern Constitutional Development in China

ence to secure in the Manchu mind recognition of the utter
hopelessness of the continuance of the Dynasty."^

Such an appeal was well calculated to secure the support
of foreigners for the revolution. The prejudices of the past,
self-interest, love of humanity and the spirit of fair play were
all invoked in turn. Nothing was said of the part the Chinese
had played in opposing the introduction of western industrial
methods, of western education, of railroads and the telegraph.
No mention was made of the part played by the people in the
anti-foreign riots and especially in the Boxer uprising. And
in fact foreigners were glad to accept the Republican protesta-
tions of friendship at their face value; to forget the past, or
blame it on the Manchus; and to hail the foundation of the
Republic as the dawn of a new era in the history of the Orient.

When defenders of the Republic were asked how an Oriental
despotism could be suddenly and permanently transmuted into
a modern democratic State, they pointed to the local self-
government which the Chinese had enjoyed for generations;
the common management of the affairs of the village under
the leadership of the head man chosen by the people and under
their control. The ability of the people to manage their own
local afifairs, it was said, showed that they could be entrusted
with the larger affairs of the nation.

But this local democratic government had engendered a
spirit of locality in the Chinese people which must be con-
sidered in estimating their ability to assume control of the
general government of the Empire. They had, and still have,
no conception of national as opposed to local interests. If
Russia seized territory in the North the people of Kuangtung
or Yunnan provinces felt no especial concern. Let the North
protect itself, was the feeling. If the Yellow River over-

^ China Year Book, 1912. The Revolution, pp. xvii-xx.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 97

flowed its banks, Shansi Province took the necessary steps to
protect itself without regard to the situation in Honan or
Shantung Provinces, perhaps even at their expense.

This spirit of locaHty had been strengthened by the nature
of the central authority to which the Chinese had become ac-
customed. The Manchu government had been interested in
the provincial administration only so far as the revenues had
been affected, or anti-dynastic agitation had arisen. It was
only in the last years of Manchu rule that an attempt had been
made to unify and centralize the administration.

John Stuart Mill, perhaps the ablest expounder of the prin-
ciples of representative government, lays it down as a general
rule that a people who have a strongly developed spirit of
locality are not ready for the introduction of representative
government. "One of the strongest hindrances to improve-
ment," he says, "up to a rather advanced stage, is an inveterate
spirit of locality. Portions of mankind, in many other re-
spects capable of, and prepared for, freedom, may be un-
qualified for amalgamating into even the smallest nation. . . .
They may, like the citizens of an ancient community, or those
of an Asiatic village, have had considerable practice in exercis-
ing their faculties on village or town interests, and have even
realized a tolerably effective popular government on that re-
stricted scale, and may yet have but slender sympathies with
anything beyond, and no habit or capacity of dealing with in-
terests common to many such communities."^

It is partly because such a spirit of locality had grown up
among the Chinese people, that it has proven, so far, impos-
sible for them to apply their local democratic institutions to
the national government, or to substitute a representative re-
publican government for the old Imperial rule.

^ "Representative Government," Everyman Edition, p. 222.

98 Modern Constitutional Development in China

In order to appreciate the Chinese attitude to the revolution
and the Republic we must briefly review the conception of gov-
ernment common to all but the educated few. The govern-
ment has always been something apart from the life of the
people, something with which they have no direct concern and
in which they have no great interest. Because of this it has
always been easy for an alien rule like that of the Manchus
to maintain itself in China. The only direct connection be-
tween the rulers and the ruled came in connection with the
payment of taxes. However, in return for the taxes which
they paid to the government, the Chinese people demanded
that they should be given protection for life and property.
If you like, their attitude was that of the property owner who
pays a detective to guard his possessions. He is willing to
pay so long as he gets the return asked.

The visible sign of decay of every dynasty in the history
of China has been its weakening of control internall}^ with a
consequent prevalence of brigandage and piracy. In a coun-
try where a large number of people live always near the star-
vation line the government must exercise a strong authority
in order to protect those who have property from those who
have none. If conditions get too bad the government is
doomed. Usually the Dynasty has been able to maintain it-
self until a leader has arisen strong enough to rally the dis-
affected to his banner, thus centralizing opposition. The ex-
haustion of the "mandate of heaven" has come usually simul-
taneously with the appearance of such a leader, and he has
been able to establish his family as the ruling House.

For about seventy-five years the overthrow of the Manchu
Dynasty had been confidently predicted. One uprising fol-
lowed another throughout the Empire. Brigandage and
piracy were the accepted order of things. But until 191 1 the
Dynasty had always been able to recover itself sufficiently to

Modern Constitutional Development in China 99

retain its hold on the Throne. This had been due, not so
much to its strength as to the inabihty of the opposition to
concentrate and obtain competent leadership. The leader of
the Taiping revolt bade fair to overthrow the Manchus, ex-
cept for two things. He was able to destroy the power of
the government but lacked the constructive ability necessary
to reorganize the country under his own control. The sec-
ond reason for the maintenance of the Manchus in control
was the aid extended to them by foreigners. The great
Mahommedan rebellion, which arose almost simultaneously
with that of the Taipings was also put down largely because
of its lack of organization and leadership. Aside from these
two great rebellions there were innumerable smaller upris-
ings throughout the country. Wherever there was a lack of
equilibrium between the food production and the increase of
population a revolt against the government was certain to oc-
cur. After foreign aggression in China became pronounced
this local dissatisfaction could be diverted for a time into anti-
foreign channels. But foreign aggression together with the
lack of power to preserve order in the country soon revealed
the weakness of the INIanchu Dynasty.

After 1900 the efforts of the Manchus to maintain them-
selves in power took a new form. Hitherto they had opposed
the introduction of foreign ideas into the country, feeling that
their very life depended upon the continuance of the old
order. Finally, however, they tried to use foreign ideas and
institutions to strengthen their position. If foreign educa-
tion was to be introduced let it be under the direction of the
Central Government! If railroads were necessary they
should be constructed under agreements concluded with the
Peking government, and not through provincial initiative.'

^ This conclusion was reached particularly during the period
after 1905.

loo Modern Constitutional Development in China

This movement toward a centralization of the government
at the expense of the old provincial autonomy however
aroused immediate opposition in the provinces. It was pro-
vincial opposition that forced the cancellation of the Ameri-
can loan agreement to construct the Hankow-Canton line.
When an agreement with the Four Power group to construct
the same road w'as concluded in the spring of 191 1, provin-
cial opposition again developed. The gentry of the provinces
concerned claimed the right to build the road themselves, and
began an agitation for the cancellation of the agreement. It
was the whole policy of the government that was objected to,
rather than this single agreement. So firm was the attitude
of the provinces that the government was forced to adopt a
conciliatory policy. The blame for the trouble was laid on
the Minister of Communications,* under whose direction the
policy of railroad centralization had been developed. Here
again the weakness of the Manchu rule was revealed. Their
policy of centralization had come too late, and had furnished
one more weapon for the opposition to the Dynasty.

As Manchu weakness became increasingly clear to the coun-
try, revolutionary secret societies, w^hich never entirely dis-
appear from China, sprang into new life. Probably the most
influential of these organizations at the time of the revolu-
tion was that known as the Tung Meng Hui.^ This society
had been formed shortly after the failure of the 1898 reform
movement and in its aims was avowedly anti-dynastic. The

* Sheng Hsuan-hui, (he is better known perhaps by his title
Sheng Kung-pao). The agitation against him personally and his
policy of centralization resulted in a victory for the provinces
when he was removed by Imperial Edict, issued at the request
of the National Assembly.

^ For description of the Tung Meng Hui see sec. "Political
Societies and Parties." China Year Book, 1913, pp. 663-666,
Also Hornbeck, Ch. V, Pol. Parties.

Modern Constitutional Development in China loi

Tung Meng Htii resulted from the union of several inde-
pendent revolutionary organizations which had been formed
in Japan by Chinese students. Its recognized leader was Sun
Wen, or, as he is better known, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.®

For ten years preceding the revolution Dr. Sun had spent
his time in travel in Europe and America wherever there were
Chinese, carrying the doctrines of the revolution and secur-
ing financial support for the movement to overthrow the Man-
chus. The great strength of the Tung Meng Hui lay in its
overseas membership rather than in its adherents in China,
but its propaganda had also enlisted the support of many in
China proper, especially in the Southern provinces.

The history of the revolution of 191 1 shows, however, that
it was not the result of a carefully planned movement, but was
rather a spontaneous and contagious uprising at isolated points,
which was later partially unified and coordinated. The Wu-
chang outbreak was preceded by a rebellion of serious propor-
tions in Szechuan province^ with which the government proved
unable to cope successfully. As the news of the successes at
Wuchang and Hankow spread up and down the Yangtze one
section after another repudiated the Manchu authority, but
always under local leaders, and without accepting any central
control. The leader of the revolting troops at Wuchang, Li
Yuan-hung, had never been identified with any revolutionary
organization before he was compelled to assume the direction
of affairs. The Republican Committee at Shanghai, which

® The name Sun Yat-sen has been used throughout because of
its greater familiarity to foreign readers.

^ Caused by the conflict over the assumption of control over
railroad construction in the province by the Central Government.
The trouble arose over the refusal of the Government to pay
more of the obligations of the provincial Board than those in-
curred for materials actually purchased and work actually done.
This lost the Gentry much of their "squeeze" on the undertaking.

102 Modern Constitutional Development in China

finally claimed the right to represent the revolution in nego-
tiations with the Manchu government, was organized almost
a month after the outbreak of hostilities. Nevertheless, all
had a common determination that the Manchu rule must go —
and this hatred of the reigning dynasty provided the bond
of union which held the revolutionary leaders together so
long as the common foe existed.

It is outside the scope of a discussion of constitutional de-
velopment to give a detailed account of the revolutionary
movement, except in its bearing on the establishment of a
constitutional regime in China. While the Manchu authority
was being overthrown in the Yangtze valley, in Peking the
National Assembly was continuing to force concessions from
the Imperial government so limiting the power of the Throne
as to give the Assembly practical control. The effect of the
revolution was very marked in the influence it exerted upon
this struggle between the Throne and the National Assembly.

The National Assembly reconvened on October 22, ten days
after the outbreak of hostilities at Wuchang. Its first act was
to secure the dismissal of Sheng Kungpao, the Minister of
Communications, whose policy of railroad centralization had
aroused such opposition in the provinces as to lead directly to
the revolt of the Szechuanese.^ Then it turned its attention
to constitutional questions.

During the latter part of its first session the members of
the Assembly had demanded the establishment of a responsi-
ble Cabinet, and had secured the promise of the Emperor to
organize it. We have seen that this promise was carried out
by a mere change of name, the Grand Council being trans-
formed into a Cabinet, with a responsibility only to the Throne.
Prince Ch'ing, an old and reactionary member of the Imperial

* China Year Book, 1912, pp. xx.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 103

family, was made the Premier and most of the Cabinet posts
were held by Manchu Nobles." Such a body was far from
satisfactory to the Assembly, both in its composition and be-
cause it was responsible only to the Emperor.

Emboldened by its success in forcing the dismissal of
Sheng Hsuan-hui, and by the compliant attitude of the gov-
ernment, due to conditions in the South, the Assembly im-
mediately made three demands on the Throne. They were:
I ) that a constitution should be framed only after consultation
with the Assembly; 2) the exclusion from the Cabinet of
members of the Imperial family, and the immediate appoint-
ment of a capable and virtuous person to organize a respon-
sible Cabinet; and 3) an immediate amnesty to all political
offenders, including those who had been proscribed in 1898.^"
Added weight was given these demands by the refusal of the
troops stationed at Lanchou, on the Peking-Mukden railroad,
to entrain for the South until the demands had been acceded
to. The action of the troops was supported by their com-
manding officer.

There was nothing for the Regent to do but yield. All the
demands of the Assembly were conceded in a series of edicts
issued on October 30.^^ The first of these acknowledged the
negligence of the Throne, assuming, according to the Chinese
custom, the responsibility of the Emperor for the unsettled
and weakened condition of the country. "In Szechuan trouble
first occurred, the Wuchang rebellion followed; now alarming
reports come from Shensi and Honan. In Canton (city) and
Kiangsi (province) riots appear. The whole Empire is seeth-
ing, the minds of the people are perturbed and the spirits of
our nine late Emperors are not able properly to enjoy the

® See China Mission Year Book, 1912, p. 41.
" China Year Book, 1912, pp. xx.
^^ Ibid., pp. xx-xxiii.

I04 Modern Constitutional Development in China

sacrifices made to them, while it is feared that the people will
suffer grievously.

"All these things are my own fault. Hereby I announce to
the world that I swear to reform and with Our soldiers and
people to carry out the constitution faithfully, modifying
legislation, developing the interests of the people and abolish-
ing their hardships, all in accordance with the interests and
wishes of the people. . . . Being a very small person stand-
ing at the head of my subjects, I see that my heritage is nearly
falling to the ground. I regret my fault and repent greatly.
I can only trust that my subjects will support the soldiers in
order to support me, to comfort the millions of my people, to
hold firmly the eternity of the Dynasty, and to convert danger
into tranquility. The patriotism of the Empire's subjects will
be appreciated and trusted forever. "^^

After this most humble "apologia" the direct demands of
the Assembly were discussed. In each of the three cases it
was stated that the Assembly was only asking for the faith-
ful observance of principles already well established. For
this reason it was possible to give in and yet "save the face"
of the Emperor. As to the adoption of the constitution the
edict said: "Now as memorialized by the said Yuan (As-
sembly), constitutional law is a law to be faithfully respected
by both sovereign and people, it should be advisable to permit
the officials and people to give their advice at the outset be-
fore its final adoption. Again it says that their deliberation
and advice should be after the conclusion of the framing and
before the Imperial sanction. This will not in the least affect
the principle of Imperial sanction as ordered by the former
Emperor. '^^ Pu Lun" and others are hereby commanded to

^^ China Year Book, 1912, pp. xxi.

^^ The italics are the author's. J

A Prince of the Imperial family.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 105

obey the main principle which was Imperially sanctioned, by
framing the clauses of the constitutional law speedily, and then
handing them to the Tszechengyuan for careful deliberation
and discussion, and to wait upon Us to give Imperial sanc-
tion before promulgation."^^

It is apparent that this was far from the idea of the Em-
press-Dowager. She thought of the constitution as a docu-
ment promulgated by the Throne and depending for its valid-
ity only on the Imperial sanction. In the "Principles of the
Constitution," it will be remembered, discussion of the con-
stitution both before and after its promulgation, was a privi-
lege expressly withheld from the Assembly. This was a very
different principle from the one now established. The Emp-
ress Dowager emphasized the absolute supremacy of the
Throne while the Regent was compelled to acknowledge that
the Assembly had an equal right with the Throne to a voice
in the determination of the principles of the constitution.

The question of the Cabinet was just as fully conceded. The
members of the Assembly objected to the personnel of the
Cabinet, as well as to the fact that they were not able to as-
sume any control over it under the "regulations" which had
been sanctioned by Imperial edict.

The edict of October 30 marks the end of the attempt to
maintain old institutions under a new name. "Relatives of
Nobles," it runs, "in holding political supremacy, are contrary
to the general usage obtaining in all other constitutional coun-
tries. The Law of Our Dynasty forbids them to interfere
with political affairs. Our ancestral rules are very explicitly
worded, they fit well with the spirit of a constitutional nation.
After the reign of T'ung Chi(h), national calamity not having
ended, prince councillors were first created to support and
assist (the government), and the practice has been handed

*^ China Year Book, 19 12, p. xxi.

io6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

down to the present. During this year, princes, dukes and
others have been again appointed Ministers of State upon the
formation of the Cabinet. This zvas a matter of temporary
policy/^ and the Throne had not done it intentionally. Now,
as memorialized by the said Yuan, a Cabinet of members of
the Imperial family cannot exist concurrently with a consti-
tutional form of government. It requests the cancellation
of the temporary rules for the Cabinet, the genuine establish-
ment of a complete system for a Cabinet, and the discontinua-
tion of the employing of relatives or Nobles as Ministers of
State, etc. These suggestions are made with a view to en-
hancing the nobleness of the Imperial House, and solidifying
the foundation of the Empire, and are much appreciated and
approved by Us. As soon as affairs get a little settled, and
competent officials are obtainable, We shall order them to
form a complete Cabinet, and not again to appoint relatives
or Nobles to be Ministers of State, and at the same time, to
have the temporary rules for the Cabinet cancelled, in order
to conform with the principles of constitutional government
and to establish national foundations.""

The proclamation of mercy for political offenders was em-
bodied in the fourth of this series of edicts issued on Oc-
tober 30, 191 1.

The National Assembly was not slow to take advantage of
these concessions. Within three days a new set of principles
to be embodied in the constitution had been drawn up and
adopted. These principles were immediately submitted to the
Throne and received the Imperial sanction on November 3.

While providing for the continued reign of the Manchu
Dynasty it was made evident that the Imperial family was no
longer to rule. Instead of the constitution being granted by

*^ The italics are the author's.

" China Year Book, 1912, p. xxii.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 107

the Emperor, it was to be drawn up and adopted by the As-
sembly and promulgated by Imperial mandate. Even the right
to withhold his assent to the provisions of the Constitution
was taken from the Emperor.

Instead of the Parliament being merely an advisory body,
the new "principles" gave it a supervisory power over the en-
tire administration. "Parliament shall elect and the Emperor
shall appoint the Premier, who will recommend the other
members of the Cabinet, these also being appointed by the
Emperor. The Imperial Princes shall be ineligible as Premier,
Cabinet Ministers or administrative heads of provinces."
Then followed the provision for a Cabinet responsible to
Parliament: "If the Premier, on being impeached by Parlia-
ment, does not dissolve Parliament he must resign, but one
Cabinet shall not be allowed to dissolve Parliament more
than once."

While the command of the army and navy was vested in
the Emperor, "when that power is used with regard to inter-
nal affairs he must observe special conditions to be imposed
by Parliament." The legislative power was transferred to
the Parliament as was the treaty making power. The privi-
lege of discussing the budget, which had been given the As-
sembly by the "constitutional principles" sanctioned by the
Empress-Dowager, was changed into an absolute control over
the national finances. And, finally, the Parliament alone was
authorized to amend the constitution.^*

No greater confession of weakness could have been made
by the Manchus than their acceptance of this work of the
Assembly by which the centre of control was shifted from the
Crown to the Parliament. Instead of strengthening their
hold on the country and enabling them to retain their old

^* For a summary of the new "principles" see China Year
Book, 1912, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

io8 Modern Constitutional Development in China

position of supremacy in the State, the representative insti-
tutions which the Manchus had called into being had brought
about a complete limitation of their authority. The National
Assembly, carefully selected so that it would act at the dic-
tation of the Government, had shown a spirit of insubordina-
tion from the time of its convocation in the fall of 1910. It
had not been content with the minor position assigned to it,
and had bent every effort to secure a recognition of the re-
sponsibility of the Government to the duly selected repre-
sentatives of the nation. It is remarkable that such a spirit
should have been manifested by an Assembly consisting of
representatives of the Nobility and the official classes, as well
as the stubbornly conservative literati, and the gentry of the
provinces. It might be said that the liberal element injected
from the provincial assemblies was responsible for the atti-
tude of the National Assembly, but this does not account for
the practical unanimity of all classes of representatives in
their opposition to the government. It would have been in-
teresting to watch the development of a constitutional mon-
archy out of an Oriental despotism, but the demand of the
Southern revolutionists for the abdication of the Emperor
ended the possibility of such an evolution. No matter how
limited the power of the Throne, the Manchus were no longer
acceptable to the country, especially the South.

While the National Assembly was busy wresting conces-
sions from the Throne, the revolutionary movement had been
spreading rapidly. The actual military successes of the one
side or the other do not furnish any indication of what was
happening. The strength of the revolution was measured not
by defeats inflicted on the Imperialists, but by defections from
the Imperial ranks. Soldiers mutinied and joined the revo-
lutionary forces; districts and whole provinces, one after the
other, declared their independence of the Central Government.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 109

The cry of "down with the Manchus" was fast becoming uni-
versal. The moderation of the attitude of the government
toward the Assembly, and the successes achieved by that body
seemed to have no effect in the South. The feeling was that
voiced by Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, that the Manchus had for-
feited the respect of the country, and that they could not be
trusted, no matter how conciliatory their attitude. Nothing
short of abdication would satisfy the people.

The Regent, however, was not prepared to succumb with-
out a struggle. It was felt in the North that only one man
could cope with the situation. This man was Yuan Shih-kai,
who had been in retirement since the accession of Hsuan T'ung.
The last expressed wish of the late Emperor, Kwang Hsu, is
said to have been that Yuan Shih-kai should be killed. ^^ He
had always been blamed by the Emperor, and rightly, for the
overthrow of the reform movement in 1898. The Regent
had not dared to carry out his promise to Kwang Hsii to kill
Yuan, but he had immediately sent him to the country to "re-
cover" from his activities in the service of the State. The
condition of the Empire now made Prince Ch'un, the Regent,
feel that the safety of the State demanded the "recovery" of
Yuan Shih-kai and his return to active political life. Since
the death of the Empress Dowager there had been no out-
standing personality in the Manchu administration. Men of
the strength and ability of the old Viceroys, Tsung Kuo-fan,
Tso Tsung-t'ang, Li Hung-chang, and Chang Chih-tung were
sorely needed. The only one left was Yuan Shih-kai, and he
had been in retirement since January, 1909. With him had
gone many of his able lieutenants, foreign educated men of
the type of T'ang Shao-yi.^°

^^ "China under the Empress Dowager," p. 286.

^° Later Yuan's representative in negotiating with the South,
and first Premier of the Republic after the election of Yuan as
President,

no Modern Constitutional Development in China

In response to the generally expressed desire, the Regent
issued an edict recalling Yuan to service on October 14, 191 1.
He was appointed Viceroy of the Hukuang provinces, and
given supreme command of the Imperial forces in Hupeh and
Hunan, with full power of granting pardons. Yuan Shih-
kai, however, did not manifest any great desire to return to
office. While he did not refuse to obey the command of the
Emperor, he made it perfectly plain that he would come back
only on his own terms. His stipulation being for practically
a free hand in dealing with the South, his terms were accepted
in an edict of October 27, which conferred on him substan-
tially a military dictatorship.^^ He was placed in command
of all the Imperial forces, both the army and the navy, and
immediately assumed direction of the military operations in
the Yangtze valley. On November 8, he was elected Premier
by the National Assembly, and returned to Peking to take
charge of the almost hopeless affairs of the Dynasty.

As a result of Imperial successes at Hanyang, the head of
the Wuchang revolutionary organization, Li Yuan-hung,
opened negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai in the last days of
November. These negotiations were almost immediately
transferred, first to Shanghai and then to Nanking. Out of
the resulting conferences between the representatives of Yuan
Shih-kai and of the Provisional Republican Government came
the settlement by which the Manchu Emperor abdicated and
the Republic established itself as the recognized government
of China.

Since Li Yuan-hung and the other leaders of the revolution
acknowledged the right of the Shanghai Revolutionary Coun-
cil to speak for them, it is advisable to discuss that organiza-
tion briefly. It was not until November 3 that Shanghai took

^^ Edicts of October 14 and October 27, 191 1. China Year
Book, 1912. "The Revolution," p. xxviii.

Modern Constitutional Development in China iii

its stand on the side of the Revolution. On that date control
of the city passed into the hands of an organization calling
itself "The Military Government of the Chinese People," or
as it later styled itself, "The Republicar^ Government of
China." Several meetings of the inhabitants of Shanghai
were held and Chen Chi-mei was chosen as the military gov-
ernor of the city. Dr. Wu T'ing-fang acted as the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Shanghai government. November
13 Chen Chi-mei issued a letter to the newly established Mili-
tary-Governors of the provinces under the control of the revo-
lution asking them to see that representatives of the provinces
were chosen to act as a National Council for the Revolution.
The Council met first at Hanyang and later at Nanking where
it secured recognition as the Republican Assembly.^^

It was with the self-styled "Military Government of the
Chinese People" that Yuan Shih-kai finally opened discussions,
The first move toward peace came from General Li Yuan-
hung at Wuchang, and while he did not insist on the negotia-
tions being conducted under his own supervision, he did insist
that conferences be held by duly accredited agents of the Revo-
lution with the representatives of the Imperial government.
Yuan Shih-kai, anxious to secure a settlement as soon as pos-
sible, appointed his old henchman, T'ang Shao-yi, as his rep-
resentative, with full powers to act for the Imperial govern-
ment.^^ Dr. Wu T'ing-fang was appointed as the chief rep-
resentative of the Revolution.

22 "This Council was composed of delegates from most of the
provinces (fourteen in fact), some duly authorized by the re-
spective Provincial Assemblies, and others self-appointed or
nominated by some local official of the faction in control of the
affairs of the province." China Year Book, 1913, p. 466.

^^ The text of T'ang's credentials read as follows : *T, Yuan
Shih-kai, in compliance with the said edict (empowering him to
reach a settlement with the South) appoint your Excellency

112 Modern Constitutional Development in Chind

At the first meeting of the conferees, December i8, 191 1,
the revohitionary demands were presented to T'ang and trans-
mitted by him to Peking. They were that the Manchu Dy-
nasty abdicate and a RepubHc be established as the govern-
ment of China; and they promised liberal treatment for the
Imperial family.^* While negotiations were at a standstill
pending the reply of the Emperor, Dr. Sun Yat-sen arrived in
Shanghai from Europe where he had been at the outbreak of
the revolution. He imm.ediately made himself an important
factor in the future negotiations. He arrived on the twenty-
fifth of December, and readily consented to become a candi-
date for the presidency of the Provisional Republican Govern-
ment which had been formed at Nanking by the representa-
tives of the provinces who had assembled in response to the
call of the Military Governor of Shanghai. The Nanking
Council elected Dr. Sun President on the twenty-eighth of
December.

On the day that Dr. Sun was elected the reply of the Em-
peror to the demand for abdication was received. Instead of
giving a definite yes or no, the edict suggested that the whole
question be referred to a legally constituted National As-
sembly, the Throne agreeing to accept the decision of such
a body as final." This concession was a great step towards
a basis of settlement, since always before the idea of abdica-
tion had been totally repudiated by the Manchu government.
The revolutionaries agreed to the proposal, but laid down such
conditions as would have made impossible any solution other
than abdication. T'ang Shao-yi accepted their terms, but his

(T'ang Shao-yi) as my delegate with full powers, and request
you to proceed there (to Shanghai) immediately in accordance
with the edict." China Year Book, 1913, p. 467.

2* Ibid., p. 466.

" Edict 28 Dec. Trans., Ibid., p. 467.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 113

action was repudiated by Yuan Shih-kai, and T'ang resigned
from his post as Imperial delegate, although he continued to
act as the intermediary between Yuan and the Republican
leaders.

Yuan Shih-kai's position was a very delicate one throughout
the period of these negotiations. He was the head of the Im-
perial government, with full power to take any steps neces-
sary to bring about a settlement between the North and the
South, but he did not have the money or the supplies to force
a fight to the finish. The best he could hope for was to secure
the retention of the Emperor, stripped of practically all power,
as the nominal head of the State. The first conferences
showed clearly that the Manchus must go, — that the Republi-
cans would not permit them to retain even the semblance of
power, Yuan's task eventually came to this, then : he must
use the threat of continued fighting to secure the best terms
possible for the Imperial family, and he had to keep the
strength of the revolution constantly before the Manchus in
order to bring them to the point of abdication when favorable
terms had been secured. It was well known that the revolu-
tionary party was even more urgently in need of funds than
the Imperialists, so that the desire for peace was as great at
Nanking as at Peking. By skilfully playing on the fears and
weaknesses first of the one and then of the other side, Yuan
Shih-kai was able to secure a settlement which was compara-
tively satisfactory to both, and which left him as the strongest
single factor in the State.

About the middle of January Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, seemingly
on his own initiative, telegraphed Yuan offering him the presi-
dency of the Republic after the abdication of the Manchu
Dynasty, which was then a foregone conclusion.^^ This was

" China Year Book, 1913, pp. 474-76.

114 Modern Constihttional Development in China

on the condition that Yuan would become a RepubHcan and
promise to uphold the government established by the Revolu-
tion. The acceptance of this proposition in the final settle-
ment might be called the first compromise of the Chinese Re-
publican Constitutionalism. The South did not like Yuan
Shih-kai, and, as it later developed, did not trust him. But
his position in the North was unassailable, his control of the
Imperial army giving him the balance of power in the strug-
gle between the revolutionaries and the Manchus.

The Emperor met this offer by conferring on Yuan the
honor of the second order of Nobility, with but one exception,
the highest rank possible of attainment for a Chinese. While
he had not accepted Dr. Sun's proposal, at least openly, neither
did he accept the Manchu distinction. Four times it was of-
fered and four times he declined it!"^ There was then no
doubt of the final outcome. On January 28 a telegraphic
memorial was received in Peking signed by the Hukuang
Viceroy and all the Imperial Commanders urging abdication
as the only possible solution. ^^

On February 3 the end was heralded in a secret edict which
ran as follows: "As we have received the telegraphic me-
morials from Tsun Chun-hsuan, Yuan Shu-hsun, and Min-
ister to Russia Lu Cheng-hsiang, and others, and Tuan Chi-jui
and the other Military Commanders, requesting us speedily to
adopt the Republican form of government to avoid further
bloodshed, and in view of the perilous situation of the coun-
try and the industrial depression from which the people have
suffered. We cannot bear to see the millions in misery for the
glory of one Family. But the questions of the matters relating
to Our Ancestral Temples and the Imperial Masolea are im-

^^ Account in the London Times. Reproduced, China Year
Book, 1913, pp. 477-480.

2® China Year Book, 1913, pp. 477-480.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 115

portant, and the courteous treatment of the Imperial House
and the Imperial kinsmen, the treatment of Manchus, Mon-
golians, Mohammedans, and Tibetans should be prearranged.
We, therefore, give whole powers to Yuan Shih-kai to make
the arrangements carefully, and speedily to consult with the
People's Army beforehand in regard to the articles of treat-
ment, and to report the whole to Us."^"

The terms of abdication having been agreed upon, a series
of three abdication edicts^" was issued on February 12, 19 12,
providing for the transfer of sovereignty from the Emperor
to the people, through the establishment of the republican form
of government. By so doing the Imperial Family "would
gratify on the one hand the desires of the whole nation who,
tired of anarchy, are desirous of peace, and on the other hand
would follow in the footsteps of the Ancient Sages, who re-
garded the Throne as the sacred trust of the Nation." No
mention was made, in the Abdication Edicts, of the Republi-
can Government at Nanking, headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The
responsibility for the organization of China as a Republic was
transferred to Yuan Shih-kai as the representative of the
Emperor. The edict stated : "Yuan Shih-kai was elected by
the Tzucheng-yuan to be the Premier. During this period of
the transfer of the government from the old to the new, there
should be some means of uniting the South and the North.
Let Yuan Shih-kai organize with full powers a provisional
republican government and confer with the Republican Army
as to methods of union, thus assuring peace to the people and
tranquillity to the Empire, and forming the one Great Repub-
lic of China by the union as heretofore of the five peoples.

''Ubid., p. 481.

"^ Ibid., pp. 481-484.

ii6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans, and
Tibetans together with their territory in its integrity."^^

The manner in which the Manchu Dynasty gave way to the
Republic may not seem important so long as the Republic was
established. But it is worth noting that the Emperor did not
abdicate in favor of the already existing Republican govern-
ment. He simply gave way to Yuan Shih-kai, who was to
establish a Provisional Republican Government himself and
then negotiate a settlement with the Army of the Republic in
the South. Thus Yuan was continued in control of the situ-
ation. It was just as essential to a settlement that an agree-
ment be reached with him as it had been to force the abdica-
tion of the Emperor. Furthermore it would seem to the peo-
ple as though the Republic had been established by the action
of the Throne, rather than by the strength of the revolution,
if it was organized under the delegated authority of the Em-
peror. That this was not desirable was recognized by the
Nanking government. Dr. Sun, in acknowledging the mes-
sage from Yuan Shih-kai announcing the abdication, said that
"the Republican Government cannot be organized by any
authority conferred by the Ch'ing Emperor. The exercise of
such pretentious power must surely lead to serious trouble."
Yuan, however, assured Dr. Sun that he did not intend to
take advantage of the wording of the edicts, and the republi-
cans accepted his assurances. Whether he took advantage of
his peculiar position or not, unquestionably Yuan Shih-kai
was greatly strengthened in the eyes of his countrymen be-
cause of the power bestowed upon him by edict, although the
Imperial authority had ceased to exist.

The understanding had been that upon the abdication of the
Emperor Sun Yat-sen would resign from the presidency in

^^ China Year Book, 1913, p. 482.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 117

favor of Yuan, providing he had first given his unconditional
promise of support to the Republic. This Yuan did in an-
nouncing the abdication. His statement follows : "A Repub-
lic is the best form of government. The whole world admits
this. That in one leap we have passed from autocracy to re-
publicanism is really the outcome of the many years of strenu-
ous efforts exerted by you all. and is the greatest blessing to
the people. The Ta Ch'ing Emperor has proclaimed his abdi-
cation by edict countersigned by myself. The day of the
promulgation of this edict shall be the end of Imperial rule
and the inauguration of the Republic. Henceforth we shall
exert our utmost strength to move forward in progress until
we reach perfection. Henceforth, for ever, we shall not al-
low a monarchical government in our country.''^^

On February 14 Dr. Sun submitted his resignation as the
provisional President of the Chinese Republic, at the same
time presenting the name of Yuan Shih-kai for the consider-
ation of the Assembly. "Today I present to you my resigna-
tion and request you to elect a good and talented man as the
new President. The election of President is a right of our
citizens, and it is not for me to interfere in any way. But
according to the telegram which our delegate Dr. Wu was
directed to send to Peking, I was to undertake to resign in
favor of Mr. Yuan when the Emperor abdicated and Mr.
Yuan had delclared his political views in favor of the Re-
public. I have already submitted this to your honorable As-
sembly and obtained your approval. The abdication of the
Ch'ing Emperor and the union of the North and South are
largely due to the great exertions of Mr. Yuan. Moreover,
he has declared his unconditional adhesion to the national
cause. Should he be elected to serve the Republic he would

^2 China Year Book, 1913, pp. 485-6.

ii8 Modern Constitutional Development in China

surely prove himself a most loyal servant of the State. Be-
sides, Mr. Yuan is a man of political experience, upon whose
constructive ability our united nation looks forward for the
consolidation of its interests. Therefore, I venture to express
my personal opinion and to invite your honorable Assembly
carefully to consider the future welfare of the State, and not
to miss the opportunity of electing one who is worthy of your
election. The happiness of our country depends on your
choice. Farewell.""

^^ China Year Book, 191 3, pp. 487-88.

CHAPTER VI

The abdication of tlie Emperor left Yuan Shih-kai in con-
trol in tlie North, with delegated authority to organize the
government as a Republic. Sun Yat-sen's resignation and the
election of Yuan to the presidency by the Nanking Council
consolidated the two governments. Officialdom transferred
its allegiance from the old regime to the new. The same local
government agencies remained. But the new government was
confronted with problems similar to those that have been
faced by all authority established as a result of revolution.
The revolution had caused the recruiting of large bodies of
soldiers. These men were under arms largely because of the
pay promised them and not because they wished to see a prin-
ciple triumph or to bring about a new political order. Their
allegiance was not to the Nanking Council or to the Peking
government, but to the commander who fed and paid them.
What he ordered they would execute if they were confident
that their stipend would be forthcoming. In most cases the
military leaders themselves were not unselfish servers of a
cause. This was more true of the southern soldiery than of
the Imperial troops.

At the time of the settlement between the North and the
South, districts and even entire provinces were under the con-
trol of self -constituted authorities maintaining themselves by
force of arms. So long as a commander led a considerable
body of men he could exercise a great deal of influence, but
let him disband his soldiers and his influence would be negli-
gible. Thus Yuan Shih-kai faced a situation that demanded

119

I20 Modern Constitutional Development in China

his immediate and earnest attention. The people expected the
new regime to reestabHsh peace and order. But many of the
provinces were dominated by men over whom the President
had only a nominal control, and who, in many cases com-
manded as large forces as he himself had under his imme-
diate authority. The situation was further complicated by the
fact that the pay of the soldiers in many cases was in arrears,
and the men refused to disband until they had received a com-
plete settlement. Their commanders had been paying them by
requisitions on the people, and by the collection and disburse-
ment of the governmental revenues. Lacking the power to
enforce the demobilization of the troops, the Government
could get rid of them only by buying ofif their leaders with
substantial sums, and meeting the demand of the common
soldiers for their back pay.

Yuan, then, had to consider the question of ways and means
of getting this money at a time when the public purse was
empty; when the normal sources of revenue could not be de-
pended upon ; when the interest on foreign obligations had not
been paid for some time; and when the authority of the gov-
ernment was not widely recognized.

Neither had the abdication of the Manchus served to end
the general unrest. The presence of armed bands living on
the peaceful inhabitants promoted rather than discouraged a
feeling of uncertainty. The establishment of a Republic in
place of the Empire was not fully understood by the people.
To whom did they owe obedience? Formerly they knew that
the Emperor and his agents represented authority of no un-
certain kind. The Republic, they were told, meant that the
people controlled. Many understood from this that they could
do as they pleased, and a feeling of freedom from all restraint
inevitably resulted.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 121

Furthermore, in many of the provinces the revolution had
resulted in a temporary breakdown of the administrative ma-
chinery. The officials, where they were not merely self-ap-
pointed military chiefs, and where they acknowledged the
authority of the government, were awaiting instructions from
Peking to guide their action. The uncertainty of the people
as to the meaning of the new order had thus communicated
itself to the officials.

Republicanism had to justify itself by bringing in its train
peace and prosperity as well as the principles of liberty, equal-
ity and fraternity. Yuan Shih-kai knew better than any one
else, perhaps, what the first demands of the people were of
their government — whether Manchu or Chinese, Monarchy or
Republic. The machinery of administration must continue to
function. His first act after the abdication, therefore, was to
provide that there should be no suspension of the routine of
governmient. A proclamation issued on February 13, 19 12,
emphasized this fact. It read: "Now that the republican
form of government has been announced. Yuan Shih-kai has
been entrusted with the duty of organizing the provisional
government. His ability being limited and his responsibility
being great, he is conscious of his incompetency. He is of
the opinion that the governmental machinery cannot be sus-
pended for even a single day, and in the course of the organi-
zation of the provisional government, all of the political af-
fairs of yore shall continue to be prosecuted as usual. In the
present new regime there are hundreds of details to be at-
tended to. Cooperation and mutual assistance are to be de-
pended upon and the maintenance of peace and order and the
preservation of the public welfare should be regarded as being
of great importance. "Pending the promulgation of the new
administrative system, all of the civil and military officials in
the Metropolis as well as in the provinces should discharge

122 Modern Constitutional Development in China

their respective functions as heretofore, and should not shirk
their usual responsibility. All of the affairs to be transacted
by the various governmental offices, all of the responsibili-
ties to be assumed, and all of the public funds and public
property should be carried on or properly taken care of as be-
fore, and no negligence will be tolerated. . . , All of the mili-
tary and police regulations of the old regime should be en-
forced as usual; thus may power be unified and order pre-
served. In the event of anyone making trouble under what-
ever pretext, to disturb the peace, he is to be dealt with ac-
cording to law."^

The formality of giving Yuan the sanction of the Revolu-
tion as the first head of the Republican Government of a
united China was accomplished on the fifteenth of February !
when he was unanimously elected by the Nanking Council. A
few days later General Li Yuan-hung was chosen Vice-Presi-
dent. One of the conditions of Yuan Shih-kai's election was
that the seat of government should be changed from Peking
to Nanking. This transfer would mean a closer control over
the government by the South than would be possible if Peking-
remained the capital city. Since the President was reluctant
to leave the North, the stronghold of his power, a deputation
was sent to Peking to show him the necessity for the change.
A very opportune mutiny of the troops in Peking which was
marked by extensive looting occurred at this time, however,
and weight was given to Yuan's contention that it was unsafe
for him to go South.^ Consequently the Republican leaders

^ China Year Book, 1913, pp. 486-87.

- Yuan was generally believed to have been chiefly responsi-
ble himself for this mutiny. The fact that it was so timed as
to strengthen his argument against leaving the North, taken with
his previous and subsequent excellent control of the Peking
soldiery certainly lends color to the allegation.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 123

were forced temporarily to absolve him from his promise, and
his inauguration took place on March 10 in the old capital.
The oath of office prescribed was as follows : "At the begin-
ning of the establishment of the Republic there are many mat-
ters to be taken charge of. I, Yuan Shih-kai, sincerely w'ish
to exert my utmost (strength) to promote the democratic
spirit, to remove the dark blots of despotism, to obey strictly
the constitution, and to abide by the wish of the people, so
as to place the country in a safe, united, strong and firm po-
sition, and to effect the happiness and welfare of the five di-
visions of the Chinese race. All these wishes I will fulfill
without fail. As soon as a President is elected by the Na-
tional Assembly I shall at once vacate my present position.
With all sincerity I take this oath before the people of China."

On the same day that Yuan Shih-kai was inaugurated as
President of the Republic, the Provisional Constitution was
adopted by the National Council at Nanking. The first sec-
tion of the constitution vested the sovereignty in the whole
body of the people, to be exercised through their representa-
tives— the National Council, the Provisional President, the
Cabinet, and the Judiciary. The territor}'^ of the Republic
was defined (art. 3) so as to include the twenty-two prov-
inces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai (Koko-
nor). The second section included a bill of rights of citizens
of the Republic. Stipulations of freedom of speech, of the
press, and of public meeting, together with provisions for the
security of property and freedom of persons from punish-
ment except in accordance with the law were incorporated in
this section.

The legislative power of the government was given to the
National Council until the convocation of the National As-
sembly. Then all powers vested in the Council were to be

124 Modern Constitutional Dc7'eJopment in China

transferred to the Assembly. It was impossible Immediately
to work out regulations for the election of an Assembly, so
that a continuance of the Nanking Council for the time being
was necessary. This body, according to the Constitution,
was composed of five members from each of the provinces and
dependencies, with the exception of Chinghai which was al-
lowed one representative. The method of election was to be
determined by each province for itself. Consequently some
of the members were chosen by the provincial assemblies,
where such bodies were in existence; some were selected by
the Military Governors of the provinces; and some were self-
constituted representatives of their locality. Those disquali-
fied for membership were: a) men who were under the age
of twenty-five; b) men whose rights of citizenship had been
removed or temporarily suspended; c) opium smokers; d) em-
ployees in the army or navy; e) holders of offices in the ex-
ecutive or judicial departments.^

The most notable feature of the Provisional Constitution
was its concentration of power in the hands of the National
Council at the expense of the executive branch of the gov-
ernment. The aim of the Nanking Council which framed the
Constitution, was certainly to limit as extensively as pos-
sible the authority of Yuan Shih-kal. He represented the
North and they the South. His election as President was a
compromise pure and simple, made necessary by his control
north of the Yangtze. The easiest solution was to confer on
him the dignity of the presidency and then, by constitutional
provisions, to strip that high office of all real weight in the
Government. In other words the intention was to legislate
Yuan Shih-kal out of his control of the situation.

^ Regulations of Council, sec. 2. See China Year Book, 1913,
P- 503-

Modern Constitutional Development in China 125

This was accomplished, on paper, by vesting all legislative
power in the Council ; giving it a control over the finances of
the State and a supervision over the administration; and by
the creation of a Cabinet which, while appointed by the Presi-
dent, must be acceptable to the Council. In addition to the
legislative authority and a control over the budget and State
finances, including taxation, the Council had the constitutional
right to impeach the President, if he were guilty of treason,
and to impeach any member of the Cabinet "if he be held to
have failed to perform his official duties or to have violated
the law."* It was within the power of the Council to convoke,
conduct and adjourn its own meetings, and to decide upon its
own procedure.

By article 29, it was provided that "the Provisional Presi-
dent and Vice-President shall be elected by the National Coun-
cil, by vote of two-thirds of the members present at a sitting
of the Council consisting of over three-fourths of the total
number of members." The President was given the general
supervision over the administration, although the National
Council was required to approve all regulations promulgated
for the administrative and official system. As the head of
the executive branch of the government the President was the
"fountain of all executive powers," and all laws were to be
promulgated by him as well as orders for the "execution of
laws and of powers delegated to him by the law." The su-
preme command of the army and navy was vested in him, and
he had the right to declare a state of siege in case of necessity,
and to declare war, with the concurrence of the National
Council.

As the representative of the State the President might con-
clude treaties, again, however, with the concurrence of the

* China Year Book, 1913, p. 490.

126 Modern Constihitional Development in China

Council, and he received Ambassadors and Ministers of for-
eign countries. The power of appointment was conferred on
him, with the Hmitation that he must have the concurrence
of the Council in the appointment of the Cabinet, Ambassadors
and Ministers. The general pardoning power was placed in
the hands of the provisional President, with the restriction
that he might not grant a general amnesty without authoriza-
tion from the National Council. In case of impeachment of
the President "he shall be tried by a special Court consisting
of nine judges elected among the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the realm."

The Cabinet consisted of the Premier and the heads of the
government departments. By the law defining the duties and
powers of the Cabinet it might consider: i) law bills and
ordinances; 2) budget bills, estimated and executed; 3) ex-
penditure apart from the estimate; 4) organization of the
army; 5) treaties; 6) declarations of war and treaties of
peace; 7) appointments and removal of officers specially ap-
pointed by the President; 8) differences regarding the special
powers of the Ministries; 9) matters which according to law
should pass through a Cabinet meeting; 10) petitions of citi-
zens which are transmitted by the National Council ; 1 1 ) mat-
ters which the Premier or a Minister of State considers should
pass through a Cabinet meeting. A majority vote was to de-
cide all Cabinet discussions. Both the "regulations" and the
provisional Constitution provided that all laws and ordinances,
before promulgation by the President, must be countersigned
either by all the Ministers of State, or by the Premier and the
Minister whose department was especially aftected by the
measure. The Premier was given control over local admin-
istration, subject to any limitations imposed upon him by law.
The close relationship which should exist between the Coun-
cil and the Cabinet was recognized as the Council was given

Modern Constitutional Development in China 127

the right to make suggestions to the Government, and might
question the Ministers, insisting on their appearing in person
or by deputy to answer the interpellation. On the other hand,
members of the Cabinet had the right to be present and to
speak in the National Council.

Section six of the provisional Constitution established a
judicial system for the country. All judges were to be ap-
pointed by the President and the Minister of Justice. They
were to try civil and criminal cases, "but cases involving ad-
ministrative affairs or arising from other particular causes
shall be dealt with according to special laws."

This provisional Constitution was to remain in force until
after a National Assembly, elected to replace the Council,
should have promulgated the permanent Constitution of the
Republic. The election regulations for the National Assembly
were to be drawn up by the Council and the Assembly con-
vened within ten months from the promulgation of the pro-
visional Constitution on March 10.

It was by no means an easy task that developed on Yuan
Shih-kai as President of the Republic. Both the old Imperial
Government and the Nanking Revolutionary Government
were without financial resources. The collection of taxes had
been impossible in many of the provinces since the outbreak
of the revolution. Where they had been collected the money
had been applied largely to meet local needs. The policy of
the Powers during the revolution had been not to lend financial
support to either side, and for that reason they had discour-
aged their nationals from entering into loan agreements. The
sympathy of the world had been, unquestionably, with the
revolutionary leaders, but, on the other hand, there was a
pronounced feeling among foreigners in China that a strong
man was essential to the development of a stable government
from the revolutionary chaos, and it was doubtful whether

128 Modern Constitutional Development in China

such a man would emerge from among the leaders of the re-
publican movement. Yuan Shih-kai was considered the strong-
est personality in the country, and while he was at the head
of the Imperial government^ it was felt to be safest to defer
judgment as to the future of the Imperial rule.

When, however. Yuan was given the Imperial Commission
to establish a Republican government as the President of the
Chinese Republic, thus concentrating in the one hands the
prerogatives of the crown and the executive powers of the
Republican President, the Powers were willing to resume ne-
gotiations for a loan to China. The negotiation of this loan,
and the reestablishment of the finances of the State on a sound
basis was one of the first tasks to which the new government
addressed itself.

At the same time. Yuan Shih-kai had to organize an admin-
istration (under the limitations of the provisional Constitu-
tion) which would be acceptable to the National Council, and
could secure its cooperation in the necessary work of reorgani-
zation and reconstruction. This was no slight undertaking,
since the Council at Nanking represented the South and was
suspicious of every move made by a President whom consider-
ations of expediency had forced it to elect. As the first step
in the formation of a Cabinet, the President appointed T'ang
Shao-yi as the Premier. T'ang immediately began the forma-
tion of a Cabinet, but since his first proposals were not well
received at Nanking he left for the South to undertake per-
sonal negotiations with the Council. After several days of
negotiation Mr. T'ang, supported by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was
able to reach an agreement with the Council, his nominees for
Cabinet positions being accepted. The greatest contest came
over the appointment of the Ministers of War and of Finance.
The southern party insisted that these posts be held by South-
erners, while the North, equally aware of their importance,

Modern Consfifittional Development in China I2g

refused to concede them to the South. A compromise was
finally reached, and the appointment of Tuan Chi-jui, Presi-
dent Yuan's nominee for Minister of War, was confirmed, on
the understanding that the post of Resident-General of Nan-
king, with control of the armies in the South, should be held
by Huang Hsing, a well known revolutionary leader. Hsiung
Hsi-ling, the final choice for Minister of Finance, was a Hu-
nan man, and had been very active in support of the revolu-
tion in his native province. He was not a member of the
southern radical party, however, and was not the first choice
of the southern delegates,^ so his selection was essentially a
compromise.

The Cabinet as finally constituted was representative of
neither the North nor the South. Yuan Shih-kai's aim in
choosing this first Cabinet, as well as later ones, was to se-
cure the best men possible, irrespective of party, for the heads
of departments. It was necessary for his own security that
the Minister of War should be in close sympathy with him,
since "whoever controls the army controls China." And in
view of later developments, his wisdom in insisting on the
appointment of Tuan Chi-ju instead of Huang Hsing cannot
be questioned. The other Cabinet portfolios were held by
men who were either members of the Tung Meng-hui (the
radical southern party), or who claimed no party affiliations
which would unfit them for cooperation with the National
Council.

During his visit to Nanking the Premier, T'ang Shao-yi,
became a member of the Tung Meng-hui. As a Cantonese he
had more interests in common with that party than with any
other. Although he had been the representative of the North
in the negotiations preliminary to the abdication of the Man-

^ Their first choice was Chen Chin-tao.

130 Modern Constitutional Development in China

chus, and had long been a follower of Yuan Shih-kai, T'ang
had shown an interest in the revolutionary movement even
while acting as the Imperial representative at Shanghai and
Nanking. A Cantonese, dealing with the Cantonese leaders
of the republican movement, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Dr. Wu
T'ing-fang, he was more inclined to compromise with them
than to act as the out and out advocate of the Manchu
Dynasty, or even the conservatively progressive party of the
North. It may be that in affiliating himself with the Tung
Meng-hui he sought to secure a greater influence in the gov-
ernment than he could hope for as the recognized henchman
of the President. Whatever his reasons, T'ang's adherence to
the radical southern party, of which he rapidly became the
leader, made cooperation between the President and his Prime
Minister difficult, and finally led to their estrangement.

Before passing on to the problems confronting the new
regime it is worth our while to note the composition of the
National Council when it assembled in Peking for its first
session under the provisional Constitution. It will be remem-
bered that the original intention of the Nanking republicans
had been to make Nanking the capital city. But since it was
impossible to get Yuan Shih-kai out of the northern capital
it was necessary for the Council to move from Nanking to
Peking. It was hardly possible to conduct the affairs of gov-
ernment with the President and Cabinet several hundred
miles away from the legislative organ. On April 29, then,
the National Council was formally opened by the President,
in Peking. At that time there were three principal parties in
the Council, no one group strong enough by itself to control.
The Tung Meng Hui (the Alliance Party) and the Kung
Ho-t'ang or Conservative party were nearly equal in voting
strength, so that the balance of power lay with the third party

Modern Consfittitional Development in China 131

mentioned, the Tung-yi-kung-ho-tang (the Coalition party). ^
This coalition party was more closely allied to the Tung Meng
Hui than to the Conservatives, but exercised entire freedom
of action, sometimes voting with the one and sometimes the
other/ Because of this division in the Council it was possible
for its deliberations to be brought to an end by the lack of a
quorum whenever the members of any one of the parties chose
to absent themselves from the meetings.

Naturally the chief interest of the early part of 1912 cen-
tered on the attempts the government was making to secure
funds for the reorganization of the country. The provisional
Constitution provided that the Council should control all of
the financial affairs of the State, including measures for ne-
gotiating loans.® Before the Council had assembled in Peking,
liowever, the first steps had been taken to negotiate a loan
with the Four Power Group.® The government desired to se-
cure monthly advances to meet its immediate needs, estimating
that 10,000,000 taels would be required at once, and monthly
advances of Tls. 6,400,000 would be necessary during the re-
construction period. On February 28 the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank, acting for the Four Power syndicate, made
an advance of Tls. 2,000,000, and on March 7 a further ad-
vance of Tls. 1,100,000 was made to the government. In
consideration of these advances Yuan Shih-kai agreed: "That
the Banks hold a firm option for the provision of further

^ China Year Book, 1913, pp. 504-505, shows the party divi-
sion of the members of the Council.

^ Some of the members of the Tung-yi-kung-ho-tang were also
members of the Tung Meng Hui, and vice versa. For the or-
ganization of the parties see China Year Book, 1913, pp. 662-670.

* Provisional Constitution, Art. 19, clauses 2-3-4.

" The original members of the International Loan Group were
representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the
United States.

132 Modern CoiistituHonal Development in China

monthly requirements of the Chinese Government for the
months of March, April, May, June, and possibly July and
August, which the Four Groups have already been requested
to finance, against the delivery of additional sterling Treasury
Bills on terms to be arranged. (4) That in consideration of
the assistance rendered by the Groups to China in the present
emergency, and of their services in supporting her credit on
the foreign markets, the Chinese Government assures to the
Groups (provided their terms are equally advantageous with
those otherwise obtainable) the firm option of undertaking
the comprehensive loan for general reorganization purposes
already proposed to them, to be floated as soon as possible,
and to be applied in the first instance to the redemption of the
sterling Treasury Bills aforesaid. "^°

In spite of this undertaking, a loan agreement with an
Anglo-Belgian syndicate was signed by the President on
March 15, six days after he had written the above to the rep-
resentatives of the Four Power Group. When this became
known, the Four Power Group immediately suspended nego-
tiations with the Chinese Government, charging it with acting
in bad faith.

Immediately after the conclusion of this so-called Belgian
loan agreement, T'ang Shao-yi, who had been conducting all
loan negotiations, left for Nanking. While there he was able
to secure the consent of the Council to the Belgian loan, taking
occasion at the same time to address it on the subject of the
dangers of a foreign financial monopoly in China. In this
way he sought to arouse a hostility to the Four Power Group
which could be used to secure a moderation of the terms on
which it was willing to undertake the financing of the Gov-
ernment.

^° China Year Book, 1913, pp. 349-50.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 133

When he returned to Peking a month later he found that in
order to get the large sum necessary for immediate expenses
he would have to resume negotiations with the Groups. Since
they would consider further advances only if the Belgian
agreement was cancelled, the Premier definitely undertook to
cancel it, except in so far as the advances already made were
concerned. With this understanding negotiations were re-
sumed on May 3. The rock on which they finally split was
the question of foreign supervision of the moneys advanced,
and of the securities given.

Because of the demand of the foreign bankers for super-
visory rights, the National Council took occasion to criticise
the entire loan policy of the Government. This critical atti-
tude was natural since the Council was determined to assert
its supremacy and could not do so if such important negotia-
tions as those with the Four Power Group (extended by May
to include Japan and Russia, and from that time known as the
Six Power Group)" were conducted independent of its super-
I vision. The criticism of the Council came at a time when
the breach between the Premier and the President was con-
stantly widening. As Premier, T'ang Shao-yi felt that he
should have a greater control over the policy of the Govern-
- ment than Yuan Shih-kai was willing to give him. Yuan had
the old Manchu idea of a Cabinet which should carry out the
policy dictated by the head of the Executive, in this case the
President. T'ang on the other hand, was determined that the
Cabinet should be the real executive, assuming the responsi-

^^ Neither Japan nor Russia were lending nations nor were
they in a position then to absorb their shares of the loans, but
for political and international reasons it was considered advisable
to admit them to the consortium.

134 Modern Constitutional Development in China

bility for the administration/^ As a member of the party
which had as its chief aim the Hmitation of the power of the
President, and with his desire to assert himself, it was im-
possible for him to act long in cooperation with the President.

On June 15 T'ang Shao-yi suddenly left Peking for Tient-
sin, absolutely refusing to continue in ofifice. The reasons he
gave for his action were : i ) the President's refusal to carry
out his (the Premier's) undertaking to appoint Mr. Wang
Chih-hsiang as Tutuh of Chihli province; and 2) a disagree-
ment with the President in regard to the action of General
Chang Hsun in continuing to occupy a position upon the
Tientsin-Pukow Railway.^^

That T'ang was determined to force recognition of the
principle of party government was evidenced by the action of
the other Tung Meng Hui members of the Cabinet. They
resigned with the Premier and in spite of Yuan Shih-kai's
plea for harmony refused to reconsider their resignations. The
attitude of the Tung Meng Hui was that the Cabinet Min-
isters must either be members of one party or of none. In
spite of the action of the Tung Meng Hui Ministers, however,
the President insisted that the time had not yet come for the
introduction of Cabinet or party government.

The first requisite of party government is the presence in
the Assembly of one party which has an absolute majority,

^^ The provisional Constitution provided that every act of the
President must receive the sanction of a member of the Cabinet.
That is, every measure must be countersigned by a Cabinet Min-
ister. Thus it was intended by the framers of the Constitution
that the real executive power should be vested in the Cabinet,
the President being simply a figurehead.

" General Chang Hsun was the Imperialist Commander at
Nanking, and after his defeat and retreat he occupied various
positions upon the Tientsin-Pukow line, where he retained and
even augmented his forces. The Premier demanded the dis-
bandment of these troops, to which the President refused to agree.

Modern Constittitional Development in China 135

and of an opposition so organized as to be capable of assum-
ing control of the government when the existing majority is
overthrown. In July 1912, when a one party Cabinet was
demanded, there were three groups in the Council none of
them with a controlling vote. Each of the parties was made
up of several smaller groups united only by the exigencies of
the moment. A Tung Meng Hui Cabinet could endure only
so long as it was supported by a majority of the votes of the
third party which held the balance of power between it and
the Kung Ho Tang. The same would have been true of a
Kung Ho Tang Cabinet. It would have been equally impos-
sible to construct a Ministry from the membership of this third
party (the Tung Yi Kung Ho Tang). Until there was a re-
grouping of the membership of the Council under the stand-
ards of two parties, one of which controlled the Assembly,
President Yuan was quite right in insisting on a Cabinet of
the ablest men in the country rather than one representative
of party.

Determined not to recognize the principle of party govern-
ment, Yuan Shih-kai attempted to form another coalition
Cabinet. His choice for Premier was Lu Cheng-hsiang, a
non-party man who had been filling the position of Minister
for Foreign Afifairs. Mr. Lu's nomination was confirmed by
the Council without much hesitation. The other Ministries
to be filled were Finance, Justice, Education, Agriculture and
Forestry, Commerce and Industry, and Communications. To
fill these vacancies the President nominated two members of
the Tung Meng Hui, two Kung Ho Tang men, and two non-
party men. All of the nominees were rejected by the Coun-
cil after a heated debate in which the Premier took part. The
Tung Heng Hui members voted against them because of their
insistence on a party Cabinet, and the Tung Yi Kung Ho

136 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Tang members for the opposite reason, i.e., because they were
given no representation.

This action of the Council in obstructing the work of form-
ing a Cabinet caused a considerable agitation against the Coun-
cil itself, especially on the part of the Military, The appar-
ent deadlock that had been reached was broken, however,
when the Council accepted all but one of the next set of nomi-
nees sent to them by the President. The one rejected was a
member of the Tung Meng Hui, the only one nominated for
a Cabinet position. Two of the others were members of the
Kung Ho T ang.

From the time of this first Cabinet crisis the partizan ac-
tivity of the Tung Meng Hui tended to discredit it more and
more in the eyes of the country, which wanted above all things
peace and harmony. After the Council had finally agreed upon
a Cabinet from which members of the Tung Meng Hui were
excluded, that party began to look to the future, and to lay
its plans ultimately to control the government. With this in
view steps were taken to amalgamate with several of the
smaller factions. A union of four other groups with the Tung
Meng Hui was finally effected (August 13), the name chosen
by the new party being the Kuo Ming Tang. The objects of
the Kuo Ming Tang were stated to be: "i) to protect and up-
hold a strong and united Government, and to organize a sys-
tem of centralization so that all constructive measures will be
systematized and coordinated. 2) To promote and support
local government, and to develop in our people such powers
of self-government as are necessary for a Republic, so as to
be able to mend the deficiencies of the Central Government.
3) To carry out effectively all measures to unite the different
races in China, and to practice real equality and civilization so
that our people will soon be united and strong. 4) To adopt
the principles of social service, to prepare the way for the in-

'I

Modern Constitutional Development in China 137

troduction of socialism in order to facilitate and better the
standard of living, and to employ the powers and strength of
the Government quickly and evenly to develop the resources of
our country. 5) To cultivate friendly feelings with foreign
nations, and to use our wisdom in, and show our due respect
for, our diplomacy with them, so as to be able to hold the bal-
ance of power and to devote a good part of attention to our
self-improvement."^*

This programme, although very vague in most particulars,
embodied many good principles, notably the determination to
effect the centralization of the government. But the basic
doctrine of the Kuo Ming Tang was not stated in their pro-
gramme— i.e., the determination to subordinate everything to
the attainment of a controlling power over the government.
Their tactics were obstructive rather than constructive, and
did more to prepare the way for the attempted overthrow of
the Republic than to secure the acceptance of the principle of
party government.

The antagonism between the Government and the Council
during July and August was increased by the seizure and exe-
cution of two prominent revolutionaries. They were accused of
participation in a plot against the government, the accusation
being made by the Vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, then acting
Viceroy of Hupeh province. Great criticism was aroused
over the way in which the seizure and execution took place.
Both men were seized at night and shot in the morning after
a hurried trial by a Military Court. When the Council de-
manded proofs of their guilt and questioned the right of the
Government to act in such an arbitrary manner, the President
I refused any explanation on the ground that it was inexpedient
to present the proofs of their guilt at that time, although later

^* China Year Book, 1913, p. 670. For the best discussion of
political parties in China see Hornbeck, Ch. V, Political Parties.

13S Modem Constitutional Development in China '

it was stated that General Li had made ten specific charges
against the accused. The President's attitude was not con-
sidered satisfactory and the Council threatened to impeach
the government. The effectiveness of the impeachment power
given the National Council, however, was greatly lessened be-
cause, on the threat of impeachment proceedings, the sup-
porters of the government always absented themselves from
the Assembly, thereby preventing further action because of
the lack of a quorum."

Just when affairs were reaching a crisis, Dr. Sun Yat-sen
visited the capital in response to an oft-extended invitation of
President Yuan. His visit did much to clear up the situation,
since he came out definitely in support of the President, criti-
cising the actions of the party of which he was one of the
leaders, the Kuo Ming Tang. Dr. Sun's visit was followed
by the arrival of Huang Hsing and Mr. Chen Chi-mei, and
the understanding apparently reached between Yuan Shih-kai
and these leaders of the radical party paved the way for a
better cooperation between the Government and the Council.

During the time of the Cabinet crisis due to the resignation
of T'ang Shao-yi negotiations had been conducted intermit
tcntly with the Six Power Group. Several advances were
made to the Government during May and June, but the con-
clusion of the comprehensive loan seemed to be blocked by the
disagreement over supervision. In his endeavor to get money,
and at the same time to satisfy the demand that no supervisory
rights should be granted foreigners, the Minister of Finance
was finally forced to conclude a loan outside the Groups.
This loan, known as the Crisp loan, was for ten million pounds.
But the Groups were too powerful, and they were successful,
because of the support of the six governments concerned, in

^^ An attempt had been made to impeach the Premier. Lu
Cheng-hsiang, on July 29, but it had failed for lack of a quorum.

Modern Cotistitiitional Development in China 139

forcing the cancellation of the Crisp Loan Agreement, and
eventually Mr. Crisp agreed to the cancellation of the flota-
tion of the second half of the loan, in return for a compensa-
tion of £150,000. Unable to secure money outside of the Six
Power Group in large amounts, the Chinese Government was
finally forced to agree to the terms of those Bankers. These
were announced to be : i ) That the purposes for which the
funds were required should be stated by the Chinese Govern-
ment to the approved Groups; 2) That China should adopt
a system of audit which would ensure the effective expenditure
of the loan funds for the purposes specified; 3) that the Salt
taxes should be hypothecated for the service of this loan, and
should be administered either by the existing Chinese Mari-
time Customs organization, or by a separate service, similar
to the Customs, under foreign direction, thus safeguarding the
proper administration of the security, despite the possible con-
tinuance or recurrence of the unsettled conditions in China."
On December 27 the proposed loan contract was submitted
to the National Council and accepted by it. Before the actual
signature of the contract, however, disagreement arose among
the Groups as to the distribution of the posts that were created
under the Agreement, such as the directorship of the Salt
Gabelle, and the head of the Audit Bureau." By the time this
had been satisfactorily adjusted, and some smaller disagree-
ments with the Chinese government smoothed over, it was
April of 1913. On April 8, the New National Assembly met
for the first time, and the Kuo Ming Tang members of the
Assembly protested against the conclusion of the loan before it
had been passed upon by the Assembly. The government,
however, disregarded their protest on the ground that the

" China Year Book, 191 3, p. 357.

^■^ China Year Book, 1914, pp. 381-384 for discussion of this
disagreement and the final settlement reached.

140 Modern Constihttional Development in China

loan had been sanctioned by the old National Council. The
Bankers making up the Group took the position that they were
dealing only with the government, and could not recognize any
parliamentary protest unless it was brought to their attention
through the Chief Executive. The contract was finally signed
on the 26th of April 1913.

There has been a good deal of controversy over the policy
of the Powers concerned in supporting certain Groups of their
nationals in their attempt to finance the Chinese Government.
It has been alleged that, because of this government support,
the Group imposed unduly harsh terms on the Chinese, and
made unnecessary stipulations infringing on the sovereignty
and limiting the independence of the Republic in her internal
affairs. We are not concerned with the rights and wrongs of
the question, but only with the influence of this loan on con-
stitutional development in China. Unquestionably in the light
of the experience of several South American Republics, it was
far better for China that responsible concerns should under-
take the financing of her government, and that the borrowing
should be done by the central authority. Only through some
such union as was effected by the Powers interested could the
large sums so urgently needed by the Chinese Republic have
been secured. If the Group had not insisted on a virtual finan-
cial monopoly in return for the flotation of the big Reorgani-
zation loan, the resources of the different provinces would
have been hypothecated in order to secure funds for local
needs,^* and such a financial disorganization would have re-
sulted that not only the central government but the provinces
as well would have gone eventually into bankruptcy. As it
has turned out, the reorganization of the Salt Gabelle under
foreign supervision has taken care of the loans for which

^* This was actually happening during the negotiations, pro-
vincial loans being made through concerns like the Krupps.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 141

the Salt Revenues have been pledged, and in spite of the con-
tinued disturbances in China, has always provided a surplus
which has been held in safety at the disposal of the govern-
ment. This surplus has been not unwelcome certainly to the
party gaining the upper hand after one of the periodical out-
bursts which have marked the recent history of China.

On the other hand it was only the conclusion of this loan
that so strengthened the hand of the President that he was
able to make himself virtually dictator, and finally to embark
on the fatal attempt at restoration of the monarchy. His po-
sition was considered so strong by the foreign Powers that
they were willing to conclude this loan agreement with him
in spite of the announced opposition of the radical party which
controlled the first Assembly elected under the laws promul-
gated by the National Council.

The National Assembly which met in April of 191 3 was
elected under the laws promulgated by the National Council
in August of 1912. The provisional Constitution stipulated
that a National Assembly should be summoned within ten
months of the adoption of the Constitution, and the Assembly
actually met within three months of the scheduled time. Since
the provisional Constitution did not provide for the organiza-
tion of the Assembly, only stipulating that there should be a
duly elected Assembly to replace the Council, the latter body
undertook the organization of the Assembly as well as passing
the laws governing elections.

The "Rules for Organization" promulgated on August
10, 19 1 2, provided that the National Assembly should consist
of two Chambers, the Ts'an Yi Yuan (Senate) and the Cheng
Yi Yuan (House of Representatives). The members of the
Senate were to be chosen by indirect election as follows:
i) Ten representatives to be elected by the Provincial as-
sembly of each province; 2) twenty-seven elected by the Elec-

142 Modern Constittttional Development in China

toral College of Mongolia; 3) ten representatives elected by
the Electoral College of Tibet; 4) three elected by the Elec-
toral College of Chinghai; 5) eight members selected by the
Central Educational Society; 6) six representatives elected by
the Electoral College of Chinese resident abroad.

The House of Representatives was to consist of members
chosen directly by the people. Each 800,000 of the population
was to have one representative, every province, however, hav-
ing at least ten even where the provincial population fell be-
low 8,000,000." Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai were en-
titled to the same number of representatives as Senators.

The term of office was placed at six years for Senators,
one third of the body being elected every two years. Mem-
bers of the House were to be elected for three years, the whole
House being renewed at the same time. The powers and
duties of the National Council were transferred to the Na-
tional Assembly, each Chamber acting separately, the decision
of the Assembly being by the concurrence of both Chambers.

Each Chamber, independent of the other, was given the
right: i) to institute a debate; 2) to question the government;
3) to demand investigation of charges of bribery or violation
of the law made against officials; 4) to reply to inquiries from
the government; 5) to receive petitions from the people; 6)
to permit the arrest of its members; and 7) to adopt regula-
tions and rules of procedure.

" For the first Assembly the distribution of representatives
was:

Chihli 46 Honan 32 Fengtien 16 Shansi 28

Kirin 10 Shensi 21 Heilungkiang loKansu 14

Kiangsu 40 Sinkiang 10 Anhui 2y Szechuan 35

Kiangsi 35 Kuangtnng 30 Chekiang 38 Kuangsi 19

Fukien 24 Yunnan 22 Hupeh 26

Hunan 27 Mongolia 27 Shantung 33

Kuei Chow 13 Tibet 10 Chinghai 3 ',-

Modern ConstiHttional Development in China 143

The estimates and accounts of the Government were to be
discussed in the House of Representatives before being pre-
sented to the Senate. In addition to the general powers given
it, the National Assembly was charged with the task of draft-
ing the permanent constitution for the Republic. The actual
drafting was to be done by a committee composed of an equal
number of members from each Chamber, and the constitution
was to be passed upon and adopted by the Chambers in joint
session. For such joint meetings a quorum of two-thirds of
the total number of members of the Assembly was required
before any business could be undertaken, and all decisions were
to be by a three-fourths majority of the members present.

The Senate was to be representative of the provinces and
the dependencies rather than directly of the people. The
qualifications for election to the Senate and the House were
the same, except that the age limit was placed at thirty years
for Senators instead of twenty-five. Any Chinese male citi-
zen thirty years of age was eligible to election as a Senator
subject to the usual disqualifications: illiteracy, opium smok-
ing, insolvency, and deprivation of civil rights. Service in the
army or police, the holding of executive, judicial or adminis-
trative office, or service in a monastic order constituted a dis-
qualification for serving either as an elector or as a member of
the Assembly.^"

The members of the Senate, as has been noted, were to be
chosen by the provincial Assemblies in China proper, and by
Electoral Colleges in the Dependencies, and where special
classes were given representation as in the representation of
the Chinese resident abroad. A candidate had to secure one
third of the total number of votes cast in order to be elected.

^° The disqualification attendent on office holding or member-
ship in a monastic or religious order did not apply to Mongolia
or Tibet.

144 Modern C onsHtutional Development in China

If the first ballot did not result in an election of the entire
number to be chosen, balloting was to continue until the full
number had been selected. In addition to the selection of
members of the Senate, the electors were required to choose an
equal number of reserve candidates in order to fill any va-
cancies that might exist through resignation or otherwise.
The provincial Assemblies might select half of the number
of Senators for their province from their own membership.
Mongolia and Chinghai were divided into electoral dis-
tricts, each entitled to choose a certain number of members of
the Senate. The electors making up the Electoral Colleges
were Nobles and Princes. Tibet was similarly divided into
two districts, each entitled to return five members, the mem-
bership of the Electoral Colleges to be appointed by the Delai
Lama and the Tashi Lama, acting in cooperation with the
Chinese Resident in Tibet. The Central Educational Society,
which was entitled to choose eight members was composed of
the Minister and Vice-Minister of Education; a representative
of each of the Ministries; one from the authorities of each
province, Mongolia, and Tibet; one from each high institution
under the direct control of the Ministry of Education; one
from each National Library ; one from each National Mu-
seum; two from the State schools in each province, Mongolia,
and Tibet ; one representing the Chinese residents of America,
one of Japan, and two of the Straits Settlements ; and twenty
noted educators at the invitation of the Minister of Educa-
tion.^^ Although the electors did, the candidates for election

^^ China Year Book, 191 3, p. 386. This was the recommen-
dation of the National Educational Conference, which met dur-
ing 1912, as to the organization of the Central Educational So-
ciety. The law on the Central Educational Society was promul-
gated on the 29th of the nth month of the first year of the Re-
public. See China Year Book, 1914, p. 502.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 145

as representatives of the Central Education Association did not
have to be members of the Association.

The Electoral College organized to choose the representa-
tives in the Senate of the Chinese resident abroad consisted of
one member appointed by each Chamber of Commerce formed
in their places of residence by Chinese residing abroad. These
Chambers of Commerce, however, must have secured the rec-
ognition of the Chinese Government. The representatives of
overseas Chinese were required to have a knowledge of the
Chinese language in addition to their other qualifications.

While the Senate was to be elected by a system of Electoral
Colleges, the "Regulations" provided that the members of the
House of Representatives should be chosen by the people.
The plan adopted, however, resulted in an indirect election
just as much as in the choice of Senators. There were two
stages to the election. The first, in which all qualified electors
took part, was called the primary election. Until a regrouping
of administrative districts was made, the Hsien" were to con-
stitute the electoral districts for primary elections, several
Hsien being joined together to make up the final electoral dis-
trict, of which there were several to each province. At the
primary election fifty times the number of representatives to
which the district was entitled were chosen. These consti-
tuted the electors in the final election.^^ So that, in fact, the

^^ For purposes of election hsien districts were places under
the direct jurisdiction of Fu, Chihli-t'ing, and Chow; T'ing and
chow. See Election Laws Ch. I Clause 10 China Year Book,
1913, p. 412.

^^ See appended table for illustrative case.
Kiangsu Province was alloted 40 Representatives.
Suppose — The province to be divided into eight final electoral

districts and each final electoral district to be divided into

8 primary electoral districts.
On estimate of one per cent of population voting the province

would have 230,000 qualified electors. (Approx. customs

146 Modern Constitutional Development in China

members of the House of Representatives were chosen by an
Electoral College of fifty times the membership of the House.
In the primary elections "any Chinese male citizen of
twenty-one years or upwards, who at the time the list of elec-
tors is made up has resided in the electoral district for two
years or more, and possesses one of the following qualifica-
tions, shall be eligible to vote for members of the House of
Representatives: a) payment of a direct tax of $2.00 per an-
num or upwards; b) possession of immovable property of a
value of $500.00 or upwards (except in the case of Mongolia,
Chinghai and Tibet, where the possession of movable property
of this value shall be sufficient to qualify as an elector) ; c) a
graduate of an elementary or higher school; d) possession of
an education equivalent to clause (c)."^^

The Chief Controller of Elections was to be the highest ad-
estimate of population 1910, 23,980,000.) 230,000 h- 40 =
5750 electors to each representative.
Each electoral final district would contain 230,000 -^ 8 r^n 28,750
electors. 28,750 ■— 5750 (no. of electors to each Representa-
tive) = 5 representatives to be elected in each final electoral
district.
There would be, therefore, 115 electors to each candidate in pri-
mary electoral district
3593-75 = number of electors in each primary district
3593-75 -T- 115 = 31-25 candidates to be elected in each pri-
mary district.
31.25 X 8 (primary districts) = 250 candidates (making up
electorate in final electoral district) X 8 (final electoral dis-
tricts = 2000 candidates or electors who would have the se-
lection of the 40 representatives for Kiangsu province.
Note — One per cent is generally accepted as a high estimate of
the percentage of the population qualified and interested to
vote. The figures throughout represent the author's calcu-
lations rather than published statistics.
"China Year Book, 1913, p. 411.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 147

ministrative officer'* of the province. He was to appoint the
Controller for each final electoral district in his jurisdiction.
The chief administrative officer of each primary district was
to act as Controller in the primary elections. The Controller
was to supervise the elections, pass judgment on the quahfica-
tions of voters, and take charge of all other matters connected
with the election, such as preparing the ballot cards, and regis-
tration lists, appointing officials to take charge of the polls,
prepare the list of successful candidates, etc.

It was necessary for a candidate to obtain "a number of
votes equal to one-third of the sum produced by the division
of the number of candidates to be elected in the district into
the number of votes cast,"-^ in order to be elected at the pri-
mary election. In the final election the successful candidate
needed to obtain a number of votes equal to one-half the sum
produced by a similar division.

The first National Assembly elected under the provisions of
the laws and regulations just discussed was controlled by the
Kuo Ming Tang in both Chambers. That party had returned
more than twice as many members as any other single party,
and almost as many as all the others combined. It might be
expected, then, that from the opening of the Assembly in

^* In response to the question who the chief administrative
officer was, the National Council decided that "in any province
where, in addition to the Military Governor, a Civil Administra-
tor has been specially appointed, such administrator shall be re-
garded as the 'Chief Administrative Authority' referred to in
the Electoral Laws, but that in any province where no Civil Ad-
ministrator has been appointed, and where there is only a head
of the department of civil alifairs, subordinate to the INIilitary
Governor, it is necessary to regard the Military Governor as the
'Chief Administrative Authority' referred to in the Electoral
Laws." Pres. Mandate, Sept. 10. China Year Book, 191 3,

p. 423-

" China Year Book, 1913, pp. 416-17.

148 Modern Constitutional Development in China

April 19 1 3, the movement toward party government would
continually grow in strength. As a matter of fact, however,
the activity of the Kuo Ming Tang during 19 13 brought about
its overthrow, and made possible the establishment of auto-
cratic government.

The aim of the revolutionary leaders had been to impose a
parliamentary regime on the country in place of the Manchu
rule, and the movement toward this end reached its height
in the election of a radical Assembly. During the next year
the influence of the 191 1 revolutionists gradually declined,
partly because of their own actions and partly because their
activity was limited by the drastic measures taken against them
by the government. The history of the next few years in
China is marked by reversion to the old order of things, the
return to the governmental conditions of the past under the
influence of the idea that only through "strong man" rule could
China hope to endure as a nation.

CHAPTER VII

The old Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, had announced that
the introduction of constitutional government would bring to
an end all of the troubles of the State. The Manchus had
tried it, and it had failed to save them, or to bring more settled
conditions in the country. This was not held to discredit
constitutionalism, however, for the failure was attributed to
the insincerity of the Manchus and to the fact that they were
aliens in China. The need of an effective and honest govern-
ment under constitutional limitations was one of the argu-
ments advanced by the revolutionists for the overthrow of the
Dynasty. The revolution resulted in an unexpected change in
the form of the government as well as the establishment of
representative institutions, and under this new form consti-
tutional government had been tried for a year without bring-
ing the greater political strength and stability to the country
that had been expected.

That government under the Nanking constitution had not

^ materially bettered conditions was admitted by everyone, but
the radical party claimed that this was due partly to the lack

I of a truly representative Assembly, in which, of course, it
would have the controlling interest, and in part to the opposi-
tion of the President to the introduction of party government,
concentrating the executive power in the hands of a Cabinet
representative of and controlled by the majority party in the

I Assembly. The followers of Yuan Shih-kai and the conserva-
tive elements in the country, on the other hand, held that the
failure of representative government in China was to be ex-
plained by the attempt to subordinate the executive to the

149

150 Modern Constitutional Development in China

legislative branch of the government. The point at issue was
clear then. Should the Assembly continue to be the dominant
branch of the government through a control of the executive,
or should the Assembly be limited to criticism and the giving
of advice, the power of interfering in the administration being
withdrawn from it?

The National Assembly elected in 1913 was more nearly
controlled by the Kuo Ming Tang, or radical party than by
any other single organization,^ and it might be said that the
electorate had given its decision in favor of parliamentary gov-
ernment." Naturally the Kuo Ming Tang members assembled
in Peking in a jubilant frame of mind, prepared to resist every
increased assumption of power by the President. This de-
termination was strengthened by indications that the President
did not intend to give up the struggle against parliamentary
dominance.

Two months before the meeting of the Assembly the at-
tempt was made partially to remove the work of framing the
permanent constitution from the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment. Upon the receipt of a memorial submitted by many
of the Tutuhs, the National Council was asked to pass a bill
establishing a committee for the drafting of the constitution.
This committee was to consist of eight representatives of the
National Assembly, (or the Council if the Assembly had not
yet been convened), six appointees of the Cabinet, two repre-
sentatives of the Tutuh of each province, and one representa-

* "It had almost as many seats as all the other parties com-
bined," says Millard. "Our Eastern Question," p. 63.

" The electorate of course must be understood as including only
a very small proportion of the total population, in pre-republic
China. Millard says only about 10,000 people (1/35 of i per cent)
took part in the elections held and it is doubtful if many more
participated in this election. See Millard, "Our Eastern Ques-
tion," p. 54.

i

Modern Constitutional Development in China 151

tive appointed by each of the provincial assembhes. The bill
was rejected by the Council without even the formality of a
discussion. But the proposal certainly indicated a desire on
the part of the President to have some share in making the
permanent constitution.

The next month (March) was marked by the murder bi
the leader of the Kuo Ming Tang, Sung Chiao-jen. The pub-
lications controlled by his party charged the government with
the instigation of the assassination. It was said that Yuan
hoped in that way to intimidate the party. While the respon-
sibility for the murder has never been definitely placed, there
is good ground for belief that the government was not en-
tirely free from blame. Later developments would seem to
place it as the first of a series of similar assassinations de-
signed to remove the leaders of the opposition to the President.
Whatever the truth of the charges made against the govern-
ment by the Kuo Ming Tang leaders, this murder was not
calculated to make more harmonious the relations between the
Assembly and the presidential office.

In addition to the murder of Sung Chiao-jen and the at-
tempted interference of the executive in the framing of the
permanent constitution, the Kuo Ming Tang had a third spe-
cific grievance against the government — the definitive con-
clusion of the quintuple loan agreement before the Assembly
had passed upon it. The hostility of the National Assembly
to the President was manifested from the time of its con-
vocation. The Kuo Ming Tang members let the President
know that if he appeared in person formally to open the legis-
lative body he would not be received in his capacity of pro-
visional President, but could only appear as a private citizen !
The presidential message, consequently, was transmitted
through his secretary, but he in turn was denied permission to
read it in person, being only allowed to present it.

152 Modern Constitutional Development in China

The early sessions of both Chambers were taken up with
the work of organization, election of officers, etc. Time was
found, nevertheless, to call the government to account for the
conclusion of the loan. Many of the sessions of the Assembly
were marked by great disorder, the lack of internal harmony
being clearly revealed. Instead of consolidating their posi-
tion under the Constitution by a constructive attitude toward
the problems of the day, the members of the Assembly limited
their activity to the work of obstruction. While demanding the
subordination of the President and Cabinet to the legislature,
they failed to convince thoughtful people of their ability to
carry on the administrative work that would have devolved
upon them. If, during 19 13, the National Assembly had at-
tempted to supplant Yuan Shih-kai by demonstrating the fit-
ness of an Assembly to exercise the large powers entrusted to
that branch of the government by the Nanking Constitution;
it might, conceivably, have been successful. But by blocking
the work of administration by obstructive tactics, hindering
all attempts at reconstruction and reorganization undertaken
by the President whether good or bad, the National Assembly
gave Yuan Shih-kai a reasonably good excuse for his subse-
quent attempt to overthrow parliamentary government.^

While the Assembly was occupied with its own quarrels,
and with its criticism of the policy of the executive. Yuan
Shih-kai was calmly proceeding to strengthen his position
throughout the country. In pursuance of this end he began
to replace the men in the provincial administrations who were
hostile to him with his own friends. The President had the
constitutional right to appoint and dismiss from office, so that

■ ^ This attitude caused the people to think of President Yuan
as one who was trying to do something for the betterment of the
country, while the Parliament wanted to prevent anything being
done of a constructive nature.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 153

nominally no exception could be taken to his action. This
was especially true of the first important change that he made.
So far as the new provincial system had been worked out
provision was made for a head of the Civil Administration
who should be eventually the highest provincial official; and
for a Mihtary Governor or Tutuh. In 1913 most of the
provinces were controlled by the Tutuhs. The Tutuh of
Kiangsi province was a member of the Kuo Ming party, so
that early in 191 3 Yuan appointed a Chief Civil Administrator
to relieve him of part of the administrative work. The Tu-
tuh, Li Lieh-chun, resented this limitation of his authority
and prepared to resist the change by force. On the surface
the President was absolutely in the right in beginning to build
up a civil administration by doing away with the military rule
in the country. But exception could be and was taken to his
use of his constitutional powers to eliminate his strongest op-
ponents in this way, while maintaining in office the Military
Governors who were friendly to him.

No active steps were taken to make Li Lieh-chun recognize
the authority of the Civil Administrator until June when he
was ordered to vacate his post and come to Peking for reap-
pointment. Li gave up his office, but proceeded to Shanghai,
and not to Peking. The Vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, was
then appointed acting Tutuh of Kiangsi in addition to the
other posts which he held. In July two other Kuo Ming Tang
Tutuhs (in Anhui and Kuangtung provinces) were removed
from office.

In justice to the President it can be said that not only was
he strengthening himself by removing those hostile to him
from control in the provinces, but that he was gradually re-
storing peace and order, and thus prosperity, to the country.
Policies were being formulated and put into effect by which
the troops were being gradually disbanded and returned to

154 Modern Constitutional Development in China

normal peaceful pursuits. Taxes were being collected again
by official agents and paid into the national treasury, instead
of being used for the support of the independent military
chiefs. And while there were still a great many of the latter
in the provinces, the administration being military in nature,
yet the Tutuhs were being brought to recognize the authority
of the President so that control was becoming more central-
ized.

All of this was being done independently of the Parliament.
Peking remained a hotbed of intrigue, but a considerable part
of the activity of the radicals had been transferred to the in-
ternational settlement at Shanghai. There, under foreign pro-
tection, the opposition to Yuan Shih-kai became centered.
This opposition rapidly assumed a revolutionary nature. The
radical press began a campaign to undermine and eventually
oust the President from his office. Secretly foreign aid was
sought for revolution, and it was no secret that the Kuo Ming
Tang leaders were preparing to reenact the scenes of 1911-12.

Yuan Shih-kai, with his agents everywhere, was fully in-
formed of the progress of the movement. From the time of
the growth of the revolutionary activity dates his use of as-
sassination and terrorist methods in ruling the country. The
more the activity of the radicals was extended, the more de-
termined he became to complete the consolidation of his po-
sition in the provinces by removing possible enemies and by .
filling the high offices with his friends. Kiangsi being a
strategic province, it was natural that he should attempt to
oust Li Lieh-chun, a man of radical affiliations. He was for-
tunate in that his right and duty to appoint a Civil Adminis-
trator enabled him to accomplish his purpose, and at the same
time permitted him to point out that he was only doing his
duty by reestablishing the civil authority.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 155

Naturally this strengthening of his hand by the President
was viewed with alarm by the Kuo Ming Tang and a series
of small uprisings took place in the Yangtze valley. Finally,
early in July, what is known as the Second Revolution broke
out, when the ex-Tutuh of Kiangsi, Li Lieh-chun, attacked the
forts at Hukow, and those forts declared their independence.*
Many of the prominent leaders of the 191 1 revolution were
implicated in this movement. Proclamations were issued in
the names of Huang Hsing, Chen Chi-mei and Dr. Sun Yat-
sen calling upon the country to overthrow the traitor Yuan
Shih-kai, and announcing the formation of a "punitive expe-
dition" to Peking. The revolt was ill-timed however, and by
September the situation was well in hand. "The rebellion"
says Dr. Hornbeck, "was altogether premature, futile in its
conception, an evidence of lack of statesmanlike qualities on
the part of its leaders, and an indication that their much
vaunted love of country was a cloak for personal self-seek-
ing."^ That is rather a severe indictment, but it is a just one.
The whole struggle at Peking had developed into a quarrel
over the control of the spoils. The majority of the members
of the Parliament, the Kuo Ming members as well as the oth-
ers, were struggling against the dominance of Yuan Shih-kai
not solely or mainly because of their desire to preserve free
government. In considerable part they were actuated by the
desire to prevent the President from leaving them out in the

* This "declaration of independence" as a political move is
very interesting. Men who have control of no territory and no
army issue declarations of independence to protest against ac-
tions of the Central Government. Provinces declare their in-
dependence similarly, and several times there have been almost
as many provinces "independent" of the Central Government,
and not acknowledging any common control, as there are pro-
vinces in the Republic.

^ "Contemporary Politics in the Far East," p. 43.

156 Modern Constitutional Development in China

distribution of offices and the spending of the pubhc money.
Votes were for sale openly in Peking before the convocation
of the Assembly,*' and it was largely because the spoils were
going to northerners instead of southerners that the Kuo
Ming Tang so consistently opposed the government. Parlia-
mentary government was desirable in the eyes of many po-
litical leaders because it created an opportunity for a greater
number to participate in the disposal of patronage and the
disbursement of the State revenue, than was the case under
a monarchical rule.

The abortive uprising in the Yangtze valley was followed
by an increased activity at Peking. The work of framing a
permanent constitution for the Republic had been passed on to
the National Assembly by the Council. After the overthrow
of the revolutionists the Assembly took up this task in earnest,
hoping to get it passed and accepted as the fundamental law
of the land before Yuan Shih-kai had been able to make him-
self absolute master of the country. The President, on the
other hand, was anxious to have his position confirmed by an
election as permanent President. The section of the constitu-
tion dealing with the election and term of office of the Presi-
dent was first completed in order that the President might be
elected and inaugurated on the date of the outbreak of the first
revolution. Parliament was persuaded to take this action by
an intimation that the Powers who had not yet recognized the
Republic would give this recognition as soon as a permanent
President had been chosen. The threat of possible foreign
intervention was also used by the government in order to
hasten the action of the Assembly. I,

' ^ Ihid., p. 42. As to this amenability of Parliament to bribery
see also Weale, "The Fight for the Republic in China," p. 55.

1

Modern Constitutional Development in China 157

The sixth chapter'^ of the new constitution dealt with the
election and term of office of the President. Any citizen of
the Chinese Republic, forty years of age, who had been a resi-
dent of the country for at least ten years was eligible for elec-
tion. This election was to be by the National Assembly sitting
as a National Convention. Two-thirds of the total member-
ship of the Convention was necessary for a quorum, and elec-
tion was to be by two-thirds majority. If, after two ballots,
no candidate had secured the necessary number of votes, the
third ballot was to be on the two names having the largest
number of votes on the second ballot. A majority was suffi-
cient to elect on the third ballot.

Little anxiety was felt as to the outcome of the election for
the first permanent President of the Republic since the oppo-
sition to Yuan Shih-kai had been temporarily paralysed by the
overthrow of the revolutionists in the Yangtze valley. Never-
theless three ballots were necessary before the final choice was
made. The Vice-President on the first two ballots developed
unexpected strength, preventing a two-thirds majority for the
President. The third ballot, when only the two highest candi-
dates could be voted for gave Yuan not only a majority, but
the necessary two-thirds. His inauguration four days later
was followed by the recognition of the Republic by the Powers
who had not already taken such action. Secure now in his
office for a period of five years the President was in a position
to deal more firmly with Parliament.

On October 26th the Constitution drafting committee®
finally passed the draft of the entire national constitution.
The next step would have been the consideration of the draft
by Parliament itself. However, other developments prevented

^ Articles 56-57-58. See China Year Book, 1914, pp. 494-496.
Entire draft given, pp. 490-499.

^ This committee was composed of an equal number of num-
bers elected by and from each House of Parliament. It was

158 Modern Constitutional Development in China

this, and as it for that reason, never went into effect it is not
necessary to consider it in any detailed way. The underlying
motive in the draft was the limitation of the executive and the
concentration of legislative power and administrative control
in the hands of the Assembly. No acts of the President were
to be valid without the approval of a Cabinet Minister. The
Cabinet itself was subordinated to the Assembly since the
Premier could be appointed only with the concurrence of the
popular Chamber, and the Ministers were to hold office only
so long as they had the support of that body. State finances
were controlled by the Assembly, although the government
had the right to introduce an estimate of the expenses and
revenues for the ensuing year. The provision was made also
that the budget estimates could not be increased by the As-
sembly. In order to prevent any assumption of increased au-
thority by the executive when the Assembly was not in session
the draft permanent constitution created a permanent com-
mittee which was to continue in session throughout the recesses
of the legislature and exercise all of the powers vested in that
branch of the government, thus holding the President at all
times under the active control of the Parliament.^

for that reason primarily representative of the ideas of the Kuo
Ming Tang which was more nearly in control of this first Parli-
ament than any other faction or party. The committee met in
the Temple of Heaven, the work of framing a constitution con-
taining ideas and principles new to China being carried on in the
place peculiarly dedicated to old China. There it was that the
Emperor, the "Son of Heaven," had in the past conducted the
worship of Heaven and Earth, and there in the first days after
the "Mandate of Heaven" had been taken from an Emperor and
given to the people acting through their representatives, these
representatives endeavored to frame an instrument of govern-
ment that would consolidate control in the hands of the new
organ. Parliament, the executive being subordinated to it.

° It should be remarked that during the period of framing of
the draft constitution at this time, and its discussion, revision and

Modern Constitutional Development in China 159

Yuan Shih-kai had made several attempts to secure modifi-
cations of the constitution while the committee was working
on it, but his suggestions had been disregarded and his dele-
gates refused a hearing. He took exception to the constitu-
tion as it was finally drafted because of the limitations im-
posed on the executive authority, and the creation of the com-
mittee of the National Assembly to watch over the adminis-
tration. After the draft had been passed he called upon the
high provincial officials for their opinion of it and for advice
as to his action. The response was immediate. The draft
constitution was denounced in a flood of telegrams from the
provinces, and in some cases the dissolution of the Assembly
was demanded.

Secured by his election as permanent President, and by the
suppression of the rebellion against his authority, and assured
of the support of the provincial officials. Yuan Shih-kai pro-
ceeded to take matters into his own hands. As a preliminary
move, he ordered the dissolution of the Kuo Ming Tang^°
throughout the country on the ground that it was a seditious
organization and had been implicated in the "summer revolu-
tion." The Kuo Ming members of the Assembly were de-
prived of their seats at the same time, by an executive man-
date. Since their presence was necessary to secure a quorum,
this act virtually brought about the dissolution of the Assem-

elaboration after the death of Yuan Shih-kai, the Assembly had
the benefit of the gratuitous advice of many capable lawyers and
political scientists, foreign as well as Chinese, and that the draft
constitutions they prepared followed the French rather than the
British or American systems. The French model was in gen-
eral followed in drafting the constitution perhaps partly for this
reason. Among those preparing such drafts may be mentioned
Messers Piggott and Barrand.

^° November 4, 1913. In this act he had the full concurrence
of his Cabinet. Weale, "Fight for the Republic," pp. 55-56.

i6o Modern Constitutional Development in China

bly. Although the President was careful to make known his
intention to preserve the Republic, he took no steps to have
the Assembly brought up to it's full strength by new elections,
and it soon became evident that parliamentary participation in
the government for the time being was ended.

After having successfully eliminated the Assembly, it might
have been expected that Yuan Shih-kai would proceed to
govern as a dictator without troubling about constitutional
forms. But he chose the wiser course, of preserving the forms
of constitutionalism, without however limiting his own su-
preme control.

Whether for effect, or because of a real desire for advice,
he made use of the foreign constitutional and legal advisers
to the government, asking an American, Dr. F. J. Good-
no w, who held the post of legal adviser at that time for a
memorandum discussing parliamentary conditions and pro-
cedure in China. It is worth while studying this document
since it recommended several departures from the ideas of
representative government which had prevailed during the
first years of the Republic.

The first part of the memorandum was devoted to a con-
sideration of the way in which representative government had
developed in Europe through the exercise of the Royal pre-
rogative. Thus the author showed that originally the parlia-
ments were not dependent on popular will or choice, but were
made up of representatives of the three predominant classes
in the State — the Lords, the Church, and the Third Estate —
summoned by the King's writ to advise in the government of
the realm. In other words, the foundations of the present
popular representative governments of Europe were laid while
the State itself was organized practically as an absolute mon-
archy. Applying this to China Dr. Goodnow said : "Within
the last two years, however, China has departed from her tra-

Modern Constitutional Development in China i6i

ditions and has attempted to establish a Republic. This at-
tempt has been made, however, without any such experience as
most European countries have had in parliamentary govern-
ment. In other words, the attempt has been made to estab-
lish a Republic before the foundations have been laid for a
parliament. . . . China is liable, if her position is not clearly
apprehended, to pass through the same unfortunate experi-
ences which have been characteristic of recent South Ameri-
can political life, and which find their most notable manifes-
tation in the occurrences now taking place in Mexico."^^ The
attempts at representative government in South American
countries, he said, resulted in dictatorships with the continual
strife and political disturbance incident to such regimes, and
the same conditions would be produced in China because of
her premature attempt to introduce popular government, un-
less representative institutions were adopted suited to the
actual state and needs of the country.

All governments are founded upon interests in the State
and not upon abstract theory. Thus China should undertake
the establishment of a parliament representative of interests
and not simply of indviduals. In that way the cooperation of
the strongest classes would be enlisted in the effort to maintain
a stable government. Dr. Goodnow suggested that the liter-
ary class, which had always been the governing class in China,
should be given representation in the parliament, together
with representatives of the landholding or agricultural class,
the merchant class, and the provinces. The latter group would
represent the interests of localities.

In order to obviate the difficulties of numerous and fre-
quent elections, these representatives should be chosen mainly
by appointment. Consequently, it was suggested that the

^^ American Political Science Review, November 1914.

1 62 Modern Constitutional Development in China

President should have the right to appoint a certain number
of the representatives, and the remainder should be appointed
partially by the local assemblies, and in part by the chief ad-
ministrative officers of the provinces. The memorandum sug-
gested that the members appointed by the President should
serve for long terms, and should continue in their appoint-
ments through dissolutions of the parliament. The idea run-
ning through the entire memorandum was that such an ar-
rangement would provide a "safe" representative body for the
immediate needs of the country, and that it would later de-
velop into a truly representative assembly as new groups in
the State reached a condition of political consciousness suffi-
ciently pronounced to enable them to gain a representation in
the government. The evolution of China's parliamentary sys-
tem was to follow the lines of European development from
an Assembly depending upon the Royal will to an Assembly
founded upon the will of the people.

Yuan Shih-kai was a practical politician, concerned with
the establishment of a government which could meet effectively
the needs of the State. Furthermore, the fact had been re-
peatedly emphasized by a large group of Chinese, and by the
foreign governments represented at Peking that the hope of
China lay in the President. So that it is not to be wondered
at if Yuan began to feel that the country could not exist with-
out his strong hand at the helm. He had given the Parliament
a chance to show what it could do, and it had failed to do
anything. The sentiment of the country seemed to be behind
him in his overthrow of parliamentary government. It is
true that the "advices" he sought from the provinces and from
officials generally, came for the most part from men who de-
pended upon the President for their places, and who could be
trusted to give acceptable advice. But in spite of that fact,
it remains true that the sentiment of the people was just as

Modern Constitutional Development in China 163

truly reflected by these appointees of Yuan Shih-kai as if it
had been given expression through some more popular agency.
At the beginning of 191 3 a radical majority had been re-
turned to the Assembly, and yet, when that majority was de-
prived of power, the only protests came from those actually
driven from office. The constituencies they claimed to repre-
sent remained silent.

In estimating the popular attitude toward the action taken
by Yuan Shih-kai at this time, it must be remembered that he
held a double mandate to reorganize the government — that
which he held as the elected representative of the people, and
that derived from the abdication edict of the Manchu Emperor,
by which Yuan was given full power to establish a republican
government suited to the needs of China. He had sworn to
uphold the Republic, and, while the Assembly was dissolved,
the Republic still existed. With that the people rested content.

The memorandum submitted by the Constitutional Adviser
to the government laid down principles entirely in harmony
with the President's own ideas of the needs of the State. The
only thing that remained was to give effect to them in the
most acceptable way. From the time of the dissolution of the
National Assembly Yuan Shih-kai exercised dictatorial pow-
ers. But he was too astute a politician not to recognize the
value of clothing his power in constitutional garb. The peo-
ple wanted a representative government and at the same time
they demanded a strong hand in that government. They
wanted to reconcile oriental absolutism with western consti-
tutionalism. So the President adhered to the forms of a con-
stitutional government during the period immediately follow-
ing his overthrow of the Parliament. When he departed from
this line of procedure he paved the way for his own downfall.

His first act was to appoint an advisory Council to aid him

164 Modern Constitutional Development in China

in the work of reconstituting the government. This Cheng
Chih Hiii Yi, or Political Council/^ was made up of men of
practical administrative experience, men of long service under
the former Dynasty who had been trained in the same political
school as Yuan Shih-kai. Working through the instrumen-
tality of this Council the President proceeded to construct a
constitutional system in which the executive was supreme, the
representative assembly being more in the nature of an ad-
visory than a controlling body.

The first recommendation made by the Political Council
was that an elected Assembly be called into being, "which,
being representative of the nation, would give constitutional
sanction to the acts of the President. "^^ The regulations for
this assembly, the Constitutional Council, were so drawn up
as to exclude from membership all except members of the old
official and literati classes. Only men who had held an official
post for at least five years, or were graduates of a law school,
or holders of a degree higher than that of Chu-jen were eligi-
ble for membership. The electorate was limited to those over
forty years of age who were officials, or held the rank of Chu-
jen, or were graduates of provincial high schools, or possessed
property to the value of $10,000. The Council was to consist
of only fifty-six members. Its chief function was to revise
the Provisional Constitution, and advise the President on any
matters submitted to it.^*

The Council was convened on March 18, 19 14, and imme-
diately addressed itself to the question of constitutional re-
vision. Its work was soon completed and the revised consti-
tution promulgated on May i, 19 14.

^2 China Year Book, 1916, p. 432.
^^ China Year Book, 19 16, p. 433.
" Ibid.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 165

The "Constitutional Compact," as the revised provisional
constitution was called, was in the nature of a voluntary
agreement by which the sovereign accepted certain limitations
on his absolute freedom of action. Instead of a bicameral
legislature, with executive as well as legislative powers, and
a President and Cabinet accountable to the legislature, the
Compact provided for a President who would "combine in
himself all the powers of government"; a unicameral legisla-
ture with limited powers; and a Council of the nature of a
Privy Council.^^

All power over the administration was vested in the Presi-
dent, unlimited by any necessity to consider the wishes of
other branches of the government. Thus he was empowered
to prescribe and determine the organization of all offices, and
to fix the duties of the officials ; all civil and military appoint-
ments were to be made by him ; he was made the commander-
in-chief of the Army and Navy with the power to declare
war and make peace, and to declare a state of seige; and he
was the fountain of honor in the State. As the head of the
State, diplomatic relations were controlled by the chief ex-
ecutive. Ambassadors and Ministers were to be received by
him, and all treaty negotiations remained in his hands, with
the exception that in case a treaty involved territorial change,
or increased the burdens of the citizens, the concurrence of the
legislature was required. This limitation was a direct benefit
to the President since it forced him to share with the legisla-
ture the responsibility for making any change to which the
people might be opposed. In addition to the powers vested in
him as the head of the administration, the President was
brought into direct contact with the legislative branch of the

^^ For translation of "The Constitutional Compact" see China
Year Book, 1916, pp. 437-443-

1 66 Modern Constitutional Development in China

government. He might initiate legislation and prepare the
financial estimates for the consideration of the legislature. In
time of emergency, executive ordinances were to have the
force of law, but they must be submitted as soon as possible
to the legislature for its approval. If this approval was
withheld they were to become null and void.^®

The Constitutional Compact further provided that the legis-
lature should be convoked and all its sessions opened, pro-
rogued or closed by the President. As has been stated, it
was to be a single-chambered body, and was, in theory, elec-
tive. Its ordinary sessions were limited to four months, al-
though they might be prolonged if the President felt the need
for a more extended session ; he also had the right to summon
the legislature in special session. Its powers were similar to
those exercised by the first National Assembly, which met in
1910. It was competent to discuss and pass bills, and the fi-
nancial estimates, including the right to "discuss and pass or
approve measures relating to the assumption of public debts,
and to the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the
National Treasury."" But, as will be seen when we discuss
the provisions of the Compact relative to finance, these rights
were so limited as to give the executive an absolute control
over the finances of the State. In addition to the above, the
legislature could reply to inquiries from the President, receive
petitions from the people, and initiate legislation equally with
the President. It also might submit suggestions and opinions
relating to legislation and other matters to the administration,

^^ For the promotion of the public welfare, for the execution
of the statutes, or in pursuance of authority granted by statute,
the President was empowered to issue, or cause to be issued
ordinances, but no ordinance might alter a statute. Ch. Ill, art.

"Ch. IV, art. 31 (3).

Modern Constitutional Development in China 167

and had the right of interpellation, although such interpella-
tions could not be so made as to censure the government.
The President might refuse to answer questions put to him,
if he felt that secrecy was desirable. Bills passed by the
legislature were to be promulgated by the President, but if
he disapproved of any measure it might be returned for re-
consideration. On reconsideration, the bill had to be passed
by a two-thirds majority, but even then the President did not
need to promulgate it if he felt that it would harm either the
internal administration or the foreign relations of the State.
If the President withheld promulgation on the above grounds
it must be with the concurrence of the Council of State. The
President had the right, in concurrence with that body, to
dissolve the legislature, in which case it was stipulated that
new elections must be held within six months from the date
of dissolution. On the other hand the legislature was em-
powered to impeach the President on charge of treason, but
all danger to the President from this provision was removed
by the fact that impeachment proceedings must have the ap-
proval of a three-fourths majority of a four-fifths quorum of
the legislature. Yuan Shih-kai was determined to avoid the
difficulties arising from a constant criticism of the government
through impeachments, and yet felt it best to give the legisla-
ture the feeling that it had a weapon by which the form of
the State might be preserved in case the President proved a
traitor to republican institutions.

The other constitutions under which the government had
been established at different times had made provision for a
Cabinet to assume a measure of responsibility for the admin-
istration, but the Constitutional Compact marks a decided di-
vergence from the former practice. The President, assisted
by a Secretary of State, was given the sole responsibility for

1 68 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the administration of the government. The actual work of
administration was to be conducted by the heads of the De-
partments, acting, not as a body, but separately. The Secre-
tary of State, the heads of Departments, and special delegates
representing the President, were given the right to appear and
to speak in the legislature, but could not be held accountable
for their acts except through the President. They could be
impeached only by the Board of Censors, and were to be tried,
not in the ordinary Courts of law, but in special administra-
tive Courts, which were to apply administrative law. Thus
all control over the administration was removed from the rep-
resentative branch of the government.

The ordinary Courts of law were to be composed of judges
appointed by the President, and were given jurisdiction over
civil and criminal cases, except where administrative officers
or administrative provisions were concerned. Trials were to
be conducted publicly, except where publicity was considered
prejudicial to law and order or public morality, when secrecy
might be observed. Thus secret trials such as had been ob-
jected to by the National Council in 19 12 were provided for
by law.

The legislature was given the constitutional right to pass on
the estimates of the government, but certain estimates might
be neither rejected nor reduced, unless with the consent of
the President. These were : i ) those pertaining to the legal
obligations of the State; 2) such necessary expenditures as
might have arisen from the provisions of statutes; 3) ex-
penditures necessary to carry out treaties; 4) expenditures
necessary for the organization of the army and the navy. The
Compact provided that all the old taxes and revenues should
be continued unless changed by statute, and all new taxes
should be imposed by statute. But when it is considered that

Modern Constitutional Development in China 169

the President determined the statutes through his pow£r to
refuse to promulgate bills passed by the legislature, it is ap-
parent that final control over revenues was retained by the
government. Furthermore a "continuing expenditure fund"
was provided which was to embody appropriations extending
over a period of years, and which could be used to meet spe-
cial emergencies. After this fund was once voted the govern-
ment had resources for which it did not have to account to the
legislature. Then there was to be a reserve fund to be used
to supply deficiencies in the estimates, or to meet requirements
not otherwise provided for. In time of war or internal dis-
turbance the President might make emergency appropriations,
submitting them later to the Assembly for ratification. If the
legislature should delay action on the budget, or should re-
fuse to pass it the last year's estimates were to continue in
force. The compact made provision for a Board of Audit,
which was to go over the accounts, after which the receipts
and expenditures of the year, with the report of the Board,
should be presented to the legislature for approval.

Since the Constitutional Compact was provisional, one sec-
tion of it was devoted to the procedure for framing a perma-
nent constitution. That instrument was to be drafted by a
committee not exceeding ten in number, appointed by the
Council of State. ^^ When the committee had completed its
work it was to be submitted to the Council of State for ex-
amination and approval. After it had been accepted by the
Council the constitution was to be submitted by the President

^* This committee was actually appointed in July 1915. Its
work, however, was interrupted by the agitation for a restoration
of the monarchy, and the subsequent rebellion which finally
brought the Kuo Ming Tang back into power. For a brief de-
scription of the membership of the constitutional drafting com-
mittee see National Review (China) for August 21, 1915.

170 Modern Constitutional Development in China

to a National Convention for final adoption. Until the per-
manent constitution had been adopted the Constitutional Com-
pact was to have the same force as the constitution.

In addition to the work of drawing up this Constitutional
Compact, the Constitutional Council, or Conference, was given
the task of framing the regulations for the Tsan Cheng Yuan
(Council of State), the Li Fa Yuan (legislative assembly),
and the National Convention which was ultimately to pass on
the permanent constitution. Furthermore any question of
amendment of the Compact was to be submitted to it. The
Compact provided that amendment might be undertaken on
a proposal of the President or a two-thirds majority of the
legislature. In either case the proposal of amendment had to
be sanctioned by a majority of three-fourths, of a quorum of
four-fifths, of the total membership of the legislature. The
actual work of amendment was to be undertaken by the Con-
stitutional Compact Conference summoned by the President.

In May the Constitutional Compact Conference completed
the regulations for the Council of State, and they were pro-
mulgated by the President on May 24. The members of the
Council were to be appointed by the President, and, as it was
actually constituted, the membership numbered seventy. The
sole function of the Council of State was to advise the Presi-
dent on matters of State or such matters as he chose to sub-
mit to it. It was further empowered to offer suggestions to
the President, but any memorandum embodying such sugges-
tions had to be signed by ten members. The work of inter-
preting the constitution devolved on it also, as did the settle-
ment of any disputes arising between the executive and the
judiciary.

The Council of State met for the first time on June 20,
1914. For the time being it was to act as the legislative As-

Modern Constitutional Development in China 171

sembly in addition to exercising its own advisory functions,
and, as a matter of fact, the Council, with the President, con-
stituted the government. Regulations for the legislature were
drawn up and promulgated, but on one pretext or another its
convocation was delayed. Since the members of the Council
of State were appointed by Yuan Shih-kai that body was what
might have been expected : a highly conservative group of men
fully in sympathy with the aims of the President and com-
pletely under his control. China had indeed reverted to
autocracy under a constitutional disguise!

The next step in the organization of the government under
the Compact was the promulgation of the laws governing the
Li Fa Yuan, or legislative council. This body was to consist
of two hundred and seventy-five members elected indirectly,
and holding office for a period of four years. Those qualified
to serve as electors in the primary election^® were men who
had held or were holding the position of a high official; had
graduated from an institution of learning not lower than a
middle school; possessed immovable property to the value of
$5000 or more, invested in commerce or industry. The quali-
fications for election in the primary election were the same
as for electors except that they were moved up one degree.

" The double system of primary and final elections was fol-
lowed in the provinces. The Central Electoral College consis-
ted of residents of Peking who had rendered meritorious service
to the country ; or had been high officials ; or were recognized
scholars, or had certain other educational qualifications ; or pos-
sessed property to the value of $10,000; or were members of the
nobility or held rank in one of the eight Banner Corps. Over-
seas citizens with property to the value of $30,000 might vote
in the Central Electoral College by coming to Peking. The Mon-
golian, Tibetan and Chinghai Electoral Colleges were made up
of nobles of Princely or hereditary rank or title, or men other-
wise distinguished.

172 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Thus, in addition to the middle school education, the candi-
date was required to have continued his study in a high grade
technical school. The property qualification was moved to ten
thousand dollars, and the official must have held office for at
least a year. The cjualifications for membership in the legis-
lative Council were placed even higher. Anyone might be
elected who had rendered meritorious service to the State;
who had been a high official for five years or more; who was
an eminent or learned scholar; who had graduated from an
educational institution not lower than a middle school after
study of not less than three years, either in China or abroad,
or who had an equivalent education; who had been a teacher
in an institution not lower than a high grade technical school
for three years or more ; who had immovable property to the
value of $30,000, or who had that amount invested in com-
mercial or industrial enterprises. ^M

These requirements followed closely Dr. Goodnow's sug-
gestion that the official, literati and gentry classes, as such,
should be represented in a single chamber legislature, thus con-
stituting a representation of interests rather than of popula-
tion.

It was intended that elections for the legislative council
should be held early in 191 5 but by that time other affairs of
greater immediate importance held the attention of the gov-
ernment, and later developments precluded the idea of a con-
vocation of such a body, so that, in fact, the promulgation of
the regulations was as far as Yuan Shih-kai advanced toward
the establishment of a semi-popular branch of the government.

At the request of the Council of State the Constitutional
Compact Conference took up the question of the Presidential
succession, and the Presidential Election Law was promul-
gated on December 29, 19 14. This law is one of the most

Modern Constitutional Development in China 173

interesting documents of Chinese constitutional history. In-
stead of following western methods for presidential elections,
provisions were made entirely unique to China. A candidate
for the office of President had to be forty years old, and of
twenty years residence in the country. The term of office
was advanced from five to ten years. When the time for an
election drew near the President was to write the names of
three men as his nominees for the office on a plate of gold.
This plate was then to be locked up in a casket, which was to
be kept in a stone house in the residence of the President.
The key to the casket was to be retained by the President, and
the keys to the stone house were to be placed in the hands of
the President, the Secretary of State and the chairman of the
Council of State. On the day of the election a committee of
ten was to be empowered to open the casket and the President
was to make known the names of the candidates to the elec-
toral college. The presidential electoral college was to be com-
posed of fifty members elected from the Council of State and
fifty from the legislative Council. In addition to the three
names submitted by the President the electoral college might
vote on the name of the President for reelection. For pur-
poses of election a quorum of three-fourths of the total mem-
bership of the electoral college was required. On the first
ballot a two-thirds majority was necessary for election. If
no one secured the requisite majority the two names standing
highest on the list were to be voted on at the second ballot,
when a majority was sufficient for election. In case, however,
it should appear inadvisable to hold an election at the ap-
pointed time the Council of State might extend the term of
office of the President for another ten years without the for-
mality of an election. At the time of taking office the fol-
lowing oath was prescribed for the President-elect : "I swear

174 Modern Constitutional Development in China

that I shall with all sincerity adhere to the constitution and
execute the duties of the President. I reverently swear."

The term of office of the Vice-President was to be the same
as that of the President. At the time for a vice-presidential
election the President was to nominate three candidates for
the office. The form of election was the same as for the
President.

The regulations for the National Convention which was to
be convoked to pass on the draft of the permanent constitu-
tion were promulgated in March, 191 5. But, owing to later
developments, no attempt was made to give effect to them.
The Convention was to consist of three hundred and thirty-
five elected members; forty from the metropolitan district;
two hundred and two from the provinces; nine from special
territories; twenty-four from Mongolia, Tibet, and Kokonor,
and twenty each from the legislative, judicial, and administra-
tive offices. The Convention was to pass on the draft of the
constitution submitted to it by the Council of State. It could
only consider amendments to the Constitution on the proposal
of at least forty members. Any amendments suggested must
be submitted to the Constitution Drafting Committee, before
being incorporated in the Constitution. The Convention was
to meet in sessions extending over four months. If it did not
reach a decision in that time it was to be dissolved and a new
Convention elected.

At the time when Yuan Shih-kai carried out these measures
concentrating power in his own hands there was no popular
feeling against his action. The only strongly organized party
of opposition had been broken up and its leaders driven from
the country; the parliament, elected in theory by the people,
had been dissolved; the Provisional Constitution had been
amended out of existence by a body which was unknown to

Modern Constitutional Development in China 175

the Constitution; the provincial assemblies had been dissolved
together with the local government bodies; a constitutional
system had been inaugurated which reestablished executive
authority on practically the same basis as that upon which the
authority of the Manchu Dynasty had rested. It would seem,
indeed, that the entire work of the revolution of 191 1, which
had been represented as an expression of the popular desire to
assume a share in the direction of political affairs, had been
undone.

Upon what, then did the revolution accomplished by Yuan
Shih-kai depend for its strength? Why was he able to bring
about such radical changes without provoking an outburst too
strong to be resisted ? The answer to these questions involves
three conditions which have already been touched upon. In
the first place Yuan Shih-kai had a certain legal basis for his
reorganization of the government. He had been commis-
sioned by the retiring Dynasty to "organize with full powers
a provisional republican government, and confer with the Re-
publican Army as to methods of union. "^° His authority as
the commissioner of the old regime meant more to one section
of the country than any mandate he had received from the
revolutionary organization at Nanking. He had sworn, it is
true, to uphold the Provisional Constitution, but that did not
preclude the possibility of making any changes in that instru-
ment necessary for the good of the country. His legal right
to institute changes incompatible with the Provisional Consti-
tution was weakened by his statement before election that he
considered the revolution as the source of his authority rather
than the Abdication Edicts. But that did not prevent a great
many of the people from looking on him as the successor to
the old government in the same sense as the Ts'ing Dynasty

^"Abdication Edicts, see above pp. 115-16.

1/6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

had been successor to the Mings, and with the same right to
make changes in the constitution of the State, provided he did
not harm directly the everyday interests of the people.

The second factor to be considered is the fact that the ultra-
liberal ideas of the southern revolutionary leaders had been
tried, after a fashion, and found wanting. The Parliament,
with its extensive powers, had not only failed to maintain
itself against the constitutionally limited executive, but it had
also failed to formulate any constructive policy which would
have indicated its fitness to wield the powers given it even if
it had been able to maintain its supremacy against Yuan Shih-
kai. The case against the Parliament is presented by one of
the most noted of Chinese scholars, Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, in the
following words : "For more than twenty days it [the As-
sembly] could not elect a speaker, and over a hundred days
elapsed before it was able to draw up rules and regulations
for its own procedure. For a long time the absence of a
quorum and the irregular attendance of the members became
an almost everyday occurrence, and when there was a quorum
the members quarreled with each other like a lot of old ladies
from the country and behaved like naughty school boys. Be-
fore dispersing each day the members wasted half the day
in wrangling about unnecessary things. With a salary of
$6,000 per annum, none of the members seems ever to have
given a thought for the benefit of the country. . . . We may
have a great love for parliamentary institutions, but we love
our country much more."^^ In the face of parliamentary in-
competency the country was more than ready to respond to
any attempt to restore a system which at least promised an
efficient administration. The people were all the more recon-

^^ "Contemporary Politics in Far East," pp. 49-50 — (citation
taken from "The Justice," Vol. I, no. 15, July i, 1913).

Modern Constitutional Development in China 177

ciled to the change by the fact that the form of the Republic
was preserved, and a certain appearance of constitutional sanc-
tion for the acts of the government was maintained.

The most important point to be remembered, however, is
that the people of China have never felt that their daily lives
were very greatly influenced by the central government. They
paid their taxes, and they knew that it was possible for them
to resist any great encroachments by the central authority on
local prerogatives and customs. Further than that, what went
on at Peking did not interest them very greatly. They lived
their lives and were content to let those who wished to main-
tain themselves as part of the machinery of government carry
on the administration. Naturally, the ones who made up the
bureaucracy were the educated classes and the men of means.
There was no hereditary nobility to make up the governing
class and restrict it to its own membership. Education was
made the basis for membership in the ruling class at a very
early period of Chinese history, and every man who had
money had a certain amount of education. So that the gentry
and the literati formed one distinct class from which official-
dom was entirely recruited. That there was no great jealousy
of this class was due to the fact that membership in it was
open to any one, and indeed many of the officials came from
poor and humble surroundings. The revolution of 191 1 had
not overthrown the conception of the right of this class to
wield the administrative authority. It had simply changed
the organs of government so that instead of the administra-
tive policy being formulated and directed by an absolute mon-
arch it was given over to the control of an assembly which
exercised the same absolute power as had the former monarch.
Now Yuan Shih-kai, in effect, reversed the change made in
191 1. Through all these shifts the administration was carried

178 Modern Constitutional Development in China

on by the same class, and the relation of the people to the
central government had undergone no change. They saw the
same officials functioning after Yuan had become the dictator
as before; the condition of the country was not changed either
for the better or the worse so far as they could see. Those
interested in opposition had been driven from the country or
temporarily silenced. And that national panacea — a constitu-
tion— had been preserved. It mattered little to the mass of
the people whether the President or the Parliament had the
supreme power until their selfish interests or local privilges
were directly affected, or until they were otherwise stirred to
action.

CHAPTER VIII

The monarchy movement of 191 5-16 was but an incident,
an interlude, in the constitutional history of the last few years.
From one point of view it deserves but a bare mention in the
story of constitutional development, but from another it
throws so many sidelights on Chinese politics that it cannot
be ignored. As we have seen. Yuan Shih-kai had taken all
the necessary steps to consolidate his position as dictator in
the Chinese Republic. He had replaced the Assembly elected
under the Nanking Constitution with a body, the Council of
State, so constituted as to be entirely subservient to himself.
The Constitution itself, which had concentrated the supreme
power in the hands of the Assembly, had been replaced by an
instrument drawn up, under the supervision of the President,
by a Conference of officials which based its authority on a
presidential mandate. The Constitutional Compact not only
combined in the President the supreme powers of government,
but, together with the Presidential Election Law, made it
possible for Yuan Shih-kai to retain the presidency as long as
he wished to do so. All of this had been done with the pas-
sive acquiescence of all classes in the State. Any who showed
a tendency to oppose the President were either forced to leave
the country or were removed by imprisonment or assassina-
tion. Men like the Vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, of whose
sympathy the government was doubtful, were concentrated in
Peking on the pretext of giving advice to the executive, but
in reality to keep them under the eye of the President. It
seemed as though China, after four years of turmoil, had

179

i8o Modern Constitutional Development in China

settled down for a few years under the rule of a "strong man"
whose position was nearly impregnable, fortified as it was by
the support of the Powers, and by the acquiescence of most
of the gentry and literati.

The opening days of 191 5, however, brought to China a
more acute danger than any she has faced in modern times,
not excepting even the danger to her national existence from
the Russian policy in the North before the Russo-Japanese
war. Less than six months after the outbreak of the great
war in Europe, and its extension to the Far East by the action
of Japan in driving German interests from Shantung province,
while the attention of the western States was distracted from
the non-European world, Japan suddenly served on Yuan
Shih-kai a series of astounding 'demands' ranging from the
disposition of the German holdings in Shantung to an agree-
ment on the part of the Chinese government to allow Japan
large administrative and police powers in China. These de-
mands were presented out of a clear sky, when there were no
oustanding questions under discussion by the two governments.
Japan tried in vain to keep the world in ignorance of her
action both by demanding secrecy on the part of the Chinese
and, when news of her action gradually leaked out, by at first
denying that such demands had been made. When the fact
of the negotiations had been so clearly established as to make
denial futile, she denied that they were of such a nature as
to endanger Chinese independence and territorial integrity.
Finally she admitted the _fact of Group V,^ but insisted that
that group had been presented not as 'demands,' but as ma-
terial for friendly discussion.

^ The demands were arranged in groups, one relating to Shan-
tung, one to South Manchuria and Mongolia, etc. Group V
consisted of the provisions designed to limit Chinese adminis-
trative autonomy.

Modern Constitutional Development in China i8i

The negotiations were prolonged until May when China
was forced, under pressure, to agree to most of the least ob-
noxious of the rights and privileges desired by Japan. While
forced to concede much, the Chinese government was able to
safeguard the Republic's interests at the most vital points.
This was due in large part to the diplomacy of the President;
— to his skill in bringing the pressure of the other Powers
to bear on the Japanese government, and in arousing the
country to the danger of the situation.

Shortly after the conclusion, in May 191 5, of the negotia-
U tions with Japan over these now famous 'demands' however,
a feeling of unrest and uncertainty became marked in Peking.
This rapidly crystallized into an agitation for the reestablish-
ment of the monarchical form of government in name as well
as in fact, with Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor. What influence
the Japanese question had in strengthening the movement will
probably never be fully and conclusively established. The at-
tempt has been made, through some unofficial documents, to
establish the fact that Japan would have been glad to see China
monarchical once more, providing the head of the State was
amenable to Japanese influence.^ This fact, it is said, was
intimated to Yuan Shih-kai and he accepted the suggestion
that the time was ripe for the reestablishment of the Empire
but refused to act as the tool of the Japanese government.
Whatever the truth of this story of Japanese influence, it is
certain that the Japanese demands influenced the course of
events in another and more indirect way. President Yuan had
conducted the negotiations with great skill, and, while forced
to make concessions, had managed to check the Japanese at
several points. His adherents could point to the fact that the

^ See Weale, 'The Fight for the Republic in China," pp. 123-
148.

1 82 Modern Constitutional Development in China

international situation was such that China must needs pre-
pare against future activity of the Powers in the Far East.
The Japanese activity showed the necessity for preserving
strong government at home, and so long as there was an elec-
tive head to the State there was danger of internal commotion,
and thus of weakness, which would invite further foreign ag-
gression.

Unquestionably the 191 5 "demands" aroused an outburst of
patriotic feeling among the Chinese such as had not been ex-
hibited for years. For the time being sectional feeling was
erased by the need for action against the common enemy.
This national patriotism was manifested in the organization
of societies for the protection of the country; in the boycott
of Japanese goods ; and in subscription to the fund which came
to be known as the "National Salvation" fund. Schoolboys,
small farmers, the poorest of the coolies, officials, gentry and
scholars all contributed to this fund for the protection of the
country against foreign aggression. All parties rallied to the
support of the President. This unanimity of sentiment may
have caused Yuan Shih-kai to feel that the country would
support him if he should undertake to overthrow the Republic
and make himself the founder of a new Dynasty.

The first thing to be done in the furtherance of a movement
of any kind in China is to establish a society to conduct the
necessary propaganda. China is indeed the home of the "so-
ciety" or "association" ! The organization through which the
monarchists worked was called the Chou-an-hui or "Society
for the Preservation of Peace." The prime mover in the or-
ganization of the Chou-an-hui was Yang Tu, a member of
the Council of State, and an intimate of the President.^ Num-

' See National Review (China), 15 January 1916. Article re-
printed from North American Review, Dec. 191 5.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 183

erous other societies sprang up either in support of the move-
ment or in opposition to it, but the Chou-an-hui was the organ
used to force the question on the attention of the country.
The President kept carefully in the background, always ixDsing
as the defender of the Republic, but in reality directing and
controlling the whole movement.

Whisperings of possible change had been in the air for a
long time before an opportunity for direct action came. Short-
ly after the Chou-an-hui had became an active organization
Dr. Goodnow* returned to China for a visit. The administra-
tion took advantage of the opportunity offered to secure his
views on abstract questions of government. Dr. Goodnow
may have known of the agitation that was going on at the
time, but he certainly did not know that the President desired
to make use of his recognized position as an authority on ques-
tions of government in order to further the movement for a
restoration of the monarchy in China. ^

In response to the request of the government he submitted a
memorandum setting forth his views in the abstract on the re-
spective merits of various forms of government, and, further,
he applied these abstract decisions, reached by a study of the
political institutions of the West, to China. He said : "China,
owing to the folly of an absolute monarchical system, has ne-
glected the education of the masses, whose intellectual attain-
ments have been, consequently, of a low standard. Then,
there is the additional fact that the people have never had a

*Dr. Goodnow had been away on leave of absence, and was
still considered an "Adviser" to the government.

^ There is no basis in fact for the charge made (see Weale,
"Fight for the Republic") that Dr. Goodnow returned to China
at the request of the government to advise it on the question of
the change in the form of the State. His visit was entirely un-
official, and when he left America he was unaware of the strong
movement on foot to restore the monarchy.

184 Modern Constitutional Development in China

voice in the doings of their government. Therefore they have
not the ability to discuss pohtics. Four years ago the absolute
monarchy was suddenly changed into a republic. This move-
ment was all too sudden to expect good results. If the JMan-
chus had not been an alien race, which the country wished to
overthrow, the best step which could then have been adopted
was to retain the Emperor, and gradually lead him to a con-
stitutional government. What the Commissioners on Consti-
tutional Government suggested w^as quite practical if carried
out gradually until perfection was reached. Unfortunately
the feeling of alien control was bitter to the people, and the
maintenance of the throne was an utter impossibility. Thus
the monarchy was overthrown and the adoption of a republi-
can system was the only alternative.

"Thus we see that China has during the last few years been
progressing in constitutional government. The pioneering
stage of the process was, however, not ideal. The results
could have been much better if a person of royal blood re-
spected by the people had come out and offered his services.
Under the present conditions China has not yet solved the
problem of the succession to the presidency. What provisions
we have now are not perfect. If the President should one day
give up his power the difficulties experienced by other nations
will manifest themselves again in China. The conditions in
other countries are similar to those obtaining in China and
the dangers are also the same. It is quite within the bounds of
possibility that the situation might threaten China's indepen-
dence if internal disturbance should occur in connection with
this problem and not be immediately put down.

"What attitude then, should those who have the good of
the nation at heart, take under the present circumstances?
Should they advocate the continuance of the Republic or sug-
gest a change for a monarchy? It is difficult to answer these

I

Modern Constitutional Development in China 185

questions. But I have no doubt in saying that the monarchical
system is better suited to China than the RepubHcan system.
For if China's independence is to be maintained, the govern-
ment should be constitutional, and in consideration of China's
conditions as well as her relations with other powers, it will
be easier to form a constitutional government by adopting a
monarchy than a Republic."®

But the memorandum went on to point out that three in-
dispensable conditions must be observed before the restoration
of the monarchy could be considered advisable. In the first
place it must be certain that such a change as was contemplated
had the support of the people and would not be opposed by
the Powers. It must be made in such a way that there would
be no uncertainty as to the succession after the death of the
Emperor. And, finally, it must make definite provision for
the progressive development of constitutionalism in China.

This, then, was the memorandum which the Chou-an-hui
seized upon and used as a basis for its agitation for the restor-
ation of the Empire. It was translated into the vernacular and
spread broadcast throughout the country, together with a
manifesto of the Society, based upon it. The Society spread
rapidly in the provinces, most of the Military Governors be-
coming affiliated with it and lending their support to the move-
ment. When the time was considered ripe the whole question
■ Iwas brought to an issue by a petition to the Council of State
asking that the question of the form of government be taken
under consideration. At the same time memorials and peti-
tions poured in from the provinces. Petitions had been used
to bring pressure to bear on the Manchus to secure limita-
tions on their power, and now they were used to force the

'^National Review (China), August 28, 1915.

l86 Modern Constitutional Development in China

executive to assume a greater authority and power/ But with
this difference, that the petitioners for a change back to the
monarchy were men who held official positions under the gov-
ernment and who were interested directly, not in a limitation
of the power of the central government, but in extending that
power because it had been intimated to them that the President
desired such action. In other words, the whole "popular"
agitation expressed through these petitions, and which finally
caused the Council of State to take action, was carefully en-
gineered from Peking by the henchmen of Yuan Shih-kai.
Yang Tu, the ostensible head of the Chou-an-hui, was really
only a tool in the hands of the President and his advisers.
The real brain back of the movement, aside from the Presi-
dent, was Liang Shih-yi, the head of the Bank of China and
a politician of no mean ability.

Instead of proclaiming the monarchy and trusting to force
to overcome all opposition, a plan was worked out by which
the people could have an opportunity to express their will as
to the future form of the State. Then, if opposition on the
part of the Powers developed, the monarchists could point out
the fact that it was the will of the people, and that since the
people had voted for the change no internal disturbance need
be feared.

On September 6, 191 5 the President referred to the agita-
tion for a reestablishment of the Empire in a message to the
Council of State.* This agitation, he said, was incompatible
with the position he held as President. But instead of order-
ing all such talk absolutely repressed he went on to say that
any question of a change in the form of the State was very

^ It is claimed that the signatures to many of these petitions
were forged. National Reviezv (China), 25 Sept. 1915.
^National Review (China), 10 September 1915.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 187

important, and he recommended it to the careful consideration
of the Council. After consideration, that body suggested that
the National Convention, for which provision had been made
in the Constitutional Compact and which was tb be convened
later in the fall of 191 5 should be authorized to pass on the
question of the monarchy. That would have meant a delay of
several months, giving time for the opposition to the move-
ment to unite and possibly prevent favorable action. Further-
more there was always the danger of foreign interference.
So the Chou-an-hui requested the Council of State "further
to discuss the question and to suggest the organization of an-
other popular body with large and adequate powers, at an
earlier date than the convocation of the National Conven-
tion."® This body should be empowered to consider the pro-
posed change.

The Council of State lost no time in acting on this sug-
gestion, and on October 6 passed "the Law on the Organiza-
tion of the Convention of Citizen's Representatives."" Two
days later this law was promulgated by the President. In
submitting the law to him the Council stated: "In spite of
the fact that we were reluctant to make any hasty proposals
since we have already suggested methods and the Great Presi-
dent has also decided upon the procedure to follow, we cannot
ignore the 'united appeal of the people' repeatedly uttered ; and
in consideration of the necessity of respecting the 'will of the
people' this House has again brought up the subject for dis-
cussion. . . . The State is the State of the people, and the
form of the State should be adopted or rejected according to
the wish of the people; and as the will of the people is now for
a speedy solution, it becomes our duty to yield to the desire of

10

China Year Book, 1916, p. 483.
Ibid., pp. 483-4.

i88 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the people and place the question above everything else. . , .
We therefore decide that the name of the body should be
called the Convention of Citizen's Representatives, which shall
be drawn from the members elected by the successful candi-
dates of the primary election of the Citizen's Convention for
the purpose of settling the question of the form of the State.
In this way all the provinces, special administrative areas,
Manchuria, Mongolia, Mohammedan regions and Tibet shall
have representatives therein. ... As the entire body of the
country is in a state of exceeding haste to see the solution of
the question of the form of the State, we hereby submit to you
the text of the said law, together with the petitions and ask
that the Great President shall speedily promulgate the same.""
The Convention of Citizen's Representatives^^ was to con-
sist of 1834 representatives elected from the provinces, and
special administrative areas; 7,^ from Inner and Outer Mon-
golia; 12 from Tibet; 6 from Chinghai; 24 representatives of
the Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese Banners; 60 elected by
the Chambers of Commerce; 30 representatives of the learned
scholars; and 20 representatives elected by those who had
done good service to the country. In the provinces and de-
pendencies the election was to proceed from the point reached
in the election of candidates for the National Convention.
Thus the successful candidates in the primary elections were
empowered to choose the representatives for the Citizen's Con-
vention. The electorate was carefully restricted in all cases,
and the election was put under the control of the high officials.
Care was taken that the electors should act as desired by the
government. Thus voters were required to sign their ballots.

" Ibid.

^- China Year Book, 1916, pp. 444-446, for text of law organiz-
ing the ''Citizen's Convention."

Modern Constitutional Development in China 189

After the Convention of Citizen's Representatives had been
constituted, the members were to have only one function — to
vote on a question submitted to them by the government.
This question was drawn up and passed by the Council of
State, as the acting legislative body, and was then submitted
to the President for approval, after which it was transmitted
to the Superintendents of Election.

Absolutely no opportunity was afforded the members of the
Convention for deliberation and discussion of the proposed
change. They were to be simply the means of registering the
will of the people at the dictation of the government. Care-
ful instructions were sent to the Superintendents, who were all
officials of the government, as to the exact procedure to be
followed, so that there would be no chance of a slip.^^ The
ballots were all printed in advance and marked in the proper
way so all that the people's representatives had to do was to
sign their names. In spite of the fact that care was taken to
see that only "favorable" representatives should be elected,
the actual voting on the question of the change in the form of
the State was conducted in most cases under the eyes of police-
men and soldiers, so that the necessity for affirmative action
was kept continually before the voters in the Convention. As
each vote was cast it was opened and scrutinized before the
representative was allowed to leave the room. Under the cir-
cumstances it is little to be wondered at that the Convention
of Citizen's Representatives decided unanimously for restora-
tion of the monarchy. The result could well have been an-
nounced in advance.

The elections were completed and the vote taken in Decem-
ber, and, on December 11, the Council of State announced that
the opinion of the country was in favor of a monarchy, and of

" See Weale, "The Fight for the Republic," ch. XL

1 90 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor. A petition was immediately sent
the President asking him to ascend the Throne. He refused
at first, because of his oath to support the Republic. But after
being petitioned a second time he accepted, since the change
had come from the people and he, as their servant, could not
refuse to do their will.^* Steps were immediately taken to
prepare for the coronation in spite of the fact that "advice"
had been tendered from several sources against the change of
name for the government.

While the monarchists had been maturing their plans for
securing the consent of the country to a reversion to the mon-
archical form of government, the opposition had not been idle.
Signs of discontent with the proposed change had been mani-
fested in many of the provinces. The office of a pro-monarchy
paper in Peking had been bombed as a sign of disapproval of
its activity. Notable scholars, led by Liang Ch'i Ch'ao had
come out as opponents of the movement. Liang presented the
case for the anti-monarchists in a very able pamphlet which
was widely read throughout the country. As he said in the
beginning in order to make his position clear, Liang Ch'i Ch'ao
was not a radical Republican. In fact he had maintained con-
sistently, since 1898, that constitutional government could be
introduced into China best under a monarchical form of gov-
ernment. "Before I proceed with my argument," he said, 'T
wish to make plain two points. One is that I am not one of
those reformers whose ears are their brains, and who are in-
toxicated with the doctrine of republicanism. I have, there-
fore, no partiality for the republican form of government nor
any bias for or against other forms of government. . . . The
second point is that I am not one of the veteran conservatives

^* Translation of the mandates given, National Review
(China), 18 Dec. 1915.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 191

who lay so much stress on the importance of having a Dy-
nasty. ... If one wishes to consider the present situation of
the country without bias or prejudice he must disregard the
rise or fall of any particular family. "^^ This statement of his
position was certainly borne out by the facts. Liang Ch'i
Ch'ao had been against the disenthronement of the Manchus
in the first place, but after the Republic had been established
he had come forward in its support. When Parliament had
discredited itself he had seen the necessity for the establish-
ment of a regime such as had been inaugurated under the Con-
stitutional Compact. Therefore his arguments at this time
carried great weight in the country. In his pamphlet Liang
argued that the time had come when agitation for a change in
the form of the State should cease, the Republic be accepted
as a fact, and all efforts bent toward a reorganization of the
government so as to give an efficient administration. The
main thing was to get a workable organization and then con-
solidate and strengthen the country in order to secure peace
and order, and prevent any foreign aggression such as had
been undertaken successfully by Japan. He pointed out that
Yuan Shih-kai had been given a term of office long enough to
enable him to accomplish this work, and that provision had
been made for his reelection if it should be advisable for him
to continue in office for more than the ten year term for which
he had been chosen. At the end of twenty years surely the
country would not be endangered by the necessity of choosing
a new executive. All the possible arguments against a change
in the form of the State were advanced in this pamphlet, which
became to the opponents of the monarchical movement what
Dr. Goodnow's memorandum had been to the advocates of a
restoration.

^^ See Weale, "Fight for the Republic," ch. X, for the com-
plete text of this pamphlet.

192 Modern Constitutional Development in China

In spite of the known opposition, the movement continued,
however, until, as we have seen, its object had been attained.
During the period from September until the death of Yuan
Shih-kai the country was ruled under the iron hand of the
military. Men who dared raise their voices against the change,
or who were suspected of hostile sentiments were summarily
arrested and executed if they remained under the jurisdiction
of the government. It was only in the treaty ports where for-
eign protection was enjoyed that opposition to the President
could be shown. This arbitrary suppression of all opposition
accounts for the fact that the monarchists were able so com-
pletely to carry out their plans.

Another fact that Yuan Shih-kai was forced to consider
carefully before allowing himself to be crowned as Emperor
was the danger of possible foreign intervention. The Jap-
anese had never been very favorably inclined to the Chinese
Republic, and, as has been said, it was reported indirectly to
the President that no opposition would be offered to a restora-
tion of the monarchy. Many prominent Japanese statesmen
had prophesied that the Republic could not have a very long
life.^® But the fact that it was Yuan Shih-kai who was ex-
pecting to make himself the Emperor changed the point of
view of the Japanese. Since the time when Yuan had held the
post of Chinese-Resident in Korea, where he had used his
position to work against Japanese interests in that country, he
had been little loved in Japan. During the whole of his offi-
cial life he had come into conflict with the neighboring Empire
in one way or another, so that it was a question from the very
beginning whether Japan would sanction his elevation to the
Dragon Throne. To offset the danger of possible Japanese

^® See Count Okuma's views and Dr. Hioki's views as given
in National Rez'iezv (China), 10 Sept. 1915.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 193

intervention, however, there was the hatred, in China, of Japan
and things Japanese, engendered by the Demands. Interven-
tion really might strengthen Yuan's position throughout the
country and enable him to defy his old enemy.

The restoration movement was well under way before Japan
took any open action. On October 28 Great Britain and Rus-
sia united with Japan, at the latter's request, in tendering ad-
vice to the Chinese Government opposing the establishment
of a monarchy in China. They inquired what effect the change
would have on the peace of the country, expressing the fear
that a change in the form of the State would lead to wide-
spread opposition, especially in the South where considerable
unrest already was apparent. It was felt to be unwise to stir
up trouble at a time when the international situation was so
disturbed. All intention, however, of interference in the in-
ternal affairs of the country was disclaimed.

The Chinese Government replied that no danger was to be
feared from an internal revolt against the monarchical change,
and that it was more apt to cause trouble if the change was
given up for a time at the request of the foreign powers.
Preparations went on for the coronation in spite of the fact
that advice counselling delay was again tendered, this time
by Japan, Great Britain, Russia, France and Italy.

After the monarchy movement was well under way, every-
one within the jurisdiction of the central government hastened
to safeguard himself by going on record as favoring the
change. Among those who submitted memorials favoring the
overthrow of the Republic was a young Yunnanese who had
been acting Tutuh of Yunnan province during the first revo-
lution and after the establishment of the Republic. In Janu-
ary, 191 5, this man, Tsai Ao, had been appointed Director-
General of the Bureau of Resurveying Cultivated Land, and

194 Modern Constitutional Development in China

had come to Peking to assume his new duties. Thus he was
among the high officials who were under the surveillance of
the President when the Imperial bee began to buzz. His later
actions show that he sent in his memorial advocating change
merely to quiet any suspicions which might be entertained of
his loyalty to Yuan Shih-kai. He was next heard from in
Yunnan province on December 23, when he united with other
provincial officials in demanding that the Republic be restored.
No answer being received, Yunnan province declared its in-
dependence and under the leadership of Tsai Ao prepared to
resist the Central Government.

The reply that was finally made to the Yunnan telegrams is
of interest because of its discussion of the threat of foreign
interference, and its justification of the President's action in
accepting the Throne and overthrowing the Republic which he
had sworn to uphold. "The question whether the telegrams
from Yunnan dated the 23rd instant are genuine documents
or not has still to be ascertained. But in order to avoid mis-
understanding we wish to reply to the principal points raised
as follows : — The fact that Japan has together with Great
Britain, France, Russia and another Government, tendered
advice in a friendly spirit to China, requesting the postpone-
ment of the monarchical movement for fear that a hurried
change might cause internal disturbance which would damage
the commerce, life and property of their nationals — but with
the distinct assurance that they have had no wish to interfere
with our internal affairs — is not without precedent in the his-
tory of diplomacy. This, together with their declaration of
watchful waiting, may be regarded as in the nature of ap-
proval; and recognition is in a fair way of being accorded.
There is, therefore, no question of interference or disregard
at issue. How can anyone fasten any blame on the govern-

Modern Constitutional Development in China 195

ment on such a pretext, seeing that the act was the friendly
advice of the friendly Powers? On the other hand the re-
sponsibility must fall on those who consider such a friendly
act as an act of intervention and thus cast an insult on the
country.

"The Presidential mandate issued on the nth instant con-
tains the following passage" : 'Keeping faith is of primary
importance in connexion with the administration and protec-
tion of a country. When the Republic was first established
I, the President, first took an oath before the Senate, promis-
ing to do my utmost to glorify the Republic. If I should set
up an Imperial system for myself I should be violating my
own oath, an accusation which I shall not be able to explain:
I, therefore, request that another person be designated as the
Emperor.'

"The Tsanchengyuan, in the capacity of the general repre-
sentatives of the people, then replied that the taking of the
oath was simply a formal undertaking by the Chief Executive
of the Republic, registered strictly in his capacity as such Chief
Executive, which ofifice is itself based on the choice of the
whole body of the people. The Chief Executive should follow
the dictates of the people. If the people are for the Republic
then the oath is valid, but if the people are for a constitutional
monarchy the validity is consequently changed. Now the
people are tired of the Republic and desire to have a monarchy.
With the change of the form of government the position of
Chief Executive no longer exists ; hence the oath becomes null
and void. . . . The change in the form of the government re-
cently carried out was made by the unanimous decision of the
officials and people according to legal methods. The unanimity
of the will of the people can be seen through the fact that
there was not a single dissenting voice. Even up till this day

196 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the telegrams from military and civil officials urging the Presi-
dent to ascend the Throne reach Peking in great numbers
every day. The shouts of joy and congratulations are as ir-
resistible as the force of the incoming tide. How could such
manifestations take place unless the change has been made by
the free choice of the people themselves. "^^

This justification offered for Yuan's acceptance of the
Throne did not satisfy the Yunnan leaders and they prepared
to defend the Republic by force. The strength of the Yunnan
movement was very seriously underrated both by the Gov-
ernment and by students of the situation in the Far East.
Thus one authority wrote : "It is scarcely to be expected that
the rebellion will make great headway. In the first place the
armed forces of the nation, especially the better trained troops
of the North are under the absolute control of Yuan^ — to whom
they are loyal. Nearly all the military governors in the prov-
inces are either old followers or personal friends of Yuan, and
the few exceptions are practical men and essentially conserva-
tive in disposition. In the second place, the principle of mon-
archical government fairly represents the political ideal of the
people as a whole. Third, even his worst enemies concede
that Yuan is the ablest man to whom the nation can look both
for reconstruction within and for defense against what, after
all, is the greatest menace to its liberties, — danger from with-
out. ... If Yuan's government is overthrown it will be by
greater forces than those moving the rebellion in Yunnan."^*

And yet, in a little more than three months after the out-
break in Yunnan the revolt had spread over South and Central

^^ Telegram sent by the Chenshih Tang and the Headquarters
of the Generalissimo in reply to the telegrams from Yunnan op-
poing the establishment of the Monarchy, National Review
(China), Jan, i, 1916.
"Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in Far East," pp. 99-100.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 197

China ; the northern troops had been unable to win any very-
decisive victories; the men on whom Yuan had absokitely re-
lied for support deserted his cause one after the other, or pled
with him to give up the monarchy ; and it was pretty well es-
tablished as a fact that whatever the people thought of the Re-
public, and however willing they were to submit to the abso-
lute control of Yuan Shih-kai, they were not willing to sanc-
tion the restoration of the monarchy, with the succession pass-
ing in the course of time to an incapable like Yuan's eldest
son, Yuan Ko-ting.

The Government felt with Yuan Shih-kai that "well trained
troops will readily suppress the rebels on reaching the scene.
A few ambitious leaders without popular support are engi-
neering the rebellion. The voting shows that the public favors
a monarchy. "^^

The indications were that this view of the situation was the
correct one. No one knew just what the strength of the revo-
lutionists was, or what support they could expect from the
other provinces. Yunnan itself is in rather an inaccessible
situation, so that it would take a long time to bring the forces
of the North to bear effectively on the province, and thus test
the strength of the rebellion. The officials in the other prov-
inces had all supjx)rted the monarchy movement and there was
no evidence of the fact that they had changed their views, or
that they could not control the territory under their jurisdic-
tion. It is not strange therefore, that the concensus of opin-
ion predicted the ultimate triumph of the government. The
only dissent from the general view as to the lack of opposition
was expressed by the Japanese government when it advised a
postponement of the change in the form of the State. The
communique issued by the Japanese Foreign Office contained

19

Peking Gazette, March 12, 1916.

198 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the extremely significant statement that : "Although it would
appear as if there were throughout the country no great oppo-
sition to the establishment of a monarchy, careful observation
of the actual state of affairs in China based upon information
possessed by the Imperial Japanese Government, shows that
it is undeniable that such appearances are more superficial than
real. The undercurrent of opposition is far stronger than
would be imagined and a feeling of unrest is spreading to all
parts of the country."^" Later developments served to prove
the accuracy of the Japanese estimate of the strength of the
opposition to the restoration of the monarchical form of gov-
ernment.

In the latter part of January Yunnan was joined by Kuei-
chow province, its neighbor to the northeast. Kwangsi and
Kuangtung provinces followed suit a short time later, declar-
ing their independence of the central authority, and it was only
with difficulty that the Peking government maintained itself in
Hunan. As far as the actual military operations were con-
cerned the revolutionists did not achieve any very notable suc-
cesses. In fact it was in the face of military reverses that the
movement against Yuan Shih-kai gained in strength by the
addition of one province after another. During the first three
months of 191 6 Peking could point to the fact that it was grad-
ually pushing the rebels from territory that they had occupied
at the outbreak of hostilities. But it was not possible to cope
with the disaffection and dissatisfaction that was invading one
province after another. Just as the Manchus had been hur-
ried in their reforms by the revolution of 191 1, so the Em-
peror-elect tried to placate the country by showing his sin-
cerity in the establishment of constitutional government, the
necessity for which had been emphasized by Dr. Goodnow in

2" See Weale, "Fight for the Republic."

Modern Constitutional Development in China 199

his memorandum. The Legislative Assembly had not been
convoked for various reasons, so now it was announced that
immediate steps would be taken to establish the legislature pro-
vided for under the Constitutional Compact. In order that
delay should be minimized the government suggested that the
members of the Citizen's Convention should be called together
to sit as the Lifayuan, since they had been elected by the peo-
ple in almost the same way that members of the legislature
were to be chosen.

The Council of State replied favorably to this suggestion.
"A Lifayuan composed of members elected by the people ought
to have been convened during the period of the Constitutional
Compact. The need of such an organ is doubly urgent during
this time when the Throne intends to start anew with the peo-
ple. A mandate was issued last year in the twelfth month
stating that the legislative organ would be established within
a year. The desire of the people to see an efficient government
at work is more earnest than ever, and in view of the need to
respect the wish of the people and to reform the administra-
tion, the delay must not continue. The process of election to
the Lifayuan, however, is exceedingly complicated and diffi-
cult, and it is impossible to expect the same to be carried
through in a short space of time. In these circumstances it
would be more practicable to treat the final election of the
Citizen's Convention — already carried through in the provinces
and all the special administrative areas in advance of the date
fixed last year — as the final election for the Lifayuan. In pur-
suance of this policy the successful members of the final elec-
tion of the Citizen's Convention shall be regarded as having
been elected to the Lifayuan. The single balloting of the
Special Central Electorate and the combined Electorate of
Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai, which have not yet been com-

200 Modern Constitutional Development in China

pleted, shall be held at an early date for the purpose of electing
members to the Lifaytian. In this way the legislature repre-
senting the wish of the people may be convoked within a short
time."'^

This sop thrown to the opposition did not serve to check the
growth of the revolutionary movement, but was rather taken
as an indication of weakness. During the early part of March,
1 91 6, however, the government forces made considerable
progress from the military standpoint, and it was felt that this
offered Yuan Shih-kai and the monarchists a good opportunity
to "reconsider" the question of the form of government, with-
out appearing to have been forced to do so by the rebellion.
The fact that reconsideration was felt to be necessary indi-
cates that the early impression of the strength of the rebellion
had been revised. From this time on Yuan devoted himself
to preserving his authority in the country with the least pos-
sible loss of "face" to himself and his supporters.

During the whole of the monarchy episode he had left a
loophole for escape by his declaration that he was acting
against his better judgment, and was only giving in to the
will of the people. That was the line he adopted in the man-
date issued on March 22 cancelling the monarchy.

Yuan Shih-kai's "abdication" edict states in part: "Since
the inauguration of the Republic troubles and disturbances
have come in rapid succession, and I, a man of little virtue,
have been obliged to shoulder the most difficult responsibility.
Patriots of this country, who have cherished the fear of im-
minent dangers, have advocated the restoration of monarchy
with the object of averting quarrels and securing permanent
peace. Since the time of the second revolution our ears have
been filled with their arguments ; but from time to time I have

^^ Far Eastern Review, March 191 6.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 201

discouraged their movements. However since last year the
circumstances have been greatly changed and I have been un-
able to suppress their opinion. They have unanimously said
that 'unless a constitutional monarchy be introduced, the ex-
istence of the Chinese nation will never be preserved.' . . .
"As the sovereign authority of the Chinese nation is lodged
with the whole body of the people of the country, I could not
raise any opposition when the question was finally settled by
the whole body of Citizen's Representatives. However my
heart could not be at ease if I should ascend the Throne by
breaking my oath of inauguration and disregarding principle
and faithfulness. I showed my sincerity and modesty by re-
fusing to accept the post of honor. But the said Yuan in-
sisted that the oath of the Chief Executive was based upon the
position he held at that time, but that as the condition changed
he should follow the will of the people. Hence I could not
make any further excuse on account of the grave responsibil-
ity forced upon me. However in order to satisfy temporarily
the public desires I proceeded with the preparatory works, and
no actual steps were taken. After the outbreak of the trouble
in Yunnan and Kueichow, I promulgated a mandate ordering
that the preparatory works should be delayed, and that no
more petitions requesting the enthronement should be trans-
mitted to me. Then I promulgated another mandate hastening
the convocation of the Lifayuan with the hope of ascertaining
as soon as possible the real opinion of the people, and devising
some means to relieve me of the difficulty. . .

"Through misunderstandings the present trouble has arisen.
My sincerity has not been sufficient to move the heart of the
people, and my understanding has not been able to read the
signs of the times. It is the lack of virtue on my part, and
therefore I have no right to blame others. . . .

202 Modern Constitutional, Development in China

"I hereby declare that I still recognise that the memorials
and documents transmitted to me through the acting Lifayuan
in connection ivith the request for enthronement are inconsis-
tent zvith the present condition of the country. The bill passed
on the nth day of the 12th month of last year on the recog-
nition of monarchy is hereby cancelled, and the State Depart-
ment is hereby instructed to return to the acting Lifayuan all
the petitions urging enthronement from the provinces and
special administrative areas, so that they may be returned to
the original petitioners to be destroyed. All preparations for
the restoration of monarchy are hereby stopped. Thus I hope
that by imitating the repentence and remorse of the ancients,
the love and grace of heaven will be received. We will cleanse
our hearts and thoughts, so that trouble will be averted and the
people will obtain peace and tranquillity."'^

The revolutionists, up to the cancellation of the monarchy,
had been fighting for that very end. But when they had
achieved their original purpose they changed their demands to
include the complete elimination of Yuan Shih-kai from par-
ticipation in public affairs, and also the punishment of the
leaders in the monarchical movement. Instead of being pla-
cated by the cancellation edict they regarded it as a sign of
weakness. For that reason the months following the restora-
tion of the Republic were taken up with the agitation for the
removal of the President. Very little fighting occurred during
the period, but several provinces declared independence and the
independence of the other provinces was not cancelled. Both
sides endeavored to find a basis of compromise which would
^erve to reunite the country. While nothing short of the re-

-- Far Eastern Review," March 1916. The italics are the auth-
or's. See also translation given in Peking Gazette, March 2^,
1916.

Modern Constitntional Development in China 203

tirement of the President would satisfy one section of the
South, another group expressed its willingness to see the
President retain his office, provided his authority in the gov-
ernment was made merely nominal. This suggestion was ac-
cepted by the President and he proceeded to form a Cabinet.

An edict promulgated on April 21 stated that the failure of
the President to bring about a stable condition in the country
was due to the lack of a responsible ministry. "Examining
the root of this failure I find that it has been due to the ab-
sence of a Cabinet and the consequent lack of direct responsi-
bility. The fact that I have merely assumed the appearance of
an unlimited control of all the powers of the State has been the
cause of dissatisfaction on the part of the people.""^ The
Secretary of State was therefore authorized to take control
and organize a government "with the Ministers of the Metro-
politan Ministries as members thereof who are to be mutu-
ally responsible to and for one another."^* This was to be the
first step in the formation of a responsible Cabinet.

The actual organization of the Cabinet was provided for in
a mandate issued simultaneously with the above. The Cabinet
was to consist of the Secretary of State and the heads of de-
partments. The Secretary of State was to be the head of the
administration, and all laws and mandates were to receive his
countersignature before becoming effective. All affairs of
State were to be decided by the Cabinet members meeting as
a body,^^

The only question was to whom the Cabinet was to consider
itself responsible. Yuan Shih-kai was still strong enough to
control any assembly elected under the provisions of the Con-

^^ Far Eastern Reviezv, April 1916, p. 428.
^^Ibid., pp. 428-429.
" Ibid., p. 429.

204 Modern Constitutional Development in China

stitutional Compact, and It was to be feared that the members
of the Cabinet, inchiding the Secretary of State, would act at
the dictation of the President. The responsibility of the Cabi-
net might mean no more than it had during the few months
just preceeding the revolution of 191 1 when the Manchus
nominally conceded the principle of responsibility by creating
a figurehead Cabinet.

The question of settlement had narrowed down, then, in
May 1916, to the future of Yuan Shih-kai. The independent
provinces were almost unanimous in the demand for his with-
drawal from public life. The Military Commanders in the
Northern provinces wished him to retain office, although fa-
voring a responsible Cabinet government, such as had been
established by the edict of April 21. They pointed out that
the control of the administration had been transferred from
the President to the Cabinet under the direction of Premier
Tuan Chi-jui, and that the Secretary of War had assumed
control of the army so that Yuan was rendered powerless.
They also pointed out that if the President were removed from
office it might open the way for mutinies of the troops, and
a general looting of the northern cities, since the soldiers of
the northern armies were more loyal to their chief than to the
State.'*'

The balance of power between these two opposed groups
was held by the leaders in the middle provinces. The question
of the day was what position would be assumed by Feng~ Kuo-
chang, Tutuh of Kiangsu province, whose influence was su-
preme in the lower Yangtze region. He held office under ap-
pointment of the Peking government, and the northerners af-

-^ This seems rather inconsistent with the argument that Yuan
had been rendered powerless by the transfer of control over the
army to the Secretary of War. But political necessity frequent-
ly overrides consistency in Chinese politics.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 205

firmed his absolute loyalty to Yuan Shih-kai. The South, on
the other hand, claimed that at heart he was an anti-monarch-
ist and in sympathy with the revolt against the overthrow of
the Republic.

The first statement of Feng's position came on April 26.
In a lengthy memorial to the President he discussed the situ-
ation in the country. But his statement left his attitude toward
the retention of the President in office still indeterminate.

Finally, his hand was forced by the government gathering
together its forces in the loyal provinces to secure a declara-
tion of terms from the independent provinces. General Feng
Kuo-chang then suggested to General Ni Shih-chung and Gen-
eral Chang Hsun that they should meet to discuss their future
action. This meeting, held at Hsiichowfu, the stronghold of
Chang Hsun, resulted in the despatch of a circular telegram
to the provinces asking them to send delegates to Nanking with
full powers to discuss terms of peace. At the same time eight
fundamental questions were suggested for the consideration of
the Conference. These embraced the position and future
status of both the President and the Vice-President; the ques-
tion of the constitution of a parliament; the revision in some
particulars of the Constitution, until a permanent constitution
could be adopted ; the question of the National finances, which
were in a very serious condition; the question of the army
control and disposition ; the qualifications and standing of both
military and civil officials; the future treatment of the advo-
cates of monarchy — whether they should be killed or simply
sent into retirement; and, finally, the question of party mem-
bers in Parliament.

This whole programme was construed in the South as an
indication of General Feng's desire to substitute his own for
Yuan Shih-kai's control of the country. The southern leaders

2o6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

responded by the establishment of an independent government
with Canton as the capital. TheVice-President, then virtually
a captive in Peking was named as the President of this new
government, and all its acts were promulgated in his name.
This step consolidated the northern military leaders in oppo-
sition to the South, and it looked as though a definite break
would be made between the two sections of the country.

In spite of developments in the North and the South, the
promoters of the Conference at Nanking, who had volunteered
their services as mediators between the two sections, proceeded
with their activities. The first indications were that they ex-
pected to use the Conference as an instrument for the retention
of Yuan. On May 13 it was stated'^ that the three Generals
concerned had telegraphed the President to that efifect, only
stipulating that he should hand over all military, executive and
legislative power to the Cabinet, and assure the mediators per-
sonally of his sincerity in giving up the power. If he did this
they declared their readiness to urge the southern leaders to
cancel the demand for the retirement of Yuan Shih-kai from
political life.

When delegates finally assembled at Nanking it was found
that the independent provinces were not represented, and they
refused to send delegates until the President gave assurances
that he would give up his office. Yuan at this time stated that
he was perfectly willing to go into retirement, providing he
could be convinced that trouble would not follow. "I assure
you that I have not the least desire to linger at my post, nor
am I unwilling to yield power and position."-® But so long
as the President retained control of the northern capital, it
was impossible to prove to him that the troops would not

^^ Far Eastern Review, May 19 16, p. 480.
^^ Far Eastern Review, May 1916, p. 483.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 207

mutiny immediately after his controlling hand was removed.
It only remained to see what action the Conference would
take, even without the representation of the independent prov-
inces. Meetings were held on May 19 and 20, and it was ap-
parent from the first that the delegates themselves were un-
decided. "Some were in favor of retaining Yuan Shih-kai,
other advocated Li Yuan-hung, while a section desired an
election for President as soon as possible. This group was
willing to allow Yuan to retain his post until a Parliament
could be called and an election be held."^^ After discussion it
was decided to inform the South that the Conference favored
the retirement of the President, but felt that definitive action
should be taken only by a Conference representative of all the
provinces.

During May three hitherto loyal provinces declared their in-
dependence of the Peking government. This fact, together
with the action taken by the Nanking Conference, made it im-
possible for the supporters of the President to continue to hold
out. Provision was made for his departure from the country,
and the parliamentarians prepared to reassume control of the
government. With this in view members of the old Parlia-
ment assembled in Shanghai. The Military Government
which had been set up in Canton issued a manifesto declaring
in part : "Since the Parliament is the most important organ
provided for in the Provisional (Nanking) Constitution and
from which all laws have their origin, how shall we be able
to reorganize our administrative affairs if the restoration of
the Parliament is further delayed. We hereby notify the
members of the National Assembly and call on them speedily
to formulate a programme for the convocation and a meeting
place of the Parliament so that all unsettled questions may be

29

Far Eastern Review, May 1916, p. 484.

2o8 Modern Constitutional Development in China

settled without delay, and all the organs called for by law may
soon be organized."^"

The members of the Parliament who had assembled in
Shanghai also issued a call to all who had held seats in the
old Assembly. *Tn consequence of Yuan's rebellion, the right-
eous troops have risen against him. The whole country has
joined the movement like the sweeping wind ; and a settlement
of the general situation is at hand. . . . Yuan continues to
show defiance behind the barricade of strong arms and to make
use of his bottomless cunning and capacity for intrigue. The
disturbances cannot be suppressed unless the foundation of the
country be at once consolidated. We, members of the Parlia-
ment— albeit we have been intrusted by the people with our
duties — have not been able to discharge the same during the
last three years owing to the unlawful action of Yuan. At
this time of extraordinary national crisis, it is our duty to
meet in accordance with law. Article 20 of the Provisional
Constitution provides that the Senate may have full freedom
to call, hold or adjourn meetings. Article 28 provides that
the Senate shall automatically dissolve when the National As-
sembly is inaugurated; and the functions of the Senate shall
be fulfilled by the National Assembly. It is thus seen that the
National Assembly is empowered to call, hold and adjourn
meetings. In order to meet the demands of the necessities of
the situation, we have been holding meetings in accordance
with this provision ; and over two hundred members have now
reached Shanghai for this purpose. We have now the honor
to issue this formal summons to all the members of the Na-
tional Assembly, except those who are accomplices in Yuan's
rebellion, to report at Shanghai not later than June 30. A

30

Far Eastern Review, June 1916, p. 20.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 209

suitable place will then be fixed for the resumption of the ses-
sions of Parliament."^^

Since Peking had finally agreed that Yuan should retire,
the South gave up its demand for his punishment equally with
the other members of the monarchical party. The southern
leaders guaranteed him a safe departure from the country in
return for his promise that the Metropolitan troops would
preserve order after he left. The American legation also
promised asylum to the defeated autocrat.

But, after all, the final decision rested neither with the
North nor the South. On June 5 all the terms of settlement
had been agreed upon. But on June 6 a higher hand inter-
vened and death claimed the right to settle the dispute. It
was the unanimous feeling throughout China that nothing
more opportune could have happened. So long as he lived
Yuan Shih-kai would have been able to make his influence felt
in the country, either directly or indirectly. He might have
been as much a thorn in the side of the government as Dr.
Sun Yat-sen has been since his retirement from the presidency
in 1 91 2 in favor of Yuan Shih-kai. It was truly said that
"Yuan Shih-kai, late President of China, has earned warmer
expressions of gratitude from all classes of his fellow country-
men by his death than by any or all of the acts of his official
hfe."^==

After his death the last mandate of Yuan Shih-kai, sanc-
tioned by him as he was dying, was promulgated. By this
mandate the executive authority was transferred to the Vice-
President, Li Yuan-hung, in accordance with Article 29 of
the Constitutional Compact. The mandate was as follows :

"The Min Kuo has been established for five years. Un-

^'^ Far Eastern Reviezv, June 1916, p. 21.
^^ Far Eastern Revieuf, June 1916, p. 10,

2IO Modern Constitutional Development in China

worthily have I, the Great President, been entrusted with the
great task by the citizens. Owing to my lack of virtue and
ability I have not been able fully to transform into deed what
I have desired to accomplish ; and I blush to say that I have
not realized one ten-thousandth part of my original intention
to save the country and the people. I have, since my assump-
tion of the office, worked in day and thought in the night,
planning for the country. It is true that the consolidation of
the country is not yet accomplished, the hardships of the peo-
ple not yet relieved, and innumerable reforms are still unat-
tended to. But by the valuable services of the civil officials
and the military men, some semblance of peace and order has
been maintained in the provinces and friendly relations with
the Powers upheld until now. While on the one hand I com-
fort myself with such things accomplished, on the other hand
I have much to blame myself for. I was just thinking how I
could retire into private life and rest myself in the forest and
near the springs in fulfillment of my original desire, when ill-
ness has suddenly overtaken me. As the affairs of the State
are of the gravest importance, the right man must be secured
to take over charge of the same. In accordance with Article
29 of the Provisional Constitution which states that in case
the office of the Great President should be vacated for cer-
tain reasons, or when the Great President is incapacitated from
doing his duties, the Vice-President shall exercise power and
authority in his stead, I, the Great President, declare in ac-
cordance with the Provisional Constitution that the Vice-Presi-
dent shall exercise in an acting capacity, the authority and
power of the Great President of the Chung Hua Min Kuo.

"The Vice-President being a man of courtesy, good nature,
benevolence and wisdom, will certainly be capable of greatly
lessening the difficulties of the day and place the country on
the foundation of peace, and so remedy the defects of me, the

Modern Constitutional Development in China 211

Great President, and satisfy the expectations of the people of
the whole country. The civil and military officials outside of
the capital, as well as the troops, police, and scholars and peo-
ple should doubly keep in mind the difficulties and perils of the
nation, and endeavor to maintain peace and order to the best
of their ability, placing before everything else the welfare of
the country. The ancients once said : 'it is only when the liv-
ing do try to become strong that the dead are not dead.' That
is also the wish of me, the Great President."^'

33

Far Eastern Reviezv, June 1916, p. 21.

CHAPTER IX

Li Yuan-hung, the new President of the Republic, had be-
come a national idol since the revolution in 191 1. He alone
of the prominent leaders had the trust of all sections of the
country, and of all classes. It was not any great brilliancy of
mind or of achievement that made the country welcome Gen-
eral Li to the presidency so much as his constancy of character
and honesty of purpose. What was needed in the new head
of the State was the capacity for unselfish and disinterested
service. He must be a man who would allow free play to the
parliamentary party and yet keep parliamentary activity within
reasonable bounds in order to prevent a recurrence of the con-
ditions which had paved the way for the overthrow of Parlia-
ment by Yuan Shih-kai. On the other hand it was necessary
for the President to have the support of the military leaders,
the so-called Pei-yang party, and reconcile them to the limita-
tion of administrative control by legislative action. Li Yuan-
hung was a military man, but a firm believer in the elimina-
tion of the military from control over the administration. He
was therefore not the first choice of the military men for Presi-
dent. But he was the one distinctly military leader who could
command the support of the South, and he had a strong con-
stitutional claim to the succession from his position as Vice-
President. To have passed over General Li and opened the
ofiice of President to general competition would have led to
the practical disruption of the Chinese State. There were fac-
tions among the military party of the North, centering around
the acting Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, and the Yangtze Viceroy

212

Modern Constitutional Development in China 213

Feng Kuo-chang, and the South was similarly divided. Both
sides were agreed on the proposition that only in the person of
the Vice-President could the two sections be held together.
So the death of President Yuan brought General Li Yuan-
hung- into ofBce as a moderator between tlie two sections of the
country.

That the New President's task was to be no easy one be-
came apparent from the outset. The situation was essentially
the same as when Yuan Shih-kai became President at the time
of the establishment of the Republic. In response to the de-
mand of the South Yuan had created a Cabinet during his last
days in office. The Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, was one of the
military party, so that the North controlled the executive
branch of the government, just as in 191 2. The Parliament
had reassembled in Shanghai, as has been noted, but had not
established itself yet as a part of the Peking government. The
first question that arose, naturally, was the exact status of
constitutionalism in China. What was to be the distribution
of power between the two branches of the government?

If the Constitutional Compact was to be regarded as the
fundamental law, the Shanghai parliamentarians had no legal
status since they had been elected under the provisions of the
original (Nanking) constitution. Furthermore any assembly
that should be elected would have very little power so long as
the Constitutional Compact remained in force.

On the other hand, if the Nanking Constitution should be
revived the condition would be reversed, the executive being
subordinated to the Parliament. Since the North controlled
the executive at the time of the downfall of Yuan Shih-kai,
and this control was continued through the transfer of the
presidential powers to the Cabinet, the revival of the Nanking
Constitution was demanded by the "independent" provinces as

214 Modern Constitutional Development in China

one condition preliminary to their return to allegiance. Titan
Chi-jui the Premier opposed this demand as long as possible
on the ground that since both constitutions were only pro-
visional, it was advisable to continue under the existing instru-
ment until a permanent constitution could be framed. His
argument ran as follows: "The [revised] Provisional Con-
stitution of the 3rd year has been in force for some time and
has been repeatedly quoted as the standard for administration.
If it be blotted out by one single sentence, all the laws of the
nation may be similarly shaken. . . . Others say that the Pro-
visional Constitution of the 3rd year derives its origin from
the Provisional Constitution Conference and the Provisional
Constitution Conference had its origin in the Political Coun-
cil, and since all the members of the Council were appointed
by the Government, they could not be considered as a legally
constituted organ and consequently to revive the Provisional
Constitution of the ist year is tantamount merely to the can-
cellation of an old mandate. But this is also impossible. The
reason why the people are not satisfied with the Provisional
Constitution of the 3rd year is because the organ which made
this law had its origin in a mandate. How then can we toler-
ate the idea of reviving the Provisional Constitution of the
1st year? ... A mistake has already been made some time
ago. How can we repeat the same mistake this time? I do
not see why the people want to follow an example which they
know to be wrong. If it is to be held that a law can be re-
stored by a mandate, why then cannot it be cancelled by a
mandate also? A law then can be restored today and can-
celled tomorrow."^

Before a reply could be framed to these arguments the gov-
ernment was forced to an unconditional surrender. Fighting

^ Far Eastern Review, October, 1916, pp. 176-177.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 215

was reported as continuing in Kuangtung province, and the
whole country was disturbed by bands of marauders and in-
surrectionaries. So long as the power of the government was
questioned in the provinces which had declared independence
it was impossible to bring order out of the existing chaos. If
Tuan had been hoping that the southern leaders would recede
from their advanced position as a result of the telegram set-
ting forth his views, he was immediately undeceived. In the
midst of the controversy over the constitution, the Chief Com-
mander of the Yangtze fleet wired to Peking declaring his in-
dependence of the Central authority.^

This new declaration, together with the fact that none of
the provinces had cancelled their independence, forced Tuan
Chi-jui to reconsider the question of the constitution. On
June 29 a mandate was issued providing for the convocation
of the old Parliament and the revival of the Nanking Consti-
tution, "in order that the will of the people may be satisfied
and the foundation of the country consolidated."^ The Pre-
mier not only gave in to this demand for the reconvocation of
Parliament and the revival of the Nanking Constitution, but
met all of the other demands of the South including the one
that the monarchist leaders should be punished.

Parliament was summoned to meet in Peking on August i,
and was formally opened on that date, in spite of the opposi-
tion of some of the members who wished to transfer the seat
of government to Shanghai. In order to get the constitutional
machinery in operation again it had been decided to treat the
entire period from the time of the dissolution of Parliament

^ "The Navy will not obey the orders of the Ministry of Navy
in Peking until the restoration of the Provisional Constitution
of the 1st year of Min Kuo, the reassembly of Parliament, and
the formation of a responsible Cabinet." Ibid., p. 177.

^ Ibid., p. 177.

21 6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

in 191 3 until its meeting in 19 16 as an interregnum.* Thus
the members were to serve their full terms during the period
when the Nanking Constitution was in active force. If this
view had not been taken it would have been necessary to hold
new elections immediately since the term of the members of
the House of Representatives and a number of the Senators
had expired during the dictatorship.

While the Constitutional Compact was in force the Parlia-
ment had no legal position, but when the first Provisional Con-
stitution was revived the Cabinet which had been formed un-
der the authority of the President was placed in the same po-
sition. The Premier, however, was confirmed in his position
by the joint action of both branches of the legislature, and the
Cabinet nominations which he submitted were accepted. It
seemed as though an "era of good feeling" had dawned in
Peking, and that, by the cooperation of the President, the Cabi-
net, and the Parliament, the necessary reform and reorganiza-
tion of the government might be effected. The situation in
the provinces was still unsettled, but after the inauguration of
the President and the meeting of the Parliament the "declara-
tions of independence" had been cancelled, and where there
was unrest it was due to the presence of unattached soldiery
preying on the country, or to individual struggles for suprem-
acy in the provincial government, as in Kuangtung province.

This apparent harmony was however not to last long. No
sooner had the Parliament reassembled than the Military
Chiefs began to assume a dictatorial position toward the gov-
ernment. Among the appointments made to Cabinet positions
was that of T'ang Shao-yi as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The opposition to Parliament concentrated its attack on the

*The foreign "Advisers" Dr. Morrison (British), Dr. W. W.
Willoughby (American), and Dr. Ariga (Japanese), advised that
this view of the monarchical period be adopted.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 217

new Foreign Minister before he had even assumed office. In
September a Conference of the mihtary leaders was held at
Hsiichow the stronghold of the old Manchii supporter Chang
Hsiin. This Conference claimed the right to be consulted by
the government before any steps of importance were taken and
it demanded the resignation of T'ang Shao-yi, accusing him
of a desire to overthrow the Premier. This organized attack
made on T'ang caused him to delay at Tientsin on his way to
assume office, and finally forced his resignation. He made
his resignation a protest against the illegal interference of the
military in the affairs of the government, intimating that some
of the high officials in Peking were implicated in the campaign
against his assumption of office. As a matter of fact, the
Premier took no steps against the Hsiichow Conference, which
went so far as to organize a "Union of the Provinces" with
the avowed purpose of interference if Parliament should "un-
der any pretext create disturbance or take up an unconciliatory
attitude toward the provinces."^ This whole question of dic-
tation to the government by such an unconstitutional and
illegal body as assembled at Hsiichow later assumed such im-
portance that it led to a complete overturning of the govern-
ment. For that reason its more detailed consideration must
be postponed.^

From the time of the resignation of T'ang Shao-yi as Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, the relations of the Premier, Tuan-
Chi-jui, with Parliament were strained. For a long time it
proved impossible to fill the vacant position in the Cabinet.
Lu Cheng-hsiang was first nominated by the Premier, and
then Wang Ta-hsich, and both names were rejected by Parlia-

^ Peking Gazette, September 22, 19 16.

® Infra, ch. X, especially pp. 234-235 ; note p. 234 for a dis-
cussion of the Peiyang military party and its influence.

2i8 Modern Constitutional Development in China

ment. Finally the veteran statesman Dr. Wu T'ing-fang was
suggested and his nomination was confirmed by both Houses.
In spite of his great age Dr. Wu accepted the post of Foreign
Minister in order that there might be a head to that Department
at a time when many deHcate negotiations were in progress
with foreign nations.^

The confirmation of Dr. Wu as Foreign Minister did not
end the conflict between the Cabinet and ParHament. Other
nominations to Cabinet positions were rejected; the loan policy
of the government was continually criticised ; constant inter-
pellations were addressed to the government concerning the ad-
ministration of the country ; and there was a growing tendency
to heckle members of the Cabinet when they were forced to
appear in Parliament.

It is hard to apportion the blame for the strained relations
existing between the different branches of the government.
Certainly no one branch was entirely responsible. Parliament
showed again most of the tendencies which had weakened its
control over the government during the first months of the
Republic: a disposition to talk and do nothing; to obstruct the
work of administration and reorganization needlessly ; and to
censure the Cabinet for acting on its own initiative when it
was found that no direction of policy was forthcoming from
Parliament. Parliament wished to feel that it held the con-
trol, but refused to exert itself to assume the responsibilities
placed upon it as the controlling and directing organ.

On the other hand the Premier was partly to blame for the
opposition to his policies in Parliament. The Constitution

^ Discussions were going on between France and China con-
cerning the attempt of the former to extend her "concession" at
Tientsin, and between Japan and China over a fracas between
Chinese and Japanese at Chengchiatun. Japan took the oppor-
tunity presented to advance in another guise some of her 1915
Demands.

Modem Constitutional Development in China 219

provided a way by which the Cabinet could assume the direc-
tion of affairs in the legislative body — the Ministers hav-
ing the right to appear and explain their policies to the mem-
bers of Parliament. But from the first Tuan Chi-jui looked
upon a legislature as an unnecessary evil in government.
Following the lead of Yuan Shih-kai, he tried to carry on the
administration without consulting the wishes of the representa-
tives, only appearing before them to ask their consent for
work already undertaken. When a Cabinet position was to be
filled no attempt was made to discover the wishes of Parlia-
ment and then make an acceptable appointment. The nomina-
tion was made first and its acceptability discovered later when
action was taken in Parliament. In some cases, without doubt,
an entirely unacceptable candidate was brought forward with
the expectation that after he had been rejected Parliament
would be willing to accept the real candidate of the govern-
ment. It is true that the opinion of one of the parties^ was
usually ascertained and its support secured, but that party,
which was really that of the government, was in the minority
in Parliament so that its support meant little.

The differences between the legislative and executive
branches of the government went much deeper than any dis-
agreement over specific issues. The conflict was a renewal of
the struggle which had been waged since 191 1 between the old
Manchu bureaucracy which had survived in the persons of
the military leaders making up the Pei-yang party, and which
controlled the army of the North, and Young China in the
persons of foreign educated Chinese and all those who had
led in the opposition to the unprogressive Manchu government.
Since the leaders of the latter group were almost all from
South and Central China the issue really lay between the North

^ The Chhi Pu T'ang.

220 Modern Conslitntional Development in China

and the South. The northerners, whatever else may be said
of them, were men of experience in administration, while the
southerners, although not all young men, were still theorists
without great practical experience. They were impatient of"
the restraint imposed by the conservative old officials, and the
latter, accustomed to the subserviency of the young, found it
difficult to make use of the knowledge and ability of men who
knew how things were done in England, France and America,
and wished to make of China a political replica of those coun-
tries. Mutual distrust and suspicion also was responsible for
much of the antagonism between the two sections. This dis-
trust manifested itself in the government through the execu-
tive going its own way irrespective of Parliament, and that
body constantly feeling itself slighted and standing on its
dignity in small matters as well as more important ones. Pek-
ing was a hotbed of intrigue and corruption. Unsubstantiated
charges and countercharges were made, and, instead of both
sides meeting issues on their merits, calumny took the place
of reason in discussion.

One of the few hopeful indications of the growing ability
of the Chinese to conduct parliamentary proceedings in an
orderly manner came in connection with the election of a
Vice-President to fill the place left vacant by the elevation of
Li Yuan-hung to the presidency. The members of Parlia-
ment were by no means unanimously agreed that it was nec-
essary to elect a Vice-President before the expiration of the
presidential term, when both places would have to be filled.
There were several candidates for the position and it was
. feared, in view of the already strained relations between the
executive and legislative bodies, — the military party and the
advocates of civil government free from outside interference
■ — that to proceed with an election would be to precipitate a

Modern Constitutional Development in China 221

governmental crisis. This was especially feared because of
the suggested candidacy of the Premier. The question was
argued in an orderly manner, however, in the Assembly, and
it was finally determined not to delay but to elect the Vice-
President to serve during the unexpired term. Tuan Chi-jui
announced several times that he was not to be considered a
candidate for the office, but in spite of his statements many
expected that he would figure prominently in the election.
Aside from Tuan, the principal contestants were General
Feng Kuochang, the Viceroy of Kiangsu province, and Gen-
eral Lu Yungting, former Tutuh of Kiangsi province. Gen-
eral Lu was supported by the extreme radicals.

According to the Presidential Election Law^ which also
regulated the election of the Vice-President, the election was
to be by the two Houses of Parliament sitting as the National
Convention. Two-thirds of the membership of the Assembly
was necessary to constitute a quorum, and election was to be
by a three- fourths majority. If no decision was reached after
two ballots, however, the third ballot was to be on the two
candidates who secured the most votes on the second ballot.
A majority vote was sufficient to elect on the third ballot.

The two branches of the Assembly met on October 30 in
joint session and proceeded to ballot for the Vice-President.
The election of General Feng Kuo-Chang seemed assured
from the outset. On the first ballot he secured more than half
of the total number of votes cast, but not the required three-
fourths. The second was equally indecisive, but he was elected
on the third when the voting was limited to the two highest
competitors, Feng Kuo-chang and Lu Yung-ting. On the
first and second ballots a number of scattered votes were cast,

° This section of the permanent Constitution had been passed
in 1913 before the dissolution of Parliament.

222 Modern Constituiional Development in China

some of the members seemingly regarding their work with
little seriousness/"

On the whole the result of the election was well received
throughout the country. The new Vice-President had close
connections with the military party, but he had refused to
identify himself with it in its attempts to dictate the policy
of the country since the death of Yuan Shih-kai. While he
had supported Yuan in his overthrow of parliamentary in-
stitutions, he had partially redeemed himself in the eyes of
many of the people by his attempted mediation between the
North and the South just before the death of the President.
At least he had shown a certain political foresight in- breaking
away from Yuan before his own political career had been
ruined by his connection with that statesman. Another vital
consideration in its bearing on the outcome of the election was
the important strategic position held by General Feng on the
low^er Yangtze. It was much safer to have him interested in
defending the government than to give a grievance v\diich
might cause him to use his influence to stir up trouble in an
unsettled region.

The Peking Gazette gives us an interesting comparison be-
tween the election of the Vice-President and the choice of a
President in 1913. "Everybody remarked on the contrast be-
tween this election and the election for the late President
Yuan Shih-kai. In 191 3 the House of Parliament was sur-
rounded by many cordons of armed soldiery and the gates
were blocked by troops to prevent any of the M.P.'s escaping
during the proceeding. Looking over the walls surrounding
the House, one saw plainly the many troops with fixed bayo-
nets peering into the Parliament building, for what everyone

^° Among others, votes were cast for K'ang Yu-wei and Gen-
eral Chang Hsiin. See Peking Gazette, Oct. 31, 1916.

Modem Constitutional Development in China 223

was free to imagine for himself. Yesterday only a handful
of soldiers patrolled the streets to direct the traffic. With the
exception of parliamentary guards in full uniform and about
half a dozen military police there was nothing unusual about
the policing of the occasion. People, including the M.P.'s,
moved about freely and the spectators were not subjected to
close scrutiny as if they were assassins. The Republic is in-
deed among us ! In perfect harmony with this promising at-
mosphere was the very orderly conduct of the members of
Parliament.""

A second and more important task to which the Parliament
addressed itself was the framing and adoption of a permanent
constitution for the Republic. This had been undertaken by
the first Parliament elected, and its task had been almost com-
pleted at the time when the Kuo Ming Tang members had been
driven from Peking by Yuan Shih-kai.^" The President had
objected to several provisions of this first draft of the per-
manent constitution, so that it had been thrown into the waste-
paper basket when he made himself the dictator. Yuan Shih-
kai, in his turn, had undertaken the work of providing China
with a permanent constitution, appointing a commission to
draw up an instrument acceptable to him, but the monarchy
movement prevented anything of value being accomplished by
this commission.

As soon as Parliament had assembled in Peking after the
collapse of the monarchy movement it took up the work of
constitution framing at the point reached in 191 3. The basis
of discussion was the draft permanent constitution presented
in that year. A Conference on the Constitution^^ was organ-

'^'^ Peking Gazette, October 31, 1916.

^^ The draft of the constitution prepared by the Constitution
Drafting Committee had been submitted for the action of the
Conference on the Constitution.

^^ The two Houses acting in that capacity.

224 Modem Constitutional Devcloptnent in China

ized for the consideration of the provisions of that draft with
a view to amending it rather than substituting an entirely new
instrument."

The fact that it had already received the tentative approval
of the members of Parliaments^ in its main outlines did not
prevent a serious disagreement as to the final form in which it
should be cast. Political changes during 1 914-15 had brought
about new party alignments. The events of the same years
had shown the necessity of adapting the fundamental instru-
ment of government to conditions as they existed in China
rather than merely incorporating in it the most advanced po-
litical ideas of the West. Yuan Shih-kai and the representa-
tives of the old mandarinate had condemned the draft consti-
tution of 1 91 3 as unsuited to the immediate needs and capacity
of China because of the excessive powers vested in the Assem-
bly and the consequent limitations placed on the executive
branch of the government. The Constitution Drafting Com-
mittee had refused to hear the views of the President and the
men who had been engaged in the practical work of adminis-
tration. The constitution drawn up, for that reason, while
admirable in theory for the government of a democratic State,
lacked the adaptable nature of an instrument which had re-
sulted from a compromise between new ideas and old practice.

The events of the year 191 3 had served to discredit political
parties and party action in China. The Kuo Ming Tang had
been condemned for its connection with the summer revolu-
tion of that year, and later many of the Chin Pu Tang sup-
porters had fallen into disgrace because of their support of

^* This conference met in the Temple of Heaven, alternating
its sittings with that of Parliament as a legislative body.

^^ It had been sanctioned by the drafting committee composed
of 60 members, 30 chosen by each House of Parliament.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 225

Yuan Shih-kai. But where there is room for difference of
opinion on political issues party groupings will result.

The regrouping of the members of Parliament after their
return to Peking came as a result of the differences over the
provisions of the permanent constitution. Party grouping in
the main followed the old Chin Pu Tang and Kuo Ming Tang
lines. On constitutional questions Parliament was divided
into four main groups, each consisting of several smaller ones.
These were i ) the "Constitution Discussion Society" which
was made up principally of old Kuo Ming Tang adherents;
2) "the Constitution Research Society," a Chin Pu Tang
group; 3) the Constitution Deliberation Society, composed of
deserters from both the Kuo Ming and the Chin Pu Tangs;
and 4) the Constitution Mutual Discussion Society" consist-
ing of members from Shantung, Chihli, Tibet and Mongolia,
who were neither radicals nor conservatives, but who merely
fell in line with the majority, whatever that happened to be.

The strongest clash between the different groups came over
the discussion of the provincial system. This chapter of the
constitution had been omitted from the draft prepared in 1913.
The issue concerned the relation of the provinces to the Cen-
tral Government. One party" desired to see the provincial
system practically freed from the control of Peking, the prov-
inces being in effect self-governing States united only for the
regulation of their mutual interests. Under this de-centralized
system the Governor of the province would have been an
elected official responsible partly to the Central Government
and partly to the provincial assembly.

The other extreme was presented by those who demanded
that the province should be only an administrative area, the
officials being appointed by the President and subject to his

^® The Kuo Ming Tang.

226 Modern Constitutional Development in China

direction and control/^ Between these two extreme groups
were the moderates who favored granting a large degree of
autonomy to the provinces, but giving the President a restrict-
ed right to appoint high provincial officials.

Under the Manchu regime the Governor had been appointed
by the Emperor and no high provincial official was allowed
to serve in his native province. With the outbreak of the revo-
lution the provincial governments were largely self -constituted.
Sometimes the Governor held office in virtue of an election by
a provincial assembly or other local organization. In most
cases however he was simply a noted revolutionary leader hold-
ing office because of that fact. A notable departure from the
old Manchu practice lay in the fact that the Governors were
frequently natives of the provinces. After the establishment
of the Republic most of these men were confirmed in their po-
sitions as Tutuhs or military Governors. ^^ Later, attempts
were made to replace them by civil Governors. Yuan Shih-
kai used his right of appointment to fill these high provincial
posts with his own friends and supporters, in some cases go-
ing back to the Manchu idea that no official must serve in his
native province.

The way in which the former President had made use of
his right to appoint provincial officers to strengthen himself
had convinced many people that the safety of the country de-
pended upon limiting this right. If the party in control of
the Parliament had also controlled the executive it is probable

^■^ This was, in effect, the position taken by the Chin Pu Tang
members.

^* In a-ddition to the Tutuh, and the civil Governor where one
had been appointed, tliere were, in many of the Provinces, the
irresponsible military chiefs holding no official position in the
provincial administrative system, but maintaining themselves by
force of arms.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 227

that this fear of the presidential use of the patronage would
not have been so strong. As it was, the executive could con-
trol the major part of the country by appointing his adher-
ents to provincial office. Yuan Shih-kai had been successful
in securing himself as dictator largely for that reason, and
while he ultimately failed to maintain himself it was due to
the fact that he went beyond the point where his own ap-
pointees would lend him their support. Consequently there
was good reason for this conflict over the manner of appoint-
ment of the Governors.

In addition to the fear of presidential appointment there
was another reason to be urged in favor of the province itself
making a choice of its chief officers. In the past the people
had been little concerned with the personnel of the administra-
tion. They seldom knew personally the officials over them
with the exception of the lowest in the scale, the district magis-
trate, and he was usually transferred before coming into inti-
mate relationship with the people of his district. At least he
was not a native of the place. The result was that the officials
did not know the local needs and customs as well as if they
had been natives of the province or of the district. If, under
the new system, the right to choose provincial officials was
given to the local assemblies they would undoubtedly select
some man well known in the province, and with an intimate
knowledge of the local customs and traditions, to serve as
Governor or in other high office. This would bring about a
more intimate relationship between the people and the govern-
ment and help to pave the way for a true representative system
in the national as well as in the local administration. A simi-
lar result would follow from the proposal to allow the local
assemblies to nominate two candidates for the position of gov-
ernor, one of them a native and the other a non-resident of

228 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the province, the President of the Republic making a choice
between the two men nominated. By giving the people even
an indirect influence in determining their higher rulers, the
much vaunted democracy of China w'ould be extended gradu-
ally from a direction of village affairs to a control over the
entire provincial system and the national administration.

On the other hand this suggested enlargement of provincial
control might easily lead to disruption of the State. The ten-
dency had always been to put local advantage before national
interest, and this had been held in check only partially by the
old method of absolute appointment of ofificials by the Central
authority and holding them responsible for the administra-
tion of their province or district. The provincial official, while
responsible to Peking for carrying out the policy of the Central
government, had been forced, even under the old regime, to
consider the cfifect of that policy on local opinion. This had
resulted in the lack of uniformity of administration in China
which has already been noted. If the Governor depended on
the provincial assembly for his election, or even for confirma-
tion after appointment by the central executive, the adminis-
tration would tend more than ever to consider local interests
and prejudices rather than national needs. The State, instead
of being unified, would become a confederation of States. The
advocates of provincial autonomy favored making the coun-
try a Federal Union, pointing to the United States as the
model to be followed. But there is this important difference
between China and the United States to be borne in mind. In
the United States the necessity of establishing an intimate
relationship between the individual and the Federal Govern-
ment was seen from the first, while in China the Central Gov-
ernment has never exercised a direct control over the indi-
vidual. In the collection of taxes, for example, national needs

Modern Constitutional Dtvclopinent in China 229

were met by assessments on the provinces as such, rather than
by levies on the people directly. Therefore any de-centralized
system that should be established would be more comparable
to the condition of the states under the xA^rticles of Confeder-
ation than to the Federal Union formed in 1789.

Furthermore, all of the proposals for appointment by the
assemblies, or limitation of the presidential appointing power,
meant an extension of the elective system beyond tlie choice
of representatives to watch over and control the administra-
tion. This would introduce the element of uncertainty and
unrest into the provincial administration which was feared in
national politics because of the periodic election of a Presi-
dent. It might lead to conflict between rival contestants for
provincial office, keeping the provinces in a state of perpetual
turmoil. However, this argument cannot be pressed too far
because the Chinese are much more accustomed to compromise
in such cases than to carry the controversy to the point of
open conflict.

From the international point of view there could be but
one answer to the question of the form in which the provincial
system should be cast. All past experience both in China and
other countries has been that foreign relations can be most
satisfactorily carried on under a centralized system of ad-
ministration. Treaty engagements made must be uniformly
carried out in all parts of a country. China has sufifered re-
peated humiliation in the past because of the variation in car-
rying out treaty provisions in the several provinces. This in-
ternational factor is one that cannot be disregarded in a coun-
try like China where the Powers hold a peculiarly favored po-
sition. The future of the State depends on the ability of the
Central Government to avoid entanglements in foreign rela-
tions. If the establishment of provincial autonomy would

230 Modern Coiistifiilioiial Development in China

weaken the control of Peking in the conduct of foreign affairs,
then, even at the expense of less popular participation in the
government, the decision should be in favor of a centraliza-
tion of authority.

The discussion over the provincial system went on without
a decision being reached. Several times it seemed as though
an acceptable basis of agreement would be found but all of
the compromises suggested failed to bring the two extremes
together. In addition to the differences over the appointment
of the officials, there was the added question of whether the
provincial system should be included in the constitution or
should be established by ordinary legislative enactment. If
it became a part of the constitutional law it would be very
difficult to adjust it to conditions as they changed from time
to time, or to remedy any defects that appeared when it was
put into actual operation. On the other hand, if it was pro-
mulgated as an ordinary law it could be changed too easily,
it was felt, and for that reason would be liable to constant ex-
perimentation. The division on this latter question was along
the same party lines as on the actual provisions of the pro-
vincial system.^''

The other important point of difference that arose in the
discussions of the Constitutional Conference was whether Con-
fucianism should be made the State religion. All were agreed
that the doctrines of Confucius should be used as the basis for
instruction in ethics in the schools, but many felt that it was
unwise to insert a specific clause in the constitution to that
effect. The old conservatives were supporters of the idea, but

" The Kuo Ming Tang members advocated the inclusion of
the provincial system while the Chin Pu Tang and the military
leaders opposed it. The Chin Pu Tang finally agreed to its in-
clusion if definite provision was made for the appointment of the
Governor by the President.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 231

after much discussion, and the expression of opinion from the
provinces, the clause was omitted from the constitution.

While Parliament was working over the draft of the per-
manent constitution the usual spring housecleaning in Chi-
nese politics was approaching. The draft of the constitution
had been rushed through its third reading by the drafting com-
mittee in 191 3 to forestall a threatened overturn of Parlia-
ment by Yuan Shih-kai, and in the spring of 191 7 it was nec-
essary to push the permanent constitution through the second
reading for a similar reason. The Constitution as it passed the
second reading in the Constitutional Conference was published
in July after Parliament had been driven again from Peking
— this time by the action of the northern military leaders. Very
few changes were made in the draft by the Conference. No
agreement had been reached on the provincial system, so that
it was omitted from the Constitution. The principal change
made was in the elimination of the chapter in the draft pro-
viding for a permanent parliamentary committee to sit during
recesses, keeping the government under the supervision of
Parliament during the whole year. This was the provision
that had been objected to in particular by Yuan Shih-kai when
the terms of the draft had been made known. Aside from
that change only a few alterations in wording had been made.
Thus the wording of the clauses providing for a responsibility
of the Cabinet to Parliament was altered to make certain that
there would be no misunderstanding of what was meant. ^^

The government of the Republic of China, if this perma-
nent Constitution as drawn up by Parliament becomes effec-
tive, will be that known as parliamentary or responsible rather
than the American or presidential system. Entire control over
the administration is vested in the Assembly. It is given

2^ Articles 75 and 81.

232 Modern Constitutional Development in China

the right to interpellate the Ministers, and to pass a vote of
want of confidence in the Cabinet. All legislative power is
concentrated in Parliament, together with control over na-
tional finances. On the other hand, the Cabinet is given tlie
right to appear and defend its policies, and to introduce legis-
lation, so that it will almost inevitably tend to assume the di-
rection of the administration, instead of acting simply as the
creature of Parliament. While the Cabinet is made responsible
to the body representative of the electorate it is safeguarded
from subserviency through the power given it to dissolve
Parliament after a vote of want of confidence, instead of it-
self giving up office. While the executive power is vested
nominally in the President, the Constitution provides that the
real direction shall be in the hands of the Cabinet. It will,
of course, depend largely on the personality of the incumbent
of the office what influence the President will have in the ad-
ministration. President Li Yuan-hung was by no means a
negligible factor in the governm.ent during his term of office,
although he left the direction of affairs to the Premier. As
a mediator between the various factions in Parliament, and
between Parliament and the Cabinet, he filled a very necessary
place in the machinery. Form the standpoint of power, how^-
ever, the important position was that of Premier rather than
that of the President, and this will be increasingly true if the
permanent constitution comes into force, and the machinery of
government runs more smoothly.

CHAPTER X

In the last chapter brief mention was made of the continued
interference of the military leaders in the conduct of the civil
government. After the death of Yuan Shih-kai the only check
on the absolute power of Parliament lay in the constitution of
the executive. Li Yuan-hung, as President, did not attempt
to assume the dominating position which had been Yuan's by
virtue of his personality and ability. President Li accepted
the subordinate position given the President under the Nan-
king constitution, and based all of his acts on a desire to do
nothing that was not strictly constitutional. The real ex-
ecutive power, however, descended to the Premier acting at
the time of Yuan Shih-kai's death. It was from the Cabinet
rather than the President that active opposition to parliament-
ary control developed. While nominally the President was the
head of the administration, the constitution provided that all
of his acts must have the countersignature of a Cabinet Minis-
ter. So long as the President was the strongest man in the
executive branch, and possessed of the most influence in the
country, he could keep the Cabinet subject to his dictation, so
that the right of countersignature could not be used as a check
on his actions. The Cabinet formed in the summer of 1916
was not of President Li's choosing, however, but was a legacy
from the preceding administration. When it received the
confirmation of Parliament, the direction of the administra-
tion became vested in the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, instead of
the President.

233

234 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Tuan was recognized as one of the strongest of the miH-
tary leaders, and he came into office under the influence of the
same ideas that had dominated Yuan Shih-kai, his old leader.
It was inevitable that he should rebel sooner or later against
parliamentary interference in the administration just as Yuan
had done. The only question was whether he could maintain
himself in the conflict. In a struggle against Parliament Tuan
Chi-jui lacked the prestige that had been so great a factor in
the early successes of Yuan Shili-kai in the same contest.
More important still, he had not succeeded to the position of
acknowledged leader of all factions of the military and con-
servative parties. He could not be depended upon absolutely
to control his own supporters, and this fact weakened him
for any possible struggle within the government itself. Know-
ing that others were desirous of supplanting him as the chief
Minister of State Tuan tried to maintain his hold on the mili-
tarists with one hand and on Parliament with the other. The
consequence was that, eventually, he lost control of both.

In the autumn of 1916 the Military Governors of the prov-
inces, following the precedent set by the Vice-President, Feng
Kuo-chang, who had tried to settle the conflict between the
North and the South by a mediating Conference, held a Con-
ference at Hsiichow under the auspices of Chang Hsiin. Lack-
ing a leader to whom they acknowledged a common allegiance,
the Military party^ attempted to formulate and enforce a
policy of opposition to parliamentary control by means of con-
ference action. They succeeded in preventing T'ang Shao-yi

^ The northern military party (Peiyang party) was not a defi-
nitely organized group but was made up of those military men
who actually controlled troops either under governmental author-
ity or without it, and the Tutuhs of most of the northern prov-
inces. They thought in terms of the old rather than the new
since most of them had been members of the old officialdom.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 235

from taking his place as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
they formed a theoretical "Union of the Provinces" which was
really a union of the Military Governors of several of the
provinces. Article two of the Regulations of the Union
stated : "The Union is organized for the purpose of prevent-
ing the desperadoes from monopolizing the powers of the gov-
ernment. If Parliament should, under any pretext, create
disturbance or take up an unconciliatory attitude towards the
provinces, the Union will meet and consider a plan to make a
unified fight (in a punitive sense) against Parliament."^

Tuan Chi-jui was accused at the time of using this Con-
ference to coerce his opponents in the government. It might

I be suspected, however, that he was not in entire sympathy
with the movement towards a military dictation which might

I easily undermine his authority equally with that of Parliament.
That he did not take action against the Conference was prob-
ably due in part to his sympathy with its anti-parliamentary
bias, and in part to a realization of his inability to exercise a
control over the Tuchuns.

As a matter of fact nothing except words came from this
first Hsiichow Conference, although there was the ever pres-
ent possibility of the words leading to action. The Military
Chiefs of the North continued to keep in communication with
each other during the remainder of the year but with the pas-
sage of time less fear of their dictation was felt. They were
far from united among themselves, several aspirants to the
leadership of the group striving to make good their respective
claims. In this disunion lay the greatest hope for a peaceful
development towards parliamentary government in China.
The opening months of 191 7, unfortunately, provided a new

'^Peking Gazette, September 22, 1916.

236 Modern Constitutional Dez'clopment in China

issue, and one that finally brought the struggle of the military
faction against Parliament to a crisis.

On the ninth of February 191 7, China joined the United
States in sending a note to the German Government protesting
against the extension of submarine warfare. This step was
followed by the severance of diplomatic relations a month
later, when no satisfactory reply had been received. In taking
this action the executive and legislative branches of the gov-
ernment worked in practical harmony. Just before it was
finally determined to break off relations, it is true. President
Li refused to sanction the decision which had been reached by
the Cabinet in favor of such action. The temporary breach
between the President and the Premier was healed almost im-
mediately, however, and at the same time the question of su-
premacy in the executive was settled in favor of the Premier.^
When the Cabinet decision was submitted to Parliament for
its approval the House of Representatives sustained the con-
templated action by a vote of 331 to 87, and the Senate voted
to support the government by a majority of about 150. It
seemed that the possibility of war against another State would
have the effect of reconciling the various factions in Chinese
politics, and thus produce a beneficial internal eft'ect.

When the breaking off of diplomatic relations had no eft'ect
in bringing about a modification of German policy, the gov-
ernment was forced to contemplate the third step — an actual
declaration of war. There was considerable opposition to this

^ Because of presidential opposition to his policy, (the Presi-
dent insisting upon his right to declare war and make peace),
Tuan Chi-jui resigned and left Peking for Tientsin. The Presi-
dent and the high officials, however, all urged him to resume
office, and he finally consented to do so after President Li had
promised him a free hand for his war pplicy. See Far Eastern
Reviezv, March 1917, "China Breaks with Germany," for sum-
mary of the controversy.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 237

in many quarters on the ground that China had nothing to
gain by war with Germany, and had much to lose by becoming
her active enemy. It was necessary, in order to counteract
this feehng, that the government should be able to show sub-
stantial advantage to China from joining the Powers at war
with the German Empire. To this end negotiations were com-
menced with the representatives of the Entente Powers at Pek-
ing. The Chinese desired that the country should be released
temporarily from the payment of the Boxer indemnity ; that
a revision of the tariff provisions should be undertaken in the
interests of China; and that the provision of the Boxer proto-
col prohibiting the movement of Chinese troops in the vicinity
of Tientsin, and that permitting the maintenance of foreign
troops in the Legation quarter of Peking, should be cancelled.
The Chinese Government, in return for these concessions,
agreed to assume only two responsibilities towards the En-
tente: i) the supply of primary materials; and 2) assistance
in respect of labor. ^

Before he had received a favorable reply from the Powers,
the Premier gave Parliament to understand that he was as-
sured of substantial concessions along the lines indicated if
China joined the Entente. The negotiations dragged on, how-
ever, without any decision being reached, and interest in the
war issue declined throughout the country. As interest les-
sened the majority of the government in Parliament decreased.
It soon became apparent that the unanimity of the different de-
partments extended only to the question of war with Ger-
many, and that opposition was steadily growing even to the
war policy of the Cabinet.^

* Far Eastern Rcviexv, April 1917.

^ German influence was steadily at work on Parliament and the
people trying to stir up opposition to the war policy in every pos-
sible way. For instance, in Tientsin, maps showing the extent of

238 Modern Constitutional Development in China

In order to divert attention from the unsatisfactory con-
dition of the negotiations, Premier Tuan resorted to the ex-
pedient of asking the advice of the country. If it could be
shown that a unanimous public sentiment favored war, he
would have that to urge as a reason for the favorable action
of Parliament, irrespective of possible concessions from the
Powers. To aid in the manufacturing of this sentiment Tuan
summoned to a conference some of the Military Governors.^

From the time this conference met the question of war be-
came more a matter of internal politics than of foreign policy.
The Military Governors assembled in Peking late in April, and
the attention of the country was immediately centered upon
their activities. The different views of the conference were
set forth in the Far Eastern Review as follows : "The ma-
jority of the Pekingese find the fact that Vice-President Feng
Kuo-chang and General Chang Hsiin have instructed their
delegates to vote for war, much more interesting than the per-
centage of increase in the Customs Tariffs which the allies
may or may not concede. The radical press sees an ominous
military plot behind the calling of a military conference and
airs the opinion that the Premier is preparing to force war
upon a peace-loving and peaceably inclined people by a display
of military power and cohesion among the big military chiefs.
The press which supports the Peiyang (Military) party on the
other hand heralds the gathering as an honest attempt to probe
the collective sentiment of the nation before entering upon a

the German conquests since 1914 as compared with the successes
of the allies, were put up on the walls of the houses. Sun Yat-
sen, T'ang Shao-yi and their followers also tried actively to
frighten Parliament into opposition to the war policy.

® The Conference was scheduled to meet April 16, but did not
meet until "sometime after the twentieth." Far Eastern Reviezv,
May 19 1 7.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 239

campaign against the 'common enemy of neutral nations' and
in support of the abstract right of weak nations to Hfe, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness."^

The Conference decided unanimously in favor of war with-
out waiting for concessions from the Entente. Further delay
was deprecated since China had already "lost face" with the
Powers by her procrastination. On May i several of the Tu-
chuns called upon the Premier and communicated the views of
the Conference to him. He, in his turn, reported their de-
cision to Parliament which immediately declared itself in
favor of war.* After the President had given his assent to
the policy it remained only to secure the passage of a declara-
tion of war through the Assembly.

When the bill was submitted to Parliament it was felt that
the government would have a sufficient majority to insure its
passage. In spite of this fact no attempt was made to rush it
to a decision. The Cabinet members and the Military Chiefs
occupied themselves in entertaining the members of Parlia-
ment, hoping to make the passage of the bill doubly certain.
It was just at this time^ that a mob demonstration in favor
of war took place outside the Parliament building. This un-
fortunate demonstration was blamed on the Premier, who was
accused of attempting to coerce Parliament into a support of
his policies. The majority of the Cabinet resigned in the
storm that followed, and Parliament refused to take any ac-
tion on the war bill until a new Cabinet was constituted. The
opposition press demanded the resignation of Tuan Chi-jui
and the choice of a new Premier as well as a new Cabinet.
Tuan however held to his position and demanded action by

^ Ibid., p. 460.
^ May 7, 1917.
® May 10, 1917.

240 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Parliament on the question of war. The whole matter was
postponed by the Assembly on the ground that there was no
Cabinet to carry out the necessary war measures in case Par-
liament passed the bill. This amounted to a vote of want of
confidence in the government, and, logically, should have been
followed by the resignation of the Premier.

A new phase of the struggle was inaugurated on May 20,
when the Military party came to the aid of the Premier, de-
manding the dissolution of Parliament. Up to that time the
issue had been whether or not Parliament should declare war
on Germany. The Tuchuns, however, changed the issue, bas-
ing their demand for a dissolution of Parliament on the ob-
jectionable nature of certain provisions of the draft permanent
constitution. "What has greatly shocked us," the Tuchuns
stated in their petition, "is the passage of a number of articles
of the draft constitution by the Constitution Conference at the
second reading and those approved by the committee meeting
the other day. Among these articles one reads that when the
House of Representatives passes a vote of lack of confidence
in the Cabinet Ministers, the President shall either dismiss the
Cabinet or dissolve the House of Representatives, but the said
House must not be dissolved without the approval of the Sen-
ate. Another states that the President can appoint the Premier
without the countersignature of Cabinet Ministers. The third
provides that any resolution passed by both Houses of Parlia-
ment shall have the same force as law."^° The petition then
went on to lay down the principle upon which parliamentary
government is based, that in case of conflict either the Cabinet
must resign or appeal to the country in a new election. The
check on the absolute power of Parliament, which lay in the
right of dissolution, was lost, it was claimed, in the draft per-

^° Translation, Far Eastern Review, June 19 17, p. 499.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 241

manent constitution, since the House could be dissolved only
with the consent of the Senate, a body constituted in much
the same way as the House, and with the same interests to
defend.

After discussing the defects in the Constitution and com-
menting on the maimer in which the meetings of the Constitu-
tion Conference had been conducted, the petition stated that
the dissolution of Parliament was necessary for the best in-
terests of the country. "An examination of the past experience
of other countries shows that the making of the constitution
should not be left in the hands of the Parliament. If China
wishes to have a good constitution there is no other method
except to attack the problem at the root. If the whole thing
be not completely wiped out, soon the second reading will be
completed and once the text is settled the third reading will
only result in alterations in wording. It will then be impossi-
ble to alter the spirit of the law.""

Instead of dissolving Parliament at the request of the Mili-
tary party the President, on May 23, surprised the country by
the dismissal of the Premier. Dr. Wu Ting-fang was ap-
pointed acting Premier^^ and the name of Li Ching-hsi was
submitted to Parliament for confirmation as successor to Tuan
Chi-jui." The approval of Parliament was given by a large
majority in both Houses.^*

^^ Far Eastern Review, June 1917, p. 499.

^^ Dr. Wu was then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^^ Li Ching-hsi was an Anhui man and a nephew of the famous
Li Hung-chang. He had held various high positions under the
Manchus, having been Governor of the Yun-kwei provinces in
1909. Li was an intimate friend of Yuan Shih-kai and politically
must be classed as a conservative militarist. For chronological
sketch of Li Ching-hsi's life see: China Year Book, 1916, p. 529.

^* House of Representatives, 388 votes for and 56 against;
Senate, 166 for and 25 against.

242 Modern Constitutional Development in China

After the dismissal of Tuan Chi-jui the Tuchiins assembled
in conference at Hsiichow. The Conference decided to oppose
the formation of a Cabinet by Li Ching-hsi, but intimated that
it would not oppose a government headed by Wang Shih-
chen, the Chief of the General Staff. General Wang, how-
ever, refused to consider the position, although Li agreed to
give way to him. This first move by the Hsiichow Conference
was followed almost immediately by reports that the Mili-
tary Governors of Fengtien and Anhui provinces had declared
independence of the Central Government. Fukien, Chekiang,
Chihli, Shantung, and Hupeh, all of them under the control
of members of the Peiyang party were reported as also having
joined the revolutionary movement.

In spite of thg reported action of the provinces. President
Li Yuan-hung reiterated his determination not to dissolve Par-
liament. *T cannot sanction the dissolution of Parliament. The
provisional Constitution does not provide for any such drastic
action," he said on May 21.^^ From that time on, neverthe-
less, as the revolutionary movement gained greater headway,
the President showed signs of weakening. While emphasiz-
ing his determination to do nothing unconstitutional he did
everything possible to conciliate the Peiyang party. The Mili-
tary Chiefs refused to consider anything short of an absolute
dissolution of Parliament, and the earlier reports of revolt
were confirmed by telegrams declaring independence.

If the President had taken a decided stand against the Tu-
chuns at the outset, the situation might have been saved. In-
stead of ordering steps to be taken against them he wasted
time attempting to conciliate them by considering every sug-
gestion made for filling the post of Prime Minister. The first
man he appointed, Li Ching-hsi, was a conservative, and a man

^^ Far Eastern Review, July 1917, p. 529.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 243

allied with the Military party. He refused to come to Peking
to assume office, or to attempt to form a Cabinet in opposition
to the wishes of the revolting Tuchuns, showing clearly that
he could not be relied upon to act against them in case of
necessity.

Being unable to form a government acceptable to both Par-
liament and the rebellious Governors, President Li took a step
which, in the light of the past history of the Republic, is al-
most inexplicable, unless it is to be explained by the assumption
that the President was willing to do anything to end the crisis.
On June i a mandate was issued calling upon the notorious
and infamous General Chang Hsiin^" to come to Peking to
mediate between the Tuchuns and Parliament. General Chang
had been only a thorn in the side of the Government since the
first revolution. He was well known for his desire to see the
monarchical regime restored under the Manchu Dynasty, and
had no sympathy with democratic government under any
guise. The first attempts at dictation by the Military party in
the fall of 1 9 16 had been made under his direction and at his
instigation. This was the man who was called upon by the
President of the Republic of China to mediate at a time of
grave crisis — he who had been a practical outlaw, maintaining
himself by the strength of his personal army for almost eight

^® Chang Hsiin, a Kiangsi man, had been raised to high office by
the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi. He had been appointed as com-
mander-in-chief for the Manchus in Yunnan and later in Kansu.
In 191 1 he was commander-in-chief of the Kiangnan forces, with
headquarters at Nanking. He remained faithful to the Manchus
to the very end. The abdication of the Manchus found him oc-
cupying important points along the Tientsin-Pukow railroad,
where he maintained himself by sheer force. Yuan Shih-kai se-
cured his support for the monarchy movement by appointing him
Field-Marshal and High Inspector of the Yangtze provinces. For
fuller description of his life see: China Year Book, 1916, pp.
500-501.

244 Modern Constitutional Development in China

years! It seems strange that the President, who above all
others in the country had always declared his faith in con-
stitutionalism and parliamentarianism in China, should have
called upon a virtual brigand to settle a constitutional crisis.
The mandate summoning General Chang Hsiin to Peking de-
serves reproduction as an interesting document: "Chang
Hsiin, the Tuchun of Anhui, has, in a telegraphic message,
given his views of the present situation in words at once earn-
est and sincere. On account of my lack of virtue and ability
as well as the fact that my prestige is insufficient to command
respect, some of the officers whose duty it is to defend the
country, have joined together in hostile demonstration. Events
have turned out to be against my wish and I am smitten by
regret and remorse. Chang Hsiin, zuho is highly meritorious
and respected as well as public spirited and patriotic, is re-
quested to at once come to Peking in order to confer with us
regarding the affairs of the State. I believe confidently that
he will be able to save the dangerous situation by coping with
the difficulties. In earnest longing I wait for his arrival. ''^^
Chang Hsiin accepted the task laid upon him, but did not
go to Peking immediately as he had been asked to do. The
revolting Tuchuns had established themselves at Tientsin as
the headquarters for operations against Peking. A provisional
military government had been formed and many prominent
anti-parliamentarians were to be found there. Tuan Chi-jui
himself, after his dismissal from office, had taken up his resi-
dence in Tientsin. General Chang, therefore, stopped at Tient-
sin to get the views of the leaders there before going to Pek-
ing to take up his work of mediating. He arrived in Tientsin
on June 7, and did not leave for the capital until a week later.

^'' Far Eastern Revieiv, July 1917, p. 537. The itahcs are the
author's.

1

Modern Constitutional Development in China 245

After interviewing Tuan Chi-jui, Li Ching-hsi and others,
General Chang showed what could be expected of him as a
mediator. On June 8 he made the statement that the whole
difficulty was practically solved. "I have wired to the Presi-
dent to dissolve Parliament, and I will go to Peking on Sun-
day to finally settle matters"^* were his words. In other words
mediation and dictation were synonomous to him.

The wavering attitude of the President became more pro-
nounced after Chang Hsiin's message reached him. Instead
of continuing to stand firmly on the constitution he began to
seek middle ground between giving in to the Militarists and
Chang Hsiin entirely by dissolving Parliament, and defying
them to do their worst. The southern provinces assured him
of their support, both moral and military ; but Yunnan, Kuei-
chow, Kuangtung and Kuangsi looked very far away when
compared with Chihli, Shantung and the revolting provinces.

The first real intimation given the parliamentarians that
President Li might fail them came when he suggested the
possibility of Parliament dissolving itself by reason of a con-
tinued lack of a quorum. While this appeared to the President
as the best way out of the dilemma, it did not appeal with
great force to the majority of Parliament. Even before the
President suggested this step, however, it had occurred to the
members of the Yenchiu-hui (Chin Pu Tang). That party
had assisted the President to overthrow Parliament in 19 13,
and it now aided the revolt of the Tuchuns by its members
absenting themselves from Parliament. The Chin Pu Tang
members published a statement in support of the Tuchuns, ex-
pressing disapproval of certain articles of the proposed con-
stitution.

18

Ibid., p. 538.

246 ' Modern Constitutional Development in China

The six points which "tended to create disturbances and
revolutions" in the future were laid down as follows: "i)
The system of Parliament has not been improved and its or-
ganization has not been definitely fixed; 2) when any decision
of the Houses is returned by the government for reconsider-
ation the ordinary method of voting will be employed to make
a final decision; 3) the mandate dismissing the Prime Minister
does not require the counter-signature of Cabinet Ministers;
4) the partiality shown in the provisions of the right of 'vote
of want of confidence' and that of power to dissolve the House
of Representatives; 5) the bills passed by the Houses shall
become the Laws of the Nation; and 6) the provincial system
has been hastily provided for in the constitution."^®

In addition to refraining from attending the meetings of
the Constitution Conference, and thus making action on the
constitution impossible, the Chin Pu Tang members consider-
ed the advisability of resigning from Parliament in a body,
making it impossible for it to function because of a lack of a
quorum. This action was considered as early as May 24.
If those members resigned there would be no necessity for a
formal dissolution of Parliament, since many of the Kuo Ming
members were beginning to leave Peking in fear of being
forcibly detained and imprisoned. Parliament, however, re-
fused to dissolve itself formally in order to help the President
out of a bad situation.

After Chang Hsiin's advice, the President became convinced
that he had no alternative to the issuance of a mandate dis-
solving Parliament and ordering a new election. It is not
necessary here to discuss the play and counter play of forces
working on him before he reached a final decision and issued

^^ Far Eastern Reviezv, July 1917, p. 529.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 247

the mandate. ^° His continued vacillation showed the President
to be what the Far Eastern Review well called him, "an idol
with feet of clay."

Having established himself as the dictator to the President,
Chang Hsiin left Tientsin, arriving at Peking on June 14 with
a large force of his own "army." The immediate result of
the dissolution of Parliament was the "cancelling of inde-
pendence" by the revolting Tuchuns. At the same time it be-
came evident that the seat of trouble simply had been trans-
ferred from the North to the South, which now threatened to
take up arms in defense of the constitution and Parliament.

Li Ching-hsi consented to assume office when Chang Hsiin
requested that he do so, and commenced the almost hopeless
task of forming a Cabinet. The warning from the South
caused little alarm since the military strength of the Tuchuns
was available to crush any revolt.

The Peking Gazette summarized the gains from the revolt
of the Tuchuns as follows: i) dissolution of Parhament; 2)
"borrowing" of funds from government railways; 3) "boost-
ing" of Chang Hsiin; 4) dissolution of a provincial assembly
in Fukien; 5) formation of a Cabinet without the approval of
Parliament (not yet completed) ; 6) isolation of the Chief
Executive; 7) return of monarchist propagandists (not yet
completed) ; 8) destruction of the provisional Constitution
and the part of the permanent Constitution which has passed
the second reading; 9) the creation of a Council of Elder
Statesmen (not yet completed) ; 10) the creation of a bogus
legislature for the making of a new constitution (not yet com-
pleted) ; 11) creation of a new Parliament in violation of the
existing laws (not completed) ; 12) wholesale suppression of
democratic elements (fairly complete).

20

June 13.

248 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Before the new Premier had an opportunity to form a gov-
ernment worthy of the name, and before sentiment in the
South had definitely crystalhzed either for or against the new
conditions in Peking, the world was treated to what became
eventually an amusing spectacle. It had been known for a
long time that General Chang Hsiin desired nothing more
than an opportunity to restore the Manchus to power. His
loyalty to the former rulers of China is the one redeeming
feature of his entire career. At various times since the death
of Yuan Shih-kai it had been rumored that he was contemp-
lating action against the Republic. Thus for a time the vari-
ous conferences at Hsiichow were reported as favoring Man-
chu restoration, and when he reached Tientsin on his way to
Peking as the "official" mediator, it seemed certain that Gen-
eral Chang would attempt some drastic action against the Re-
public. He stated definitely, however, that he was interested
only in the dissolution of Parliament, and had given up all
idea of reinstating the former Dynasty. This decision was
apparently reached after he had learned that the Military
leaders would not support him in any such movement.

The ease with which he became established as dictator in
Peking, however, evidently caused him to over-rate his
strength and influence. Whatever caused him to change his
mind and attempt his scheme, the fact is that he did reach
the conclusion that the time was ripe for the Restoration.
On July I, as the result of a midnight resolution, the Manchu
Dynasty was declared restored to the Throne, Peking was
placed under control of the military forces of General Chang,
and China for a few days became a monarchy.

As if by magic the old 'Dragon' flag of the Manchus was
substituted for the flag of the Republic in all parts of Peking".
Edicts were issued by Chang Hsiin, in the name of the Emp-

I

Modern Constitutional Development in China 249

eror, notifying tlie people of the change in their allegiance,
and preparations were made to defend Peking against any
forces that the anti-Manchu party might be able to muster.
General Chang had his own troops with him, and it was upon
them that he placed his chief reliance. They had gained a
bad name as ruffians and fighters without ever having been
called upon to engage in battle against regular troops, and it
was this name that terrorized the people of Peking and its
vicinity when their leader first came to act as 'mediator'. The
appearance of his troops as much as anything else, helped to
lend the air of comic opera to this restoration attempted by
Chang. For example they were all required to retain the
queue as a reminder of the good old days of the Manchu su-
premacy, and the different divisions wore various colored uni-
forms, the most picturesque being a vivid blue. In addition
to their military force, the Manchu adherents seemed to rely
on a general passive acceptance of the change, both by the peo-
ple and the Tuchuns, after it had been definitely effected. But
in that expectation the event proved that they were grievously
in error.

When the fact of Chang Hsun's coup d'etat became known
the Tuchuns merely restated the object of their 'punitive ex-
pedition,' directing it against the new monarchy. Tuan Chi-
jui took supreme command of the forces and by the middle of
July had made himself master of the situation, defeating
Chang Hsiin and forcing him to seek refuge in the Legation
Quarter of the city. This effort to dislodge the monarchists
involved some little fighting, but it, again, was of the comic
opera variety. Foreigners in Peking regarded it as so little
dangerous in character as to permit them to go out on the wall
of the city to observe it as an interesting spectacle. There was
really much more danger to spectators than to the actual par-

250 Modern Constitutional Development in China

ticipants in the fighting. Chang Hsiin's army exhibited all
of the weaknesses of mercenary troops in the face of actual
danger, coming over in large numbers to the army of the Re
public until the 'Empire' was defended by only a faithful but
stupid few. Thus the would be King-maker learned when it
was too late that the conservative militarists were as dis'
tinctly anti-monarchical and anti-Manchu as they were op
posed to Parliament.

One beneficial result of the short-lived monarchical restora^
tion was the final elimination of Chang Hsiin as a factor in
Chinese politics. Another was the temporary union of all;
factions in opposition to the Manchus. The constitutionalists
could not act against the Tuchuns when the latter were fight-j
ing to uphold the Republic instead of to overthrow it. The
futility of a continued strife which only opened the way for
control by such men as Chang Hsiin must have been apparent
to both sides. Had the struggle against the monarchy con-
tinued long enough to allow of active participation by the
South it is entirely possible that the temporary sinking of dif-
ferences in the face of the common foe might have resulted in
a permanent healing of the breach. The fighting was over,
however, before the constitutionalists could take part, and, as
a matter of fact, their cooperation was not sought by Tuan
Chi-jui. The overthrow of the monarchy was wholly the
work of the Peiyang party, and left it, in union with the Chin
Pu Tang, in substantial control of the government.

President Li Yuan-hung had been successful in gaining a
refuge in the Japanese Legation when the restoration was pro-
claimed, and from there he requested the Vice-President, Feng
Kuo-chang, to act in his place, and also authorized Tuan Chi-
jui to resume office as Premier and form a Cabinet. ^^ Later

^^ The text of the telegrams may be found in the Far Eastern
Review for August 191 7, pp. 608-609.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 251

he announced his intention of retiring forever from political
life. His last political act was an announcement of this inten-
tion and a plea to the country to sink all differences and work
unitedly for the good of China.

In order to forestall any recognition of the monarchy by
the Powers, Tuan appointed an acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs"" before he left Tientsin to take charge of the Re-
publican army. At the same time, when the former Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang,"^ learned of the coup
d'etat undertaken by Chang Hsiin, he left the North hurriedly
and established himself at Shanghai as the Minister for For-
eign Affairs. By taking this action he, too, hoped to prevent
a recognition of the monarchy. The effect was, however, to
emphasize again the differences between the North and the
South.

After the republican forces had regained control of Peking
the Premier undertook the formation of a Cabinet. Here
again was presented a possible opportunity of uniting the
constitutionalists and the militarists. If recognition had been
I'iven the former equally with the latter in the construction of
the government harmony might have been restored. No at-
tempt was made in this direction, unfortunately, and the first
list of Cabinet members contained only militarists and mem-
bers of the Chin Pu Tang. This w^as true also of the Cabinet
as it was finally constituted."* The Peiyang party felt that

" Mr. Wang Ta-hsieh.

^^ Dr. Wu had offered his resignation several times, but it had
never been accepted.

^* The Cabinet as constituted by July 17 was as follows: Pre-
mier and Minister of War, Tuan Chi-jui ; Navy, Admiral Liu
Kuan-hsiung; Foreign Affairs, Wang Ta-hsieh; Interior, Tung
Plua-lung ; Finance, Liang Ch'i Ch'ao ; Communications, Tsao
Ju-lin ; Justice, Lin Chang-min ; Commerce, Chang Kuo-han ; Edu-
cation, Fan Yuan-lien. One member, the Premier, was a member

252 Modern Constitutional Development in China

this was an opportunity not to be lost for strengthening itself
in control. This was evidently also Tnan's opinion. In justi-
fication of his Cabinet appointments the Premier said that the
great source of weakness in the past had lain in coalition Cabi-
nets which could not harmoniously administer the govern-
ment. Now the opportunity was presented of eliminating the
southern party and entering upon a harmonious administra-
tion, and this opportunity should not be lost. He may have
been influenced also by the recollection of the opposition al-
ways shown him by the South.

The southern leaders took the constitution of the Cabinet
as a direct challenge and the old struggle was resumed. Even
before the shortlived monarchy, Kuangtung province had
declared itself self-governing, although not independent. The
difference lay in the fact that it still recognized Li Yuan-hung
as President and the Parliament as being in existence. After
the resignation of the President and the succession of Feng
Kuo-chang to the office as the head of the military government
which controlled the North, the movement for separation of
the South from the North gained headway. Many chronic
revolutionists such as Sun Wen came to Canton and the for-
mation of a government there was begun. Parliament was
endeavoring to function from Shanghai so that for an inter-
val the country was triply divided. Finally the members of
Parliament in Shanghai went to Canton, and the permanent
division of the country under two governments appeared im-
minent. The permanency of such a division, however, de-
pended on the lack of ability of the northern government to

of the Peiyang military party, and the others were members of
the Chin Pu Tang, or more nearly in sympathy with it than with
the constitutionalists of the South. Some were known for their
support of the 191 5 monarchy movement.

I

Modern Constitutional Development in China 253

bring the South under its authority, or of the southern gov-
ernment to extend itself over the North. The issue was
definite.

The government at Peking, headed by Tuan Chi-jui was
recognized by the Powers as the legal government of China
and was dealt with as such when the question of war with
Germany was again revived. A proclamation was issued on
August 14 declaring a state of war to exist between China on
the one hand and Germany and Austria on the other. It
seemed very much as though a country at war with itself was
only adding to its burdens by undertaking a foreign war. But
to take such a step meant getting the solid support of the
Entente Powers behind the Peking government. The value
of this support was recognized by the Canton government
which protested that it alone had the power to declare war
and make peace, since those powers were vested in Parliament
by the constitution, and the Parliament, so far as it could be
said to be in existence, was in the South. The constitutional
issue, under the circumstances, did not appeal to the Powers
as a valid reason for not working with the most powerful ele-
ment in the State, and the one in control of the administra-
tive machinery of most of the provinces.

From the time of the overthrow of General Chang Hsiin
the internal history of China has been the story of the strug-
gle between the North and the South, first of all, and in the
second place between various factions in the North. Feng
Kuo-chang succeeded to the office of President, but he did not
leave his post in the Yangtze valley to assume office in Peking
until the latter part of July. The experience of Li Yuan-
hun^ who also had left a high provincial position to go to

254 Modern Constitutional Dez'elopment in China

Peking, served as a warning to the new President.^^ From
his position at Nanking as Viceroy of Kiangsu province Feng
Kuo-chang could exert a great influence on the country.
While there he had his army to aid him, and he had control
of a region of great importance to both the North and the
South. In Peking, separated from his immediate supporters,
he would be constantly in danger of losing all direction of af-
fairs. The South held out every possible inducement for him
to join the constitutionalists in their fight against Tuan Chi-
jui and the northern Generals, but the North appeared the
stronger to him for he finally went to Peking, accompanied
by a bodyguard, to assume office. Before he would consent to
leave Nanking, however, he made sure, so far as possible, of
a continued control of the Yangtze. He insisted that one of
his supporters^^ be made Viceroy of Kiangsu province, and
another be appointed to fill the vacancy in Kiangsi.-' One of
his friends was already in control of Hupeh province, so that
these appointments assured to President Feng continued con-
trol of the Yangtze valley.

Both the President and the Premier aspired to the leader-
ship of the Peiyang party^® and their rival aspirations eventu-

2^ While at Wuchang and supported by his troops General Li
had exercised a much greater authority than when in Peking and
separated from the soldiers loyal to him. After Yuan Shih-kai
persuaded him to come north, he was practically a prisoner until
he succeeded to the presidency, and even then, as has been seen,
he was only able to make himself felt by siding with one party
or the other.

-•^ Li Hsun, Tutuh of Kiangsi province.

-■^ Made by the transfer of General Li Hsun to Kiangsu.

28 The Peiyang party, it may be noted, was divided into two
factions, the Chihli faction of which General Feng and his ad-
herents had control, and the Anhui faction dominated by Gen-
eral Tuan Chi-jui. General Ni Ssu-cheng who was leader in the
movement to overthrow Parliament was an Anhui man.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 255

ally led to conflict in the government. This conflict developed
first over the question of the steps to be taken against the con-
stitutionalists. The Premier desired to take active military ac-
tion while the President's policy was rather one of conciliation.
Tuan had allied himself with the Chin Pu Tang, finding it
impossible to eliminate from influence both the political par-
ties. He made this alliance with the expectation that through
the Chin Pu Tang he would be able to control the Parliament
which all agreed eventually must be elected. The President,
in order to have similar party backing, wished to conciliate
the South, in order to control the Kuo Ming Tang members
who would certainly represent that section of the country.
This fact helps to explain his desire to conciliate rather than
coerce the South.

It is futile to attempt to give a clear and coherent account
of Chinese politics during the last months of 1917 and the
first months of 19 18. The summaries of political conditions
in the current weeklies and monthlies rightly headed their ac-
counts "The Chinese Political Fog," "The Muddle in Chinese
Politics," etc., etc. Fighting went on intermittently between
the North and the South without either side gaining any dis-
tinct advantage. Tuan Chi-jui, as the leader of one faction
of the Peiyang party insisted on strong measures being taken,
while the President as the leader of another faction nullified
all such action.

After he perceived that the President would not support him
in his efforts to check the southern forces Premier Tuan in-
sisted on resigning. For a time no one could be persuaded to
undertake the task of forming a new Cabinet. Finally Gen-
eral Wang Shih-chen accepted the Premiership, with the policy
of peace with the South through negotiation. The peace
policy eventually had to be given up. Reports from the South

256 Modern Constitutional Development in China

were not encouraging, and the Tuchuns finally took matters
in their own hands, announcing that either Peking would
have to give up all idea of compromise with the constitutional-
ists or they would carry on the war independently of the Cen-
tral government. Three of their leaders were thereupon
authorized to conduct the war, and peace talk was at an end
for a time. Matters went from bad to worse in the contested
provinces as well as at Peking. In the provinces desultory
fighting continued simultaneously with peace discussions, and
neither had any real effect. In Peking the President had lost
control of the Peiyang party,"^ and its real leader, Tuan Chi-
jui, refused to resume office.

In the latter part of February 191 8, a definite agitation for
peace was begun, the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and all
business interests supporting the movement with enthusiasm.
At this time, however, the three Manchurian provinces were
federated under the leadership of General Chang Tso-lin,
who moved a large force into the metropolitan province and
announced his intention of going to the aid of the northern
forces. This brought all talk of peace to an end in the North,
Tuan Chi-jui came back to office as Premier with the solid
support of the Northern Tuchuns, and a vigorous campaign
was undertaken against the South. For a time, again, it looked
as though the two sections would be brought by force under
one government. But the North did not prove strong enough
to extend its power to the provinces in the far South, or to
maintain more than a precarious hold on the middle provinces.

From the strictly constitutional point of view there is but

-^ Li Hsun developed a policy and a following of his own, at-
tempting to play the same game that President Feng had for-
merly— to preserve the neutrality of the Yangtze provinces — thus
holding the real balance of power between the North and the
South.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 257

little of interest to record. The pretence of constitutionalism
and parliamentarianism was maintained in the North. The
South, of course, claimed to be struggling to preserve the
constitutional regime in China. But while the old Parliament
reassembled at Canton nothing of a constructive nature was
done in the South to advance the course of constitutional de-
velopment.

In the North, in order to maintain the pretence, Tuan Chi-
jui, the Premier in the fall of 191 7, summoned an Assembly
for the purpose of framing an acceptable law for the election
of a new Parliament. The Law was promulgated by the
President February 17, 1918,^° and under it a Parliament was
elected in time to proceed to the election of a President in the
autumn of 19 18.

The new Parliament consisted of two chambers, the Senate
and the House of Representatives. The members of both
Houses were elected by a system of electoral colleges. The
qualifications for electors were i) educational; 2) property,
shown either by the payment of direct taxes or by ownership;
3) service as an oflicial. The qualifications for electors of
Senators were higher than for electors of members of the
Plouse of Representatives, but were of the same nature. In
order that Parliament might be more easily controlled the
membership of both Houses was reduced, and the representa-
tion of the provinces reapportioned, strengthening the hold of
the Northern provinces and assuring a quorum for action in
case the South did not choose to elect representatives.

The first task to which the new Parliament at Peking ad-
dressed itself was the election of a new President of the Re-
public. Previous to the election, the Tuchuns, or Military

^° The text of the law is published in the Far Eastern Review,
July 19 1 8, pp. 296-303.

258 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Leaders of the North, met in Conference at Tientsin to con-
sider the question of the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Feng- Kuo-chang was a mihtary man and a leader of one fac-
tion of the mihtary group, but because of the continued breach
with Tuan Chi-jui, the leader of the other faction, it was felt
to be inadvisable to continue him in the presidency. The one
man who seemed to command the support of both factions was
Hsii Shih-ch'ang, a representative of the old regime, but a
man of administrative experience and of great capacity. ^^ Ac-
cordingly he was elected by Parliament on September 4 as the
successor to Feng Kuo-chang.^^

The position of the new President was a difficult one. No
one recognized more clearly than did he the necessity for peace
and harmony in the country, both because of internal needs
and because of the international situation. That the Powers
wished for an adjustment of the internal difficulties was em-
phasized by President Wilson in his message of congratula-
tion to President Hsii. "This is an auspicious moment," he
said, "as you enter upon the duties of your high office, for
the leaders in China to lay aside their differences and guided
by a spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice to unite in a deter-
mination to bring about harmonious cooperation among all
the elements of your great nation so that each may contribute
its best effort for the good of the whole and enable your Re-
public to reconstitute its national unity and assume its rightful

21 Member of the Grand Council from 1905 to the Abdication,
and, after the resignation of the Regent in 191 2, one of the Grand
Guardians of the infant "Emperor."

During the 191 5 Monarchy movement he had been given the
title of one of the "Four Friends of Sung Shan" (Yuan Shih-
kai). He was a "sworn brother" of Yuan Shih-kai.

32 After considerable squabbling it was found to be impossible
to elect a Vice-President.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 259

place in the councils of nations."^^ The international view
of the necessity for peace was further emphasized from time
to time by the Allied Ministers in Peking.

But while President Hsii Shih-ch'ang realized the necessity
for peace he was not unaware of the forces with which he
would have to contend, both in the South and in Peking, in
his effort to restore harmony and unity to China. A perma-
nent peace for the country depended and depends on the aboli-
tion of military government in the provinces. This could be
accomplished only by the gradual elimination of those who had
been ruling China since the dissolution of Parliament by Li
Yuan-hung in 191 7. This was ostensibly for what the South
was fighting. But in actual fact the southern provinces were
just as truly ruled by the military as the northern. Conse-
quently there would be an opposition in both sections of the
country to any settlement that meant the limitation of the
power of the Tuchuns.

While the President had been raised to that office by the
northern Tuchuns he did not by any means command their
absolute allegiance. Whether in or out of office Tuan Chi-jui
remained always a factor to be considered. In the Cabinet
Tsao Ju-lin commanded considerable support, because of his
party following and his great natural abilities. The President,
then, had to prepare the way in the North before he could un-
dertake peace discussions with the South. He waited, watched,
and worked until November 16 when a presidential mandate
was issued ordering the northern soldiery to stop fighting and
return to their original posts. ^* Following this declaration of
an armistice steps were taken to bring about a Conference be-
tween the Military Government of the Southwest and the

^^ Far Eastern Review, November 1918, p. 460.
^* Far Eastern Review, Dec. 1918, p. 505.

26o Modern Constitutional Development in China

Peking Government with a view to discovering a basis for
peace and reunion. The absokite victory of the allies in Eu-
rope as indicated by the armistice of November ii undoubted-
ly reacted on the military in China, causing them to support
Hsii Shih-ch'ang in his peace move.

This idea of a conference had been advocated by both Chi-
nese and foreigners for a long time, and several concrete sug-
gestions as to a basis for settlement had been advanced. The
one most worth consideration was that put forth in an analysis
of the situation by W. W. Willoughby, former Legal Adviser
to the President. In brief he suggested that "there be consti-
tuted a joint or Conference Committee composed of a small
number of members from each of the Canton and Peking
Parliaments, this committee to agree upon the terms of new
laws for the organization and election of a new National
Parliament, these laws thus agreed upon to be enacted, with-
out amendment, by both Parliaments, and, under them, a new
Parliament could be elected, whereupon the Parliaments now
sitting at Peking and Canton would go out of existence. Prior
to this the Canton Parliament might elect Hsii Shih-ch'ang as
President of the Republic, or after the convening of the new
Parliament that body could elect Hsii to the Presidency. Thus
would be brought into existence a government the constitution-
ality of which neither side could or would be disposed to
assail."^^

Such a Conference, to discuss the points at issue and reach
a settlement, was finally constituted and assembled at Shang-
hai. It is not necessary, even were there space, to discuss the
controversies between the two sides prior to the meeting at
Shanghai. Chu Chi-chien was appointed Chief delegate of

^^ PubHshed in Far Eastern Review, November 1918, pp. 433-
436.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 261

the Peking Government while T'ang Shao-yi headed the dele-
gation representing the Military Government of the South-
west.

The first question taken up by the Conference involved a
questioning of the sincerity of the North. T'ang claimed that
the terms of the second armistice agreement were being vio-
lated by a continued advance of the northern forces in Shensi
province. This question caused a temporary suspension of
the Conference until the southern delegation was satisfied that
the fighting had entirely stopped.

At the same time the southern delegation demanded that
the Peking Government discontinue the War Participation
Board of which Tuan Chi-jui was the head, and disclaim any
intention of accepting further advances from Japan for the
services of that Board. ^^

But the rock on which the Conference finally split, and this
in spite of repeated advices from the allied Ministers not to
let anything prevent a consolidation of the country under one
government, was the demand of the South that, as a prelimi-
nary to peace, the mandate issued by Li Yuan-hung dissolv-
ing Parliament should be cancelled. This was the fifth of
eight points submitted to the Conference by T'ang. There
was agreement on the other seven. ^'^ When the North refused
to give in on this point both delegations resigned and returned,
the one to the North, the other to the South.

The course of the internal Conference was influenced
greatly by the Paris Peace Conference when it announced its

^^ This Board had been established to direct such military aid
as China might furnish her allies in Europe. A Japanese loan
was to finance such participation. Advances on the loan had
been made, and Japan suggested her readiness to complete the
loan. The Southern objection was based on a fear that the money
would be used to finance a resumption of internal warfare.

^'' North China Herald (Weekly ed), May 17, 1919, p. 412.

262 Modern Constitutional Development in China

decision on the Shantung question. A widespread agitation
sprang up throughout the country to prevent the Chinese rep-
resentatives from signing the treaty, and this agitation reacted
directly on the Government at Peking which was held account-
able for the actions of the members of the Chinese delegation
to Paris. A Cabinet crisis was precipitated which resulted in
the elimination of the most strongly pro- Japanese member of
the Cabinet, Tsao Ju-lin.

What the future will bring forth it is hard to say. The
anti-Japanese feeling in China if it develops far enough may
conceivably make possible a union of the provinces for the
purpose of protection against external aggression. In all
parts of the country there is a continuation of the demand for
the resumption of the Conference and a settlement of the in-
ternal question.^^ If popular sentiment is sufficiently aroused
against the militarists so that their opposition to any solution
of the difficulty would be removed, peace would not be long
delayed, and it would be possible to recommence an orderly
constitutional progression.

^® It has been reconvened but up to the present time, 1920,
January, has not worked out a plan of settlement acceptable to
both the North and South.

CHAPTER XI

From an oriental despotism to a limited monarchy; from
monarchy to republicanism and back to monarchy for a day
before the restoration of the Republic; from a parliamentary
Republic to a division into two States, each ruled by a group
of irresponsible military chiefs, with the Parliament a dummy
rather than a board of control; such have been the political
mutations in China during the past twenty years. After trac-
ing constitutional development in modern China, seemingly
we come back to our starting point, semi-irresponsible gov-
ernment— certainly we do not find such a logical and ordered
development into a democratic State as seemed to be indicated
by the events of 1911-1912.

That these twenty years of development have not been pro-
ductive of good not even the most severe critic of China would
venture to say. The education of the people politically, while
it has not proceeded very far, has been substantially begun.
Valuable reforms have been instituted in legal procedure and
the administration of justice ; there have been the necessary
experiments with foreign institutions so that the process of
adapting them to the peculiar needs of China is well under
way ; and in spite of change, there has been retained in the
political organization the agency through which eventually
the democratic voice of China will make itself heard. Because
parliamentary control is for the present lost, the value of the
successive acknowledgments of the necessity of a Parliament
to satisfy the people should not be underestimated.

China has always been classed as a democratic country, and

263

264 Modern Constitutional Development in China

very properly so, by those who have appreciated the control ex-
ercised by the people over the local administration, and the
respect necessarily shown by the government, both central and
provincial, for local customs and wishes. The right of revo-
lution was recognized both in theory and practice, and was a
powerful weapon in the hands of the people for the preserva-
tion of their freedom from a too autocratic power. It was
this element of democracy in China which caused observers to
expect too much from her in the transformation years after
the outbreak of the revolution. Proceeding from a local self-
government, it was felt and predicted that China would escape
the years of toil and experimentation incident usually to the
change from autocracy to democracy. That there has been
much confusion, unrest, and even retrogression is not to be
wondered at if one stops to consider some of the reasons of
a fundamental nature for the apparent failure of representa-
tive democracy in China.

The necessity for a period of preparation and readjustment
was recognized more clearly by the dynastic rulers of China
than by the revolutionists who were bent primarily on one
thing, the elimination of the Manchus, and only secondarily on
the solution of the problem of popular control of the gov-
ernment. Because of this recognition of unreadiness, and of
course also because of their own necessity, the Manchus strove
for a nine year period of development and gradual change
before the actual promulgation of a constitution and the elec-
tion of a Parliament. What might have been accomplished in
these nine years it is of course impossible to say, since the
revolutionary ferment denied any breathing space to the Gov-
ernment. The leaders of the revolution were of foreign edu-
cation in many cases, or had received the rudiments of a wes-
tern education in foreign maintained schools in China. They

Modern Constitutional Development in China 265

felt themselves able to give the people the intelligent direction
and guidance that would be necessary after the transfer of
sovereignty from the Emperor to the populace. Their belief
would seem to have been, not in popular government itself,
but in a government by the qualified few in the interest of the
unqualified masses. Thus from the beginning there was a
very extended limitation of the right of the suffrage, by vari-
ous kinds of qualifications. This would certainly constitute
a recognition of the lack of preparation of the people to par-
ticipate in the government of the country, even while the doc-
trine of popular sovereignty was being preached.

The self -constituted leaders of the uneducated masses
styled themselves the "Young China" party. That many of
them had received a thorough education in western univer-
sities or in Japan is undeniable. But those who studied in the
United States, England or France were studying the operation
of political institutions foreign to China in the setting natural
to the institution and the student naturally found it difficult
to visualize them in a Chinese environment. The tendency
was for him, the longer he was absent from his country, to
overestimate its advancement, and to think of China in wes-
tern terms. Consequently he could not see that what might
have been of proven worth in another country might not be
adapted to the needs of China. Where the student had re-
ceived his education in Japan he had seen an imitation of Eng-
lish parliamentary government rather than its complete adap-
tation to the needs of the Oriental country. Furthermore even
in so close a neighbor as Japan, conditions were very differ-
ent from a Republican China. The Manchus were able to and
did draw on Japanese experience in their attempt at a solution
of the constitutional problem ; the founders of the Republic
had different needs to consider. Thus a study of constitutional

266 Modern Constitutional Development in China

government in Japan would not give the student an adequate
knowledge of the problems which have to be faced in a Re-
public and of the manner of solution of these problems in
China, the first Oriental Republic. From the standpoint of
training, then, these new aspirants to leadership in China had
to study in the school of practical experience before they could
hope to solve the problems facing the country. In many cases
they had no experience in actual administration prior to the
revolution. They were theorists who found it difficult to di-
vorce themselves from theory for the sake of expediency.

Many of the old regime came into the service of the revo-
lution after it had manifested its strength; but because of their
training in the old school they were able to give only a lip-
service to the new institutions and ideas. Concerned only
with practical considerations of administration they found it
difficult to work in harmony with the "New China." But
since they were the holders of administrative posts and were
men of experience in practical politics the revolution found it
necessary to avail itself of their services, even though mis-
trusting the sincerity of their professed belief in the principles
of the revolution. They entrenched themselves in the execu-
tive and administrative services where the ground was most
familiar to them, while "Young China" concentrated its efforts
on a control of Parliament, which it intended to make the
supreme organ of government. This brought the new into
the conflict with the old regime that has prevented the orderly
operation of a constitutional government.

The essence of parliamentary government is that the As-
sembly should act as the body representative of the people,
carrying out their wishes through legislative act. One prob-
lem of representative government is the devising of ways in
which the Parliament shall truly speak for the nation and not

Modern Constitutional Development in China 267

for itself alone — the establishment of a continuing connection
between the electorate and its agents. In order that the peo-
ple shall effectively control the government through Parlia-
ment they must be sufficiently interested in national affairs to
follow the work of the government carefully and intelligently.
Because representative government demands this political in-
terest in more than local affairs, John Stuart Mill says that in
many cases a people prepared to carry on the work of local
government well may be entirely unfitted for the operation of
a representative government. The history of China during
the past few years assuredly illustrates the truth of his state-
ment. For generations the people of China had effectively
controlled the local government. But this very control had
done much to unfit them for the control of the national demo-
cratic government established in 1912. They were not ac-
customed to look beyond the provincial boundaries even where
they had looked that far abroad. They had no thought for
national needs and problems. That was left for those who
made a business of government, — the literati and bureaucracy.
Even in time of war sentiment was localized. Thus, while the
British were hammering on the gates of Peking, they were
appealed to by the Chinese at Shanghai for aid against the
Taiping rebels. Again, in time of flood, each province looked
out for itself without thought for the needs of its neighbors.
Instances of this lack of national feeling and thought might be
endlessly multiplied. When the people then were expected to
supervise the work of national government and administration
they had no intelligent conception of the problems faced. The
years since the revolution of 191 1 have been remarkable for
the development of a national feeling among the people in the
provinces, a development which will ultimately make possible^
the successful operation of a representative government in
China.

268 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Even though the people had been ready to assume the direc-
tion of the government the organization of the Empire pre-
sented a problem which up to the present time has proved im-
possible of solution. Under the Manchu Dynasty while China
had been outwardly a unified State, actually there was more
nearly a union of independent provinces in the person of the
Emperor. Practically each Governor or Viceroy had been the
ruler of his own province. In many respects the Empire might
be compared to the old Roman Empire. Peking had extended
its sway over the country step by step, appointing its agent to
rule the province, but leaving him to his own devices so long
as the tribute was paid. The national revenues were not de-
rived by a direct levy on the individual so much as by as-
sessment which might be collected according to the wishes of
the inhabitants. The Central control was not manifested to
the people except through an alien soldiery and an alien official-
dom. This soldiery was for a two- fold purpose : to manifest
the power of the Emperor and to afford protection to the peo-
ple in return for the contributions they made to the Imperial
treasury. The officials, not being indigenous to the locality
were regarded as the representatives of a foreign power, and
were forced ultimately to deal with the people through their
own representatives. So far as the Peking Government was
concerned, until the foreign impact of the last century, if the
contributions came in regularly from the provinces, and there
was no evidence of disaffection which might be directed against
the Imperial authority, the provincial authorities were the
rulers in their own jurisdiction. The distribution of powers
territorially inclined strongly toward the provinces.

With the presentation of the new problems brought by the
presence of foreigners in the countr}^ and with the attempt to
introduce foreign institutions, the ]\Ianchus faced the alterna-

Modern C onstitntional Development in China 269

tive of either making themselves the leaders of a Federal
Union of the provinces or of uniting the government under a
centralized direction from Peking. In the last years of their
rule they made the decision for centralization and began to
interfere more and more in provincial affairs. This was espe-
cially shown in the movement to nationalize railway construc-
tion and operation. But this attempt to centralize was one
factor in the ultimate overthrow of the Dynasty since it
brought into opposition the "gentry" in all of the provinces,
who might otherwise, through fear of revolutionary ideas,
have been led to align themselves with the representatives of
the established order.

The Republic, when it faced the same problem, decided in
favor of centralization, just as the Imperial authorities had.
This decision, in its turn, made for dissension and factional
strife in the new government, and for opposition in the prov-
inces to every attempt at centralization.

In addition to the problem presented by the traditional in-
dependence of the provinces, the Manchu rule had left the
Republic with another problem which yet remains to be solved
before China can expect peace and order. The provincial gov-
ernments had been under a double direction ; the civil adminis-
tration represented by the Governor, and a coordinate military
control. The necessity of maintaining an alien rule was of
course responsible for the introduction of the military element
in the government. Each military governor had his own
forces which were responsible to him and for whose conduct
he was responsible to the central authorities. Thus instead of
there being one national army recruited from all over the coun-
try and paid from the Imperial treasury directly, there were
separate armies in the provinces, separately maintained. So
long as the commanders of these forces were Manchu they

2/0 Modern Constitutional Development in China

were held under the direction of the Emperor because they
stood or fell with him. With the outbreak of the revolution,
however, the control of these forces, together with the forces
recruited for the purpose of revolution passed into the hands
of Chinese commanders. Thus the way was paved for Tu-
chun control in the provinces simultaneously with parliamen-
tary control in Peking.

When the military administration made necessary for a
time by the revolution was not immediately replaced by a su-
perior civil administration, with a nationalization of the army,
the framework of an extra-legal government of a very per-
nicious character was provided. The assertion of this extra-
legal authority depended upon one thing, force, and it had to
be given consideration or be destroyed. There was no middle
ground. Since it was not destroyed at the beginning it has
gradually become more and more assertive, with each indica-
tion of its strength, until finally it has come to control not only
the provincial governments, but the central government itself.
Conditions at Peking were responsible in part for the ultimate
triumph of the Tuchunate, for there was going on at the capi-
tal the struggle between Parliament and the executive for con-
trol. The Tuchuns naturally aligned themselves with the
executive, and were used by it in its struggle with Parliament,
only to find that it had invoked a force which ultimately over-
shadowed it.

Aside from the purely internal factors responsible for the
failure of representative government in China, the outside
world, and particularly Japan, must bear a share in the respon-
sibility. Properly used the influence of the Powers might have
brought strife to an end long before this. Improperly used it
has made possible the long continued civil war which has been
raging intermittently since 191 1.

Modern Constitutional Development in China 271

Consider the situation in 191 1 ! The Imperial treasury was
empty, and the outbreak of the revokition deprived the Man-
chu government of great sources of revenue. An empty treas-
ury meant that no money was available for soldiers and muni-
tions for use in quelling the rebellion, unless it could be ob-
tained by foreign loans. On the other hand the revolutionists
were equally in need of funds, in spite of the fact that they
had the revenues of most of the provinces south of the Yangtze
upon which to draw. Four alternatives presented themselves
to the foreign governments. Either they could allow their
nationals to make loans indiscriminately to both sides; they
could restrict them to the aid of the de jure Imperial govern-
ment, in which case the revolution would have been a failure
from the outset because of a lack of funds; the Powers might
have permitted their nationals to make loans only to the revo-
lutionary government, which would have amounted to active
intervention against the established and recognized authori-
ties; or aid might have been denied to both parties equally.
To have adopted the first course would have meant the pro-
longation of the strife indefinitely. Aid to the Imperial gov-
ernment exclusively was objectionable to the Powers because
of the reactionary and the anti-foreign disposition of that
government, a disposition that had been modified since 1900,
but only because of necessity. Aid to the revolutionists in
order to promote the overthrow of a government with which
the Powers were at peace would have been undesirable both
from the standpoint of international law and ethics. The last
alternative, then, was the one adopted, a "watchful waiting";
as little active participation as possible under the circumstances,
with, however, a decided leaning toward the South manifest-
ing itself. The result of this policy was a compromise of the
question, by the elimination of the Dynasty on terms favorable
to the Manchus, and the establishment of the Republic, but

272 Modern Constitutional Development in China

with the North, in the person of Yuan Shih-kai, in control of
the executive, while the South controlled the legislature.

After the establishment of the new government the Powers
through the Six Power Group prepared to finance it through
the initial difiicult years of its existence. There has been much
criticism of the policy of restricting loans to the Group, but
on the whole it was the wisest thing to do under the circum-
stances. Without such restriction the entire resources of the
country might have been alienated by an indiscriminate bor-
rowing on the part of the individual provinces to meet their
immediate needs.

The outbreak of the great war in Europe had an unfortun-
ate reaction on the relation of the Powers to China in that it
made Japan the sole Power of the group in a position to make
advances to China to meet her pressing needs, the United
States having withdrawn from the Consortium after the po-
litical change in this country in 191 3.

When the monarchy movement came in 191 5 the South and
West immediately sprang to arms to defend the Republic.
The Powers, however, continued to treat with the Peking gov-
ernment as the rightful authority in China. This continued
recognition was of substantial advantage to Yuan since it gave
him a source of revenue that might otherwise have been de-
nied. Advances continued to be made on the loans contracted,
and the funds thus gained were used largely for the purpose
of putting down the rebellion. But while Japan, as the rep-
resentative of the Four Power Group, made advances to Yuan
and thus enabled him to maintain his hold on the government,
she was accused of lending aid equally to the South, both in
money and munitions.

This same accusation has been brought against her more
recently during the struggle between the North and the South

Modern Constitutional Development in China 2y^

for control. A vast number of loans, some large and some
small, have been made to the Peking government, and the
South has also, though to a lesser extent, looked to Japan for
material support. This has made possible a continuation of
the division between the two sections for a longer period of
time than would have been possible had the policy of 191 1
been followed. Count Okuma, as early as 1905, said openly
that a strong, united China constituted a menace to Japan,
and, since 19 14 his countrymen seem to have followed him
in that belief, to the extent of aiding both parties to any quar-
rel that arose in China, thus keeping that country in a state
of perpetual turmoil.

From this it does not follow that Japan should bear the
blame for the failure of the Chinese to stabilize conditions in
their country. Her policy, both in loaning money, and in acts
of aggression on China have made it much more difficult for
the Chinese to reconcile their quarrels, but the fundamental
reasons for the failure of the new form of government set up
in 191 2 are to be found in China herself.

With conditions as they exist today where is the ground for
hope in the eventual establishment of a democratic govern-
ment in China? Can the Chinese be expected to work out a
solution of their problems for themselves? How can the other
Powers render the most service in the stabilizing of condi-
tions in China?

Professor W. W. Willoughby, former Legal Adviser to the
President, has suggested a plan for the reconciliation of the
two sections of the country. In brief, it is that the Confer-
ence at Shanghai, representative of both the North and the
South, should be empowered to draw up laws for the election
of a new Parliament. These laws would then have to be ac-
cepted, without alteration, by both the Peking and the Canton

274 Modern Constitutional Development in China

Parliaments. Thus the new ParHament would have an un-
questioned title from both contestants for power. Then the
Canton government should elect Mr. Hsii Shih-chang, who has
already received an election in the North, to the presidency of
the Republic. This would not be asking too much of the
South for he commands the respect of both sections of the
country. If this should not be done, then the new Parliament
could give the necessary validity to his title. If the election of
the new Parliament were under the proper supervision, Chi-
nese if possible, foreign if desired, it should represent the
entire country, uniting in its membership the various factions
that have been at loggerheads for so long.

But that would not entirely meet the needs of the situation.
It would do no more than restore the country to its condition
in 191 2. There would remain the problem of the Tuchunate,
and the problem of financing the new government until it
could meet its own needs. These two problems might be
solved simultaneously. The old Consortium for the purpose
of loaning money to China has been revived at Paris. It pre-
sents a means of utilizing the financial strength of the Powers
for the purpose of setting a united China on her feet financial-
ly, just as the Five Power Group was used in the early days of
the Republic. If a comprehensive loan could be made suffi-
cient to provide for immediate administrative expenses and to
consolidate all of the foreign obligations of the Chinese Re-
public in one international loan the pressing needs of the gov-
ernment would be taken care of, and the danger of financial
control by one Power obviated, without an indiscriminate
pledging of the resources of the country. But in order that
the experience of the past few years should not be duplicated,
any comprehensive loan to China should be made under con-
ditions that would provide for the adequate supervision of the

Modern Cotistitiitional Development in China 275

expenditure of the funds actually turned over to the govern-
ment. A large part of the moneys recently advanced to the
government has been diverted to the personal needs of the
official, either as "squeeze," or as out and out appropriation
of public funds. The latter could be prevented by parliamen-
tary auditing of accounts, but it is not unreasonable to think
that a good deal of "squeeze" might be overlooked and con-
doned by any Chinese supervisory board, while it would not
be under foreign supervision. With such an oversight of the
public expenditure the Powers would be able to deprive the
military chiefs of the subsidies from the Central government
which have enabled them to maintain their forces and thus
their grip on the country, and it would only be a question of
time until they would be entirely eliminated as a factor in
Chinese politics.^

On the surface this would look like a betrayal of China to
the exploitation of Western capital. This would not neces-
sarily follow, however, for it could be only a temporary ex-
pedient at the best, to tide the country over the present emer-
gency. She will have to borrow to finance herself in any case,
and it is obviously much better for her to borrow from a
group of Powers than from any one Power, or from a num-
ber of States acting independently the one of the other. She
will need the money not only for administrative needs but for
industrial development as well, and experience has shown that
only through a supervision of expenditure can there be assur-
ance that money loaned for development projects will not be
diverted to other needs.

^ This would certainly follow if the revenue services of China
were to be put under foreign administration to prevent the main-
taining of these "personal armies" by the collection of the taxes,
thus not only enabling the military men to pay their troops but
depriving the Central Government of large sources of income.

2^6 Modern Constitutional Development in China

In any case the world cannot afford longer to ignore China.
She constitutes a problem today just as she has for the past
twenty years, and a problem that may prove to be the cause
of another world war. The international complications in the
Far East can be adjusted most naturally by an honest attempt
to aid China in the settlement of her internal difficulties, and
this can best be done, from present indications, by some action
similar to that outlined above.

APPENDIX ONE

Nine Year Programme of Constitutional Preparation.^

First Year, 1908-09.

a — Organization of Provincial Assemblies.

b — Issue of Local Administrative regulations.

c — Issue of census regulations.

d' — Issue of regulations for financial reform.

e — Establishment of a Bureau for the reform of the Manchu
system, particularly as regards the treatment of Ban-
nermen, and the fusion of Manchu and Chinese.

f — Preparation of elementary lesson-books for teaching
reading.

g — Preparation of books for general reading.

h — Revision of the Penal code.

i — Drafting of Civil, Commercial and Criminal laws.

Second Year, 1909-10.

a — Inauguration of Provincial Assemblies.

b — Issue of Regulations for the National Assembly.

C' — Elections for same.

d — Organization of Local Administrative Councils.

e — Taking of census of whole Empire.

f — Investigation of Provincial Budgets.

g — Reform of Metropolitan Official system.

h — Drafting of Civil Service Examination regulations, and

of regulations for official salaries,
i — Issue of regulations for Judicial Courts,
j — Organization of Judicial Courts,
k — Drafting of new Criminal Laws.
1 — Organization of Elementary Schools.
ni' — Inauguration of modern constabulary system.

Third Year, 1910-11.

a — Inauguration of the National Assembly.

^ China Year Book (1912), pp. 361-63.

277

278 Appendix' One

b — Local administrative system to be extended to townships.

c — Report by Viceroys and Governors on census in prov-
inces.

d — Consideration of Provincial Budgets.

e — Drafting of local tax regulations.

f — Endeavor to carry out Provincial Budgets.

g — Reorganization of Provincial Official system.

h — Issue of regulations for Civil Service Examinations.

i — Establishment in all Capitals and Treaty Ports of Judi-
cial Courts (Shenpanting).

j' — Issue of new Criminal Laws.

k — Extension of primary education.

1 — Organization of Police in hsiens.

Fourth Year, 1911-12.

a — Organization of system for auditing government ac-
counts.

b — Investigation of the Budget for the Empire.

c — Issue of Government tax regulations.

d — Enforcement of Civil Service and Official Salaries regu-
lations.

e — Establishment of Judicial Courts in Fu's.

f — Organization of elementary Schools in all townships.

g — Organization of Rural Police.

h — Consideration of the revised Commercial, Civil and
Criminal Laws.

i — Extension of Local Government system to townships.

j — Investigation of the census.

Fifth Year. 1912-13.

a — Local Government system to be carried out this year.

b — Issue of new Metropolitan and Provincial Official sys-
tems.

c — Judicial Courts in all cities, towns and townships must
be in working order this year.

d — Extension of elementary education.

e — Extension of Police system.

Appendix One 279

Sixth Year, 191 3-14.

SL — Endeavor to carry out Budget for the whole Empire,
b — Organization of Judicial Courts to deal with political

matters.
c — Complete organization of all judicial Courts in the

provinces,
d — Inauguration of Village Courts,
e — Enforcement of new Criminal Laws,
f — Issue of Civil and Commercial Laws,
g — Police forces shall be established this year in all towns

and villages.

Seventh Year, 191 4- 15.

a — Strict adherence to the Imperial Budget,
b — One per cent of the population should be able to read
and write in this year.

Eighth Year, 1915-16.

a — Budget for Imperial Household.

b' — Abolition of all distinction between Manchu and Chinese.

c — Organization of a Statistical Department.

d — Enforcement of new Civil and Commercial Laws.

e — Organization of Police throughout the Empire to be

completed,
f — Two per cent of the population should be able to read

and write in this period.

Ninth Year, 191 6- 17.

a — Issue of Constitutional Laws.

b — Issue of Imperial House Laws.

c — Issue of Parliamentary Laws.

d — Issue of regulations for the election of an Upper and
Lower House.

e — Elections for the Upper and Lower Houses.

f — Preparation of Budget for the following year for dis-
cussion in Parliament.

g — Organization of a Privy Council and of Advisory Min-
isters.

28o Appendix One

h — Five per cent of the population should be able to read
and write in this period.

As a result of the agitation for an early convocation of the
national Parliament a "Revised Programme of Constitutional
Preparations" was issued, shortening the period of prepara-
tion by three years. The "Revised Programme" can be found
in the China Year Book (1912) p. 376.

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